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
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
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
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A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS VIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR: 1965-1972

## VIET CONG--HORTH VIETHAMESE OPERATIONS

VOLUME 3





Editor: Thomas C. Thayer

#### A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS VIEW OF THE VIETNAM WAR: 1965-1972

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Volume 2 - Forces and Manpower

Volume 3 - Viet Cong--North Vietnamese Operations

Volume 4 - Allied Ground and Naval Operations

Volume 5 - The Air War

Volume 6 - Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)

Volume 7 - Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF)

Volume 8 - Casualties and Losses

Volume 9 - Population Security

Volume 10 - Pacification and Civil Affairs

Volume 11 - Economics: War Costs and Inflation

Volume 12 - Construction and Port Operations in South Vietnam

## A Systems Analysis View of The Vietnam Mar: 1965-1972

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#### INTRODUCTION

This volume, plus the other eleven volumes in the series, contains every article ever printed in the Southeast Asia Analysis Report (a few additional papers not printed in the reject are occasionally included, too.).

Fifty issues of the Southeast Asia Analysis Report were published from January 1967 through January 1972 by the Southeast Asia office under the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis). The Report had two purposes. First, it served as a vahicle to distribute the analyses produced by Systems Analysis on Southeast Asia. It thus provided other agencies an opportunity to tell us if we were wrong and to help prevent research duplications. We solicited and received frequent rebuttals or comments on our analyses which sharpened our studies and stimulated better analysis by other agencies. Second, it was a useful management tool for getting more good work from our staff — they knew they must regularly produce studies which would be read critically throughout the Executive Branch.

The second s

The first page of the Report stated that it "is not an official publication of the Department of Defense, and ices not necessarily reflect the views of the Secretary of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis), or comparable officials." The intent was solely to improve the quality of analysis on Southeast Asia problems — and to stimulate further thought and discussion. The report was successful in doing precisely this.

We distributed about 350 copies of the Report each month to OSD (Office of the Secretary of Defense), the Military Departments, CINCPAC, and Saigon, and to other interested agencies such as the Paris Delegation, AID, State Department, CIA and the White House Staff. Most copies circulated outside OSD were in response to specific requests from the individual person or agency. Our readership included many of the key commanders, staff officers, and analysts in Washington and in the field. Their comments were almost always generous and complimentary, even when they disagreed with our conclusions. Some excerpts appear below:

"I believe the 'SEA Analysis Report' serves a useful purpose, and I would like to see its present distribution continued." (Deputy Secretary of Defense, 31 May 1968)

"We used a highly interesting item in your May Analysis Report as the basis for a note to the Secretary, which I've attached." (State Department, 28 June 1967)

"We were all most impressed with your first monthly Southeast Asia Analysis Report. Not only do we wish to continue to receive it, but we would appreciate it if we could receive 4 (four) copies from now on." (White House, 9 February 1967)

"Arbasasion has ester me to tell you that he has much appreciated and benefited from the studies and analyses of this publication."
(State Department/White House, 24 January 1969)

"Constabilities on your January issue. The 'Situation in South Victor.' article was especially interesting and provoking." (State Department, 24 January 1967)

"I let Ambassmlor take a swing at the paper. He made several comments unled may be of interest to you. Many thanks for putting us back on distribution for your report. Also, despite the return volley, I hope you will continue sending your products." (MACV-CORDS, 17 June 1/08)

"As an avid reader (and user) of the SEA Analysis Report, I see a need for more rounded analyses in the pacification field and fewer simplistic constructs." (MACV-DEPCORDS, 17 April 1968)

"The SEA Programs Division is to be commended for its perceptive analysis of topics that hold the continuing concern of this headquarters... The approach was thoughtfully objective throughout and it was particularly pleasing to note a more incisive recognition of factors that defy quantified expression." (Commander, US Army Vietnam-USARV, 29 November 1967)

"In general, I think it is becoming the best analytical periodical I've seen yet on Vietnam (though there's not much competition)." (MACV-DEPCORDS. 21 April 1967)

"Statistical extrapolations of this type serve an extremely useful purpose in many facets of our daily work." (CIA, 6 February 1967)

"One of the most useful Systems Analysis products we have seen is the monthly Southeast Asia Progress Report... Indeed it strikes many of us as perhaps the most searching and stimulating periodic analysis put out on Vietnam." (President of The Rand Corporation, 22 October 1969)

In November 1968, 55 addressees answered a questionnaire about the Report: 52 said the report was useful, 2 said it was not, and .. said, "The report does not meet an essential need of this headquarters;" nonetheless, it desired "to remain on distribution" for 7 copies. From 48 questionnaires with complete responses, we found that an average 4.8 people read each copy -- a projected readership of 500-950, depending on whether we assumed 1 or 2.4 readers of copies for which no questionnaire was returned.

Readers responding to the questionnaire reported using the Report for the following purposes:

Information Analysis Policy Making Briefings Other 42% 31% 11% 7% 9%

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In addition, readers reported about equal interest in each of the seven subject areas normally covered in the Reject.

VC/LYA	163
Air Operations	20%
RVILLE	17%
Pacification	13%
Friendly Forces	12%
Deployments	12%
Logistics/Construction	87,
	100%

There was some negative reaction to the Report. Concern was expressed about "the distorted impressions" the Report left with the reader and its wide dissemination which "implies its acceptance by the Secretary of Defense, giving the document increased credibility."

Given the way in which the Southeast Asia Analysis Report was used, the important responsibilities of many of its readers, and the controversial aspects of the report, I decided to include in these twelve volumes every article ever published in a Southeast Asia Analysis Report. This will allow the users of these volumes to arrive at their own conclusions.

Thomas C. Thayer February 18, 1975

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#### GO CONG PROVINCE - PACIFICATION AND TO ACTIVITY

A number of logical theses on charges in patterns of VC incidents in an area undergoing pacification could be developed. One might be a sharp increase in actions as the VC reacted to GVN efforts to increase their control. An alternative hypothesis would be that pacification progress leads to an over-all drop in incident rates. Data on Go Cong Province in IV Corps, a province making rapid progress, supports this latter thesis. a

When an area is pacified by the GVN significant changes in incident patterns should occur. The nature of the change probably differs depending on the strength of the VC, the approach taken by the GVN, etc. As a preliminary study of how activity patterns change, Go Cong, a province in northeastern IV Corps, was examined. Go Cong Province was created in January 1964 when it was separated from Dinh Tuong Province. GVN efforts have increased its control in Go Cong from essentially 0% to about 50% and progress is continuing. Therefore, Go Cong appears to be a good test of the changes in VC activity as an area is successfully pacified.

Objects of VC Incidents - Table 1 examines the objective of VC incidents since Go Cong was created in 1964. Total numbers of actions have dropped sharply since Jan 1966, averaging 46 per querter compared to 170 per quarter in 1964 and 132 in 1965. Incidents against military objects decreased until the final quarter of 1966 when a sharp jump occurred; the 1st quarter 1967 level was even higher. The primary cause of this rise was an increase in incidents against aircraft. This may merely reflect a large increase in aircraft sorties in the area or it may be indicative of changes in VC tactics and equipment. In any event aircraft incidents would appear to have little if any impact on the study. If these are excluded, the military incident level would be stable from early 1966 to the present.

Incidents against civilian targets and transportation/communications targets tended to increase in 1964 and early 1965 and declined steadily since. One target that has been struck more frequently is waterborne craft. This may reflect the greater use of waterways since the province began to be secured or it may reflect greater activity by GVN/US forces (such as GAME WARDEN) which draw VC fire. The data are not adequate to provide any insight as to the reasons for this increase.

a/A data file recently automated by the JCS National Military Command Center (NMCC) may provide a new tool to evaluate pacification progress. This file, based on a study of VC incidents by WSEG (Staff Study 122, May 1966), permits detailed examination of VC incident patterns by province using two type of measures: 1) 36 categories of actions (e.g., attack, harrassing fire, sabotage) and 2) 83 categories of the objective of the action (e.g., military unit, outpost, road). The data are very detailed and can be sorted and viewed in innumerable ways. (INCC file VCJSA)

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#### VC EFFCRIS TO DISRUPT PACIFICATION

VC actions against Revolutionary Development workers are up sharply in 1967, and have caused a sharp rise in the desertion rate. However, the number of RD workers killed is running below the 1966 rate.

Prior to 1966 the enemy reaction to US-GVN pacification programs was initial; he apparently did not believe those programs threatened him. In 1966, however, his interest began to grow and a systematic pattern of activities; including attacks, assassinations and kidnapping began to emerge.

Table 1 shows VC indidents against Revolutionary Development (RD) workers and RD worker attrition. It shows that:

- 1. Indidents against RD teams tripled abruptly in March 1967 and have remained at a rate 2.5 times higher than the January-February 1967 level.
- 2. The number of RD workers killed reached its highest level in March and April 1967, but the first half 1967 rate was slightly below the 1966 rate.
- 3. ND worker desertions rose sharply in March 1967 and the subsequent rate is about double the January-February level. Moreover, RD desertions per 1000 personnel have risen to 1.6 times the 1966 rate. About 16% of the RD cadre will desert this year, and average total losses will be about 34% of strength.
- 4. RD worker strength in the field declined from February to April and rose thereafter. The net gain between January and July was 1447 workers (6% over January).

Table 2 shows that RD workers comprise a growing proportion of the total GVT officials and employees who are assassinated, with the sharp rise in assassinations beginning in March 1967. Throughout the past year, RD workers have been abducted at a steady rate of about 5 per month.

#### BOIL IDENTIFIE

TABLE 1

RD CADRE: INCIDENTS AND LOSSES

		•		19	67
	Total 1966	Jan	Feb	Mar	
VC Incidents Against RD Teams	<u>s</u> /	. 44 .	48	126	
RD Worker Attrition		• •		. :	•
MIA b/ Captured b/ Discharged Resigned Described Retired	593 N/A N/A N/A N/A <u>d</u> / N/A	37 9 18 127 51 144	20 , 3 , 44 108 94 227 0	62 19 6 174 151 361	
Total Losses		386	496	773	
RD Worker Field Strength	17998 🗹	23374	22992	55500	2
Monthly Desertion Rate per 1000	8.4 _4/	6.2	9.9	16.3	

Source: CIA for 1967; USMACV/CORDS for 1966.

a/ Not reported. 25 "major attacks" were recorded.

b/ May include some overlap of MIA/Captured.

Average strength during period.

d/ Reports available for Sept-Dec only show 603 desertions. On basis of average 195 this gives average monthly desertions of 8.4 per thousand.

e/ Computed as average monthly desertions per average worker field strength in thous

20

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•		1				
	1967				First Helf	1967
Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	1967	July
48	126	110	83 .	109	520	126
20 3 44 108 94 227 0	62 19 6 174 151 361	60 20 22 65 68 10	36 18 11 252 95 435 2	45 0 25 209 88 388 0	260 69 126 1035 547 1865	35 0 • 40 106 104 311 8
496	773	3-5	849	755	3904	604
2992	22200	2440	22295	23824	22688 3	24821
9.9	16.3	4.5	19.5	16.3	13.7 5	12.5

sis of average 1966 trength of 17998, strength in thousads.

12

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TABLE 2
ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS OF RD WORKERS (Monthly)

				•	
	30 19	<u>66 •</u> /	40 196	<u>6</u>	
Assassinations	Mo.	(\$)	No.	<u>(\$)</u>	Jan Pe
RD Workers Other JVN Officials/Employees Total	7 36 43	(100) (84) (16)	10 39 49	(80) (100)	5 33 3 38 4
Abductions					
ND Workers Other GVN Officials/Employees Total	8 18 26	(31) (69) (100)	2 35 37	(5) (95) (100)	6 27 33 1
Total Assassinations and Abductions	٠.				
ND Workers Other GVN Officials/Employees Total	· 15 54 , 69	(22) (78) (100)	12 74 86	(14) (85) (100)	11 1 60 .4 71 5

Source: CORDS Public Safety Division Monthly Airgram, "WC Assassination and Abduction of GVN personnel an af July 1966 data not available. Aug-Sept data was divided by 2.

<i>"</i>	A THE RESIDENCE AND ADDRESS OF THE PARTY OF	
4q 1966	1q 1967	22 1967
No. (5)  10 (20) 39 (80) 49 (100)	Jan         Feb         Mar         Mc.         (%)         Apr         Ty         Jun           5         14         24         11         (24)         24         16         41           33         36         33         34         (76)         53         50         48           38         40         57         45         (100)         77         -0         89	<u>F3.</u> (2) 27 (25) 44 (62) 71 (100)
2 (5) 35 (95) 37 (100)	$\begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	5 (17) 24 (83) 29 (100)
12 (1 <b>4</b> ) 74 (86) 86 (100)	11 11 27 16 (2 <sup>L</sup> ) 36 16 <sup>L</sup> 3 60 .45 <sup>L</sup> 7 51 (76) 83 56 63 71 56 74 67 (100) 119 72 196	1 <u>co</u> ( <u>1co)</u> 93 (93) 35 (35)

Lon and Abduction of GVE Personnel and Civilians."

June 65

#### ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY AGAINST PF/FF

PF are more vulnerable and more often attacked by VC/NVA forces than are RF. In 1967 the energy initiated 6% more incidents, inflicting 48% more casualties (72% more KIA), on Popular Forces than Regional Forces. The PF were hit nearly one and a half times as often as the RF per 1000 troop strength. The reasons for this include (1) the greater vulnerability of the PF due to their static defensive mission and their distribution in small, scattered and isolated units, and (2) PF firepower inferiority to both the enemy and the RF. The enemy hits RF and PF units most frequently in Quang Nam and Quang Ngai provinces in I CTZ, along LOC's (particularly Highways 1, 22 and 4), the III CTZ area north of Saigon, and the eastern Delta.

#### Enemy Incidents Involving RF/PF

The incident statistics shown in the following tables include all enemy initiated incidents involving RF or PF whether they (1) were the sole target of the enemy action, or (2) were in the company of other allied forces when hit. (For example, many I CTZ incidents involving PF in CAP teams also had US Marines present.) These data do not include encounters with the enemy during friendly operations.

Table 1 shows the incidents since 1965. Harassments compose about 75% of the reported type of incident against RF and PF. The sharp rise in attacks in 1967 is partly due to an increase in mortar attacks reported as attacks (rather than as harassing fire), and partly due to an absolute increase in all types of attacks. Total incidents against RF rose 34% between 1965 and 1967, but total incidents against PF, although up about 10% in 1967 over 1966, did not exceed the 1965 total.

The PF are hit more often than the RF, by 69% in 1967, 89% in 1966 and 232% in 1965. Obviously the gap is falling, reflecting the buildup in RF strength (from 86,760 in mid-1965 to 117,348 at the end of the third quarter 1967) while PF strength dropped during the same period (148,401 in mid-1965 to 139,047 in 1967). It may also reflect increasing enemy emphasis on the RF, and use of the RF in more exposed areas and missions, particularly in conjunction with US and ARVM forces.



TABLE 1

## ENEMY INCIDENTS INVOLVING RF/PF

שמ	1965	1966	1967
Attacks Harassment	159 1076	213 1237	384 1266
Other	209	118	285
Total	1444	1568	1935
PF			
Attacks	362	355	608
Harassment	3984	2362	2258
Other	կկկ	249	409
Total	4790	2966	3275

a/ Source for tables 1, 3, and 4: VC Initiated Incidents Computer File, derived from NMCSSC VNDBA File.

If we believe the incident reports, in 1967 enemy activity accounted for 47% of total PF KIA and 36% of RF KIA. There percentages are probably low because of incomplete reporting. In any case the 1967 percentages were lower for both forces than those for 1966 (57% for PF and 56% for RF), possibly indicating more initiative in 1967 by both forces in seeking out the enemy. (Absolute KIA totals for both forces were up in 1967.)

## TABLE 2 TOTAL RF/PF KIA FROM ALL ACTIVITY

•	1966	1967
KIA From Enemy Initiated Incidents	1275 1008	1810
KIA From Other RF Activity Total	2283 -	. 2832
FF KIA From Enemy Initiated Incidents KIA From Other PF Activity	1919 1442	1757 2017

a/ Source: VC Initiated Incidents File.
b/ OSD(SA) Statistical Tables, 4B.

Totalb/

Focusing on only those casualties reported as resulting from enemy activity (Table 3), both RF and PF casualties (KIA, WIA, and MIA) declined slightly between 1966 and 1967. The high 1965 PF total was due mainly to a large number of MIA during that year. MIA has declined every year for both groups. WIA increased in 1967 over 1966, possibly due to increased enemy mortar fire.

TABLE 3

RF/PF	CASUALTIES	FROM	ENEMY	INCIDENTS

RF	1965	1966	1967
KIA WIA MIA	1107 1697 713	1275 2481 439	1022 2673 224
Total	3517	4195	3919
PF KIA WIA MIA	2264 3308 2557	1919 3138 808	1757 3483 562
Total	8129	5865	5802

Table 4 shows a significant decrease in the number of KIA per incident for RF in 1967, but a fairly steady rate for PF for all three years.

TABLE 4

#### RF/PF KIA FROM ENEMY INCIDENTS

	1965	<u> 1966</u> .	1967
INCIDENTS RF PF Total	11:44	1568	.1935
	4790	2966	3275
	6234	4534	5210
RIA FROM ENEMY INCIDENTS RF PF Total	1107	1275	1022
	2264	1919	1757
	3371	3194	2779
KIA/INCIDENT  RF PF Total	.8	.8	•5
	.5	.6	•5

#### Enemy Incidents Compared With RF/PF Troop Strength

RF/PF combined strength bas risen over the last three years about 9%, while total enemy incidents involving RF and PF declined 16%.

a/ Based on data obtained from the monthly RVN strength report. The strength numbers in Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 do not agree with OSD SEA Statistical Summary numbers because the latter include administrative personnel (particularly RF), and the RVN numbers primarily reflect combat strengths.

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However, RF strength has increased each year and so have incidents against RF; PF strength was lower in 1967 than 1965 although showing some increase over 1966, and the incident pattern for PF shows the same trend. A comparison of incidents per 1000 RF and per 1000 PF (Table 5) indicates that the VC attack, harass and terrorize the PF nearly one and a half times as often as they do the RF.

TABLE 5

RF/PF STRENGTH VS ENEMY INCIDENTS INVOLVING RF/PF

a	1965c/	1966°/	19674
Strength (000) <sup>8</sup> /	86.8 148.4	109.9	117.3
PF Total .	235.2	138.2 248.1	<u>139.0</u> 256.3
Incidents RF	1կկե կ790	1568 2966	1935 3275
Total	6234	4534	5210
Incidents/1000 RF/PF	16.6	14.3 .	16.5
PF	32.3	21.5	23.6
Total	26.5	18.3	20.3

Source: RVN monthly strength report.

c/ End of 2 Qtr.

Total RF and PF killed as a result of enemy activity has declined each year. PF KIA per 1000 PF is 20-45% higher than RF KIA per 1000 RF. (See Table 6)

b/ Source: VC Initiated Incidents File, derived from IMCSSC VMDBA File.

d/ End of 3 ftr. Complete RF/PF strength data by province not available for 2 ftr.

TABLE 6

RF/PF STRENGTH VS RF/PF KIA RESULTING FROM ENEMY INCIDENTS

Strength (000)a/	1965°/	19665/	19679/
RF .	86.8	109.9	117.3
PF	148.4	138.2	139.0
Total KIA From Enemy Incidents	235.2	248.1	256.3
RF	1107	1275	1022
PF	2264	1919	1757
Total KIA/1000 RF/PF	3371	3194	2779
RF	12.8	11.6	8.7
PF	15.3	13.9	12.6
Total	14.3	12.9	10.8

a/ Source: RVN monthly strength report.

b/ Source: VC Initiated Incidents File derived from NMCSSC VNDBA File.

c/ See footnotes "c/" and "d/" in Table 4.

The reasons why PF are more frequently the targets of enemy activity and take more casualties from enemy initiated incidents than do the Regional Forces include the following:

- 1. The Popular Forces primarily defend their own hamlets and villages. Regional Forces mostly are district forces used to react to attacks on critical areas and district and province capitals. (Territorial Forces Evaluation System data in February 1968 showed 64% of PF units assigned to security of hamlets and villages while only 29% of RF units had this mission.) Being more isolated, the PF offer more vulnerable targets for the VC than the RF.
- 2. The usual unit size of a PF unit is a platoon (actually about 20-30 men) led by a sergeant, while the RF normally operate with a company size unit and sometimes a battalion.
- 3. The RF are better equipped. While the PF have only small arms and an occasional grenade launcher, the RF are equipped with mortars and machine guns. (February 1968 TFES data also indicate that 51% of PF are rated inferior or greatly inferior in firepower to VC/NVA units versus 33% of the RF.)

#### Where Incidents Against RF/PF Occur

As the accompanying plot shows, the hardest hit areas for both RF and PF forces are the following:

1. Coastal I CTZ - 29% of the enemy incidents against RF and PF and 28% of RF/PF casualties occured in I CTZ in 1967.

- a. Quang Nam Province In terms of total incidents and casualties for both RF and PF this is the worst province in SVN for these local forces. Quang Nam had 588 (11%) incidents (253 against PF and 335 against RF) in 1967. Casualties totaled 889 (397 PF and 492 RF), 9% of the country total. The incident activity was concentrated most heavily near Hoi An and southward along Highway 1 across the border into Quang Tin as far as Tam Ky.
- b. Quang Ngai Province This was the second hardest hit of the SVN provinces (414 incidents and 687 casualties). While in Quang Nam the RF suffered more incidents and casualties than the PF, in Quang Ngai the PF took the brunt of the activity. The 1967 incident pattern formed a rough square in the mid-coastal area of the province with Quang Ngai city at the top, and a tail of incidents follows Highway 1 southward from the lower right corner of the square.
- 2. The tri-border area of northern Gia Dinh, southern Binh Doung and northwestern Bien Hoa.
- 3. Highway 1 f.om Saigon through Hau Nghia to the Tay Ninh border (where it becomes Highway 22) to Tay Ninh city.
  - 4. Highway 4 particularly in Long An and Dinh Tuong provinces.
- 5. The three neighboring delta provinces of Kien Hoa, Vinh Binh and Vinh Long. Nearly half of IV CTZ RF/PF incidents and casualties (and about 16% of all SVN incidents and casualties) occurred in this area in 1967.

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A review of PF strength, enemy incidents involving PF and PF KIA resulting from enemy incidents by province (Table 7) shows that:

- 1. In IV CTZ incidents and losses matched PF strength (42% PF strength, 1/3% incidents and 41% KIA of the SVN totals respectively).
- 2. In I CTZ, 16% of SVN's PF had 27% of the incidents and 27% of the KIA.

Table 8 shows data on RF strength, enemy incidents and RF KIA from enemy incidents and indicates the following:

- 1. Although I CTZ had only 14% of total RF strength in 1967, 34% of the incidents involving RF in the country occurred there and 40% of the resulting KIA. Quang Nam and Quang Ngai provinces had 24% of all RF incidents. One-third of all RF KIA resulting from enemy incidents occurred in three I CTZ provinces -- Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai.
- 2. In terms of the number of incidents per RF Quang Nam was hardest hit with 9 incidents/per 100 RF strength, followed by Hau Eghia (5), Binh Duong (4), Thua Thien, Quang Agai, Bien Hoa, and Long An (3 each).

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TABLE -

## COMPARISON OF PF STRENGTH, ENERY INCIDENTS INVOLVING PF AND PF KIA RESULTING FROM INCIDENTS IN 1967

	PF®/	Inci- dentsb	KIAD/	Inc/per PF	100	<u> </u>	Inci- dentsb	KIAD/	Inc/per	100
T CTZ  Chuang Tri Chua Thien Quang Nam Quang Tin Quang Mgai Total	3483 4217 4662 4126 612 22609	80 165 251 89 204 881	56 68 128 128 128 128 128	24 5/2 5/4	EI CTZ  Kentum  Einh Dinh  Pleiku  Fau Bon  Fau Yen  Khauh Hoa  Kinh Thuan  Darlac  Quang Duc  Tuyen Duc  Lam Dong  Einh Thuan  Total	3191 8305 1516 866 3561 3221 2683 3497 926 2113 936 3538 34553	17 75 13 6 54 23 28 8 19 13 36	16 69 40 31 17 27 20 8 20 263	1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	
Birh Tuy Phuce Long Birh Long Long Khanh Phuce Tuy Bien Hoa Tay Kinh Birh Duong Hau Mghia Long An Gia Dirh Total	1217 1830 472 1744 1762 2826 3343 2031 1505 2366 4853 23949	19 32 16 23 15 82 60 101 123 108 80	7 25 13 18 7 53 31 29 33 70 21	2 2 3 1 1 3 2 5 5 5 15 1 2 3	IV CTZ  Sa Dec  Kien Tuong Dinh Tuong Go Cong Kien Hoa Kien Phong Chau Doc An Giang Kien Giang Vinh Long Vinh Binh Fhong Dinh Chuong Thies Ba Xuyen Bac Lieu An Xuyen Total	2923 937 5483 2507 5692 3572 3955 4369 2472 5613 3415 248 1377 1363 57936	107 16 138 15 293 39 28 7 60 27 17 18 125 1420	8586855238 <u>19</u> 888938	+23151102.4342152	•

End of 3Q 1967. Source: RVW monthly strength report.

Source: VCIIA Computer File

MOTE: Underlined numbers indicate the 5 provinces with the largest numbers of PF incidents, KIA, and incidents/FF.

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TABLE 8

## COMPARISON OF RF STRENGTH, ENERY INCIDENTS INVOLVING RF AND RF KIA RESULTING FROM INCIDENTS IN 1967

	RFª/	Incib/	KIA b/	Inc/per PF	100	<u>rf</u> ª/	Inci-b	KIA b/	Inc/per 100 PF	
Quang Tri Thua Thien Quang Ham Quang Tin Quang Mgai Total	2315 3105 3746 3010 1416 16592	47 82 335 71 120 655	40 38 134 107 94 413	જ જોઇલ જો	Kontun Binh Dinh Pleiku Phu Bon Fnu Yen Khanh Hoa Finh Thuan Darlac Tuyen Duc Quang Duc Lam Dong Binh Thuan Total	2138 5752 2294 1526 3443 2053 1758 2437 2311 1412 1938 366 30722	18 60 10 11 37 6 12 12 7 20 39	11 26 4 9 26 4 4 6 2 3 33	1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1	
Binh Tuy Phace Long Binh Long Long Khanh Phace Tuy Bien Hoa Tay Binh Binh Duong Hau Eghia Long An Gia Dinh Total	1253 1332 1359 2018 2789 3115 3712 1857 1613 3014 3518	131 23 33 33 75 76 83 75 76 75 76	3 5 9 17 14 29 46 19 38 51 12 252	T N N N I MALENTAN N	IT CTZ Sa Dec Kien Tuong Dinh Tuong Go Cong Kien Hoa Zien Phong Chau Doc An Giang Kien Giang Vinh I nh Vinh Long Phong Dinh Chuong Thien Ea Kuyen Bac Lieu An Kuyen Total	1305 1687 3240 2071 4006 3235 2862 3868 2751 3436 2137 2543 19536 44454	13 11 37 15 50 17 22 8 26 50 77 29 8 14 31 32 467	2 2 10 5 26 4 23 1 5 14 43 15 8 29 9 22 5 22 5	1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1	

All SVM 1935 1022

a/ End of 3Q 1967. Source: RVS monthly strength report.
b/ Source: VCIIA Computer File.

BOTE: Underlined numbers indicate the 5 provinces with the largest numbers of RF incidents, KIA and insidents/RF.

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#### ENEMY INITIATED ACTIVITY AGAINST VIETNAMESE ARMED FORCES

Summary. VC/NVA forces target GVN Popular Forces more than any other Vietnamese force, but the Regular Forces are gaining fast (particularly in III CTI). Regular Forces have more KIA per enemy initiated incident and, in 1967 for the first time, they suffered the most combat deaths and even the most combat deaths per 1000 combat troops. Until Tet the enemy killed more friendly troops than he lost in the incidents he initiated, but U. S. and Vietnamese forces more than held their own when working together. Finally, when the enemy can initiate the action at a time and place of his choosing, he loses only 3-5% of his total combat deaths while inflicting 21-28% of total friendly KIA.

Our June report\* noted that in 1967 the VC/NVA initiated 69% more incidents and killed 72% more GVN Popular Forces (PF) than Regional Forces (RF), probably because of the inferior fire power and vulnerability of the scattered PF. Enemy incidents against the Vietnamese army and other Regular Forces were not considered. This month's analysis examines enemy incidents involving the Regular Forces and compares the findings with last month's RF/PF findings.

#### Enemy Incidents Against RVNAF Forces

The statistics shown in the following tables include all enemy initiated incidents involving RF, PF or Regular Forces whether they (1) were the sole target of the enemy action, or (2) were in the company of other allied forces when hit. (For example, many I CTZ PF incidents involved CAP teams which also include US Marines) These data do not include encounters with the enemy during friendly initiated operations.

Table 1 shows that PF forces consistently suffer the most enemy incidents, but their proportion of the total actions is decreasing as incidents against the RF and Regular Forces increase. The PF were the target of 60% of the enemy incidents against RVNAF forces in 1965, 46% in 1966 and 43% in 1967. In 1967 they were subjected to 69% more enemy actions than the RF and 40% more than the Regular Forces.

The table shows that the most incidents against Vietnamese forces occurred in 1965, followed by a significant decline in 1966, followed by a 1967 rise. This pattern may reflect the intensive enemy campaign in 1965 to destroy the RVNAF forces, which was disrupted in 1966 by the large US forces which had entered combat by that time. The increased campaign against RVNAF in 1967, with more emphasis on Regular and RF forces may indicate (1) a VC/NVA strategy once more directed heavily at RVNAF forces, (2) an increased VC/NVA capability

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\* SEA Analysis Report, June 1968, p. 1.

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to attack or harass the better equipped FF and Regular Forces successfully, (3) increasing unwillingness to attack US/FW forces, (4) a mix of these factors. The answer will not be clear until we have analyzed the VC/NVA patterns of action against US/FW forces and reviewed in detail the appropriate intelligence regarding the enemy's 1967 strategy.

TABLE 1
ENEMY INCIDENTS INVOLVING RVNAF FORCES a/

	1965	1966	1967	Total
Regular Forces Attacks b/ Harassment Other	124 1044 561	158 1225 523	330 1332 674	3601 1758
Total	1729	1906	2336	5971
Attacks b/ Harassment Other Total	159 1079 209 1447	213 1237 118 1568	384 1265 285 1935	756 3582 612 4950
Attacks b/ Harassment Other Total	<b>36</b> 2 3984 444 4790	355 2352 249	608 2258 469 3275	1325 8604 1102 11031
TOTAL INCIDENTS	7966	6hi-0	7546	21952

a/ Source: VC Initiated Incidents Computer File derived from CINCPAC VNDBA File.

Table 2 indicates that Regular Forces bore an increasing brunt of the VC/NVA offensive actions in 1967 in terms of combat deaths. In 1966, the Regular Forces accounted for 34% of the RVNAF combat deaths from enemy offensive actions; in 1967 they lost 12% of the total, while similar RF and FF

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b/ The sharp rise in 1967 attacks is partly due to an increase in mortar attacks reported as attacks (rather than as harassing fire) and partly due to an absolute increase in all types of attacks.

combat deaths actually declined absolutely and in proportion to the total. Moreover, Regular Force combat deaths from all causes increased 30% in 1967 over 1966 compared to a 14% decrease for the RF and 11% for the PF.

## TABLE 2

#### RVNAF COMBAT DEATHS

	1966	1967	Total
Regular Forces Combat Deaths From Enemy Incidents a/ From Other Regular Forces Activity b/ Total c/	1681	1974	3655
	2737	4136	6873
	4418	6110	10528
From Enemy Incidents a/ From Other RF Activity b/ Total c/	1275	1022	2297
	2037	1810	3847
	3312	2832	6144
From Enemy Incidents a/ From Other PF Activity b/ Total c/	1919	1757	3676
	2304	2017	4321
	4223	3774	7997
Total Combat Deaths  From Enemy Incidents  From Other Activity  Total	4875	1,753	9628
	7078	7963	15041
	11953	12716	24669

s/ Source: VC Initiated Incidents Computer File derived from CINCPAC VMDBA

Table 3 indicates that enemy actions against Regular Forces are more intense (in terms of KIA per incident) than those against the RF or PF. It also shows that the rates of intensity against the Regular and Popular Forces have been fairly constant since 1965. Conversely, the intensity of incidents against the RF declined sharply in 1967, perhaps to allow for the increased actions against the Regular Forces in 1967.

b/ Residual from subtracting combat deaths in W incident file (footnote s/)

from deaths reported in OFREP 5 (footnote c/).
c/ OASD(SA) Statistical Table, 4B, and OSD(C) Statistical Summary, Table 50.

TABLE 3

#### RVNAP KIA PER ETEMY INCIDENT a/

	1965	1966	1967
REGULAR REF	1729	1906	2336
	1447	1568	1935
	4790	2966	3275
	7966	6440	7546
RIA FROM ENEMY INCIDENTS REGULAR RF PF	1564	1681	1974
	1107	1275	1022
	2264	1919	1757
	4935	4875	4753
KIA/INCIDENT Regular RF PF	•9 •8 •5	8 .6	.8 .5 .5

s/ Source: VCIIA file.

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#### Enemy Incidents Compared With RVMAF Troop Strength \*

A comparison of incidents per 1000 ccmbat strength (Table 4) indicates that the VC attack, harass and terrorize the PF nearly 1.5 times as often as they do either the RF or Regular Forces. The number of incidents per 1000 troops rose in 1967 for all forces with incidents per 1000 ARVM showing the greatest increase.

The incident file records all incidents against all Regular Forces as a group (ARVM, VMM, VMAF, VMMC) while strength numbers by province are available only for ARVM. However, since very few incidents occur or are reported against the RVM Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps, we believe comparison of the two sets of numbers is valid for analysis purposes.

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. TABLE 4
ENEMY INCIDENTS PER RVNAF STRENGTH

<i>;</i>	1965	1966	1967
Combat Strength (000)			
ARVEA	121.1	149.1	141.2
RF b	86.8 148.4	109.9 138.2	117.3 139.0
PF 5/			137.0
Total	356.3	397.2	397.5
Incidents c/			
ARVN	. 1729	1906	2336
RF	1447	1568	1935
PF	4790	2966	3275
· Total	7966	6440	7546
Incidents/1000 RVNAF			
ARVN	14.3	12.8	16.5
RF	16.7	14.3	16.5
Po .	32.3	21.5	23.6
Total	22.4	; 16.2	19.0

a/ Source: DIA Fact Book; combat strength as of July for each year.
b/ Source: RVN monthly strength report. These strength numbers do not agree with OSD SEA Statia\_ical Summary numbers because the latter include administrative personnel (particularly RF), and the RVN numbers primarily reflect combat strengths. 1965 and 1966 strength numbers are end of 2nd quarter; 1967 numbers are end of 3rd quarter.
c/ Source: WCIIA file.

The total RVMAF combat deaths per 1000 forces from enemy incidents have remained about the same since 1964, declining slightly. However, the rate for regular forces has increased to 14 per 1000, while the RF and PF rates per 1000 declined significantly and steadily. Prior to 1967, the PF suffered the highest rate.

TABLE 5

RVNAF COMBAT DEATHS FROM VC INCIDENTS PER 1000 STRENGTH a/

KIA/1000 RF/PF/ARVN	•	1965	1966	1967
Regular	•	12.9	11.3	14.0
· RP		12.8	11.6	8.7
PF Total	•	15.3 13.9	13.9 12.3	12.6 12.0
a/ Derived from Tables 2 and 4.	•			•

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#### Where Incidents Occur Against Regular Forces

The map plot/and Table 6 show that 1967 VC/NVA incidents against the Regular Forces were heavily concentrated around Saigon; 35% of such incidents in 1967 occurred in the five provinces surrounding Saigon. On the other hand, IV CTZ had the most incidents against the FF and I CTZ the most against RF during 196%. The reasons for the different patterns are not clear, but probably can be explained by further analysis of VC/NVA strategy and capabilities in each CTZ and the numbers and effectiveness of RVMAN forces present in each. For example, IV CTZ has the most FF of any CTZ, and the relatively weak VC forces there probably prefer to fight the FF rather than the tougher RF and Regular Forces. In III CTZ the enemy objective is Saigon which is defended by the Regular Forces, making them the most popular enemy target among RVNAF forces there. The last transfer of US family with CTZ, clear forces there. The last transfer of US family and The WISA C Enemy/Friendly Kill Ratios Resulting From Enemy Initiated Incidents

Up to this point we have compared types of South Vietnamese forces with each other. Table 7 compares kill ratios obtained in enemy incidents against (1) one or more Vietnamese forces, (2) Vietnamese plus US forces, and (3) US forces alone. Until the Tet offensive in first quarter 1968, the best kill ratio for friendly forces was obtained when Vietnamese and US forces were combined. The enemy suffered most when he initiated activity in III CTZ against combined US and Vietnamese forces (about five enemy KTA to one friendly). In addition, until the Tet offensive US forces alone did not fare much better than Vietnamese forces alone. The data also indicate how such advantage the enemy gains when he can initiate actions at a time and place of his choosing; only 3-5% of his total KTA resulted from such activity in 1967-68 versus 21-28% of total friendly KTA.

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TABLE 6

# COMPARISON OF ARVA STREWETH, EMEMY INCIDENTS INVOLVING REGULAR FORCES & FEGULAR-MIA FESULTING FROM INCIDENTS IN 1987

	ARVN	Inci- dentsb	<u>kta</u> b	Inc/Pir 100 ARVI		ARVNª/	Inci- dentsb	KIAD	Inc/Per 100 ARVN
Quang Tri Thua Thien Quang Nam Quang Tin Quang Ngai Total	5216 6892 5671 4719 7534 30032	114 95 136 93 124 562	101 141 99 83 114 538	2 2 2 2	Kontum Binh Dinh Pleiku Phu Bon Phu Yen Khanh Hoa Hinh Thuan Darlac Quang Duc Tuyen Duc Lem Dong Binh Thuan Total	1600 9416 2152 500 1451 770 5128 575 1630 1200 23422	29 211 24 5 54 5 12 15 13 2 24 37	28 130 10 2 20 5 35 0 6 35 30 304	2 31 14 2 0 2 1 3 2
Binh Tuy Phuoc Long Binh Long Long Khanh Phuoc Tuy Bien Hoa Tay Hinh Binh Duong Hau Nghia Dong An Gia Dinh Total	1300 1064 1693 8744 675 3680 10323 7306 5033 10303	19 54 28 50 35 89 13 179 248 191 100	26 82 53 57 33 61 13 77 131 209 23 765	15/215/2 23/4172	IV CTZ Sa D:c Kien Tuong Dinh Tuong Go Cong Kien Hoa Kien Phong Chau Doc An Giang Kien Giang Vinia Binh Vinh Long Phong Dinh Chuong Thien Ba Xuyen B c Lieu An Xuyen Total	850 550 8746 550 2866 1350 1152 1815 5644 1901 2436 1362 4855 2526 36603	12 9 82 1 57 7 0 11 42 26 14 15 17 29 8	0 356 14 79 40 17 0 35 58 6 27 9 5 12 6	1 2 1 0 2 - 1 0 - 2 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1

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a/ As of July 1967, source: DIA Fact Book.
b/ Source: VCIIA Computer File.

NOTE: Underlined provinces indicate those with highest number in each category,

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TABLE 7

RATIOS RESULTING FROM ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS 8/

		1966 (	YR) Ratio	_	1967 (	YR) Ratio	_1	968 (1	Q) Ratio
	En	Fr	En/Fr	En	<u>Fr</u>	En/Fr	En	Fr	En/Fr
I CTZ VN US & VN US Total	1029 45 89 1163	1267 89 75 1431	.8 .5 1.2	945 322 138 1405	1304 263 283 1850	.7 1.2 .5	184 22 533 739	216 45 178 439	.9 .5 3.0
VN US & VN US Total	491 0 41 532	73 <sup>4</sup> 7 '61 802	·7 0 -7 ·7	371 0 13 384	794 17 55 866	.5 0 .2	625 52 133 810	338 26 37 401	1.8 2.0 3.6 2.0
III CTZ VN US & VN US Total	456 250 322 1028	1494 51 373 1918	•3 4.9 •9	948 467 506 1921	1387 94 544 2025	.7 ,5.0 9	132 50 107 289	449 10 144 603	.3 5.0 <u>.7</u>
IV CTZ VN US & VN US Total	385 23 1 409	1763 27 40 1830	.0	615 19 18 652	1375 28 61 1464	.4	436 197 40 673	607 81 37 725	.7 2.4 1.1
VN VN US & VN US COTAL	2361 318 453 3132	5258 174 549 5981	1.8 .8 .8	2879 808 675 4362	4860 402 943 6205	.6 2.0 <u>.7</u>	1377 321 813 2511	1610 162 396 2168	2.0 2.1 1.2

Source: VCIIA File.

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### ENEMY OFFENSIVE ACTIONS AGAINST ALLIED FORCES

For a 31% increase in his monthly rate of incidents against allied forces, the enemy was able to kill 67% more friendly troops per month in the first half of 1968 than in 1967, but it cost him 180% more LIA. The incident data also show that the enemy has hit the toughest allied forces more frequently in 1968; incidents against US, Pree World, and Regular Forces increased more in 1968 (up 36%) than incidents against the Regional Forces and Popular Forces (up 21%). The total pattern confirms other evidence that the VC/NVA fought harder than ever before during the first half of 1968, at a much higher cost.

Although enemy losses from his offensive actions almost tripled in 1968, the kill ratio and combat death data still indicate that the enemy fares much better in actions he starts than in ones we start; only 8-9% of his total KIA resulted from such activity in 1967-68 versus 27-29% of total allied KIA.

In previous reports we have analyzed enemy actions against Vietnamese Regular, Regional and Popular Forces. We now complete the study by looking at enemy activity involving US and Free World Forces and comparing the findings with the previous analyses.

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Table 1 shows that since 1965 US forces have consistently been subjected to more enemy offensive actions than all RVNAF forces put together.

Of the Vietnamese forces, the FF consistently suffer the most enemy incidents, but their proportion of the total actions is decreasing as incidents against the RF and Regular Forces increase. The FF were the target of 60% of the enemy incidents against RVNAF forces in 1965, 46% in 1966,

SEA Analysis Report, June 1968, p. 1 and July 1968, p.3.

The statistics shown in the following tables include all enemy initiated incidents involving allied forces whether they were (1) the sole target of the enemy action, or (2) in the company of other allied forces when hit. (For example, many I CTZ FF incidents involved CAP teams which also include US Marines.) These data do not include encounters with the enemy during friendly initiated operations.

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TABLE 1

ENEMY INCIDENTS INVOLVING FRIENDLY FORCES a/

•	1965'	1966	1967	First Half 1968	Total
US Forces					
Attacks b/	46	73	426	830	1375
Harassment	1828	8251	5482	2745	18306
Other	300 2174	1961	2343	1705	6309
Total	2174	10285	8251	5280	25990
FW Forces					
Attacks b/	2	6	15	71,74	67
Harassment	59	203	276	343	881
Other	10	41	81	97	229
Total	71	250	. 372	484	1177
	•				
RVN Forces	_				
Regular:	124	158	330	կկկ	1056
Attacks b/ Harrassment	1044	1225	1332	925	4526
Other		523	674	298	2056
Total	<u>561</u> 1729	1906	2336	1667	7638
	-,1-3				100.
RF:					
Attacks b/	159	213	384	321	1077
Harassment	1079 -	1237	1266	839	4421
Other	209	118	285	115	727
Total	1447	1568	1935	1275	6225
Ħ:		•			·
Attacks b/	362	355	608	417	1742
Herassment	3984 '	2362	2258	1338	9942
Other	ithit	249	409	114	1516
rotal	4790	. 2966	3275	1869	12900
Total RYMAF c/		•			
Attacks b	645	726	1322	1182	3875
Harassment	6107	726 4824	4856	3102	18889
Other	1214	890	1368	527	3999
Total	7966	6440	7546	4811	26763
	, ,		•	1	, ,

a/ Source: VCIIA File.

c/ Totals reflect double counting because more than one force frequently is involved in a single incident.

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The sharp rise in 1967 attacks is partly due to an increase in mortar attacks reported as attacks (rather than as harassing fire) and partly due to an absolute increase in all types of attacks.

43% in 1967 and 39% during the first half 1968. In the first half of 1968, they were subjected to 47% more energy actions than the RF (as compared to 69% in 1967) and 12% (40% in 1967) more than the Regular Forces.

Table 1 also shows that the rate of enemy incidents against Vietnamese forces in the first half of 1968 was the highest ever. The previous high was in 1965 followed by a 1966 decline and then a 1967 rise. This pattern may reflect the intensive enemy campaign in 1965 to destroy the RVMAF forces, which was disrupted in 1966 by the large US forces which had entered combat by that time. Actions against US forces in 1966 were the highest of the 1965-1967 period, but actions against RVMAF were lowest that year. Thereafter, the number of actions against US and RVMAF forces are much closer together, indicating the enemy may have adjusted his activity to fit the new situation by 1967.

A good indicator of VC/NVA ability to undertake offensive actions against allied forces is the attack rate.\* Table 1 indicates an increasing enemy willingness to attack tougher targets (although often by indirect rocket or mostar fire): 1968 attacks against US forces are about 4 times the 1967 rate. Attacks against 3rd nation forces have increased six fold and attacks against RVMAF regular forces are up significantly.

#### Allied Combat Deaths From Enemy Actions

Tables 2 and 3 indicate that: (1) US forces have suffered only 11-26% of the total allied combat deaths from enemy offensive activity, despite being the targets of 50-61% of the incidents, but that (2) each year US combat deaths per VC actions have increased. The data indicate that when US forces are attacked, harassed, etc., they do not suffer as many combat deaths as Vietnamese forces. Table 3 bears this out by showing a range of .1 to .3 KIA per incident for US forces versus a range of .6-.9 KIA per incident for Vietnamese forces over the 1965-68 period.

Table 2 shows that enemy offensive actions have accounted for 14% of all US combat deaths since 1965; the figure for RVNAF is 44%. Moreover, the weaker the RVNAF force, the higher the proportion of combat deaths from enemy offensive actions: PF-59%, RF-47%, Regular Forces-35%. The explanation for the differences probably lies in the firepower, training, location and missions performed by each force. The PF are poorly armed and trained, rarely reinforced, and scattered about the country in static defense positions, all of which makes them easy prey for the enemy. The Regional and Regular forces are correspondingly better off, spend more time on mobile offensive operations and fare better, but not nearly as well as the US forces



For full description and pitfalls of attack data see, "VC Attack Patterns 1965-1967," SEA Analysis Report, May 1968, p. 10. For data on attacks as an indicator of initiative see, "Military Initiative In South Vietnam" on page 6 of the September 1968 issue.

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TABLE 2
FRIENDLY FORCES COMBAT DEATHS

•	1966	1967	1H 1968	<u>Total</u>
US Forces Combat Deaths				
From Enemy Incidents a/	678	1230	1529	3437
From Other Activity 5/	4311	8128	8042	20481
. Total c/	4989	9358	9571	23918
me manage manage makka				ĺ
FW Forces Combat Deaths	42	67	88	197
From Cher Activity 5/	524	1038	520	2082
From Other Activity 5/ Total <u>c</u> /	566	1105	608	2279
20002 27	500		444	1
RVN Forces Combat Deaths				ł
Regular Forces:				
From Enemy Incidents a/	1946	2240	1931	6117
From Other Reg Force				
Activity by	2472	3870	5117	11459
· Total 5	4418	6110	7048	17576
RP:				[
From Enemy Incidents 2/	1383	1226	968	3577
From Other RF Activity b	1929	1606	551	4086
Total C/	3312	2832	1519	7663
PF:				
From Enemy Incidents 2/	2141	2200	1287	5628
Prom Other PP Activity 2/	2082	1574	230	3886
Total C/	4223	3774	1517	9514
makal matan.		•		İ
Total RVNAF: From Enemy Incidents	5470	5666	4186	15322
From Other RVN Forces	3770	2000	4700	13322
Activity b/	6493	7050	, 5898	19431
Total C/	11953	12716	10084	34753
<del></del>	<del>-</del>		<del>-</del>	•

a/ Source: VCIIA File.
b/ Residual from subtracting combat deaths in VC incident file(footnote a/) from deaths in OPREP 5 (footnote c/).
c/ OASD(SA) Statistical Table 4B and OSD(C) Statistical Summary, Table 50.

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who are the strongest of all. On the other hand, the US combat deaths may be understated because any enemy initiated activities occurring in an area where a large US operation is underway are considered a reaction to the operation and are not reported as enemy initiated actions.

Table 3, in addition to showing an increasing US KTA per enemy incident, indicates that enemy actions against Regular Vietnamese Forces have a higher friendly KTA per incident then those against the RF or PF. Finally, the KTA per incident is higher in 1968 than 1967 for all but PF and is at a new high for US and Regular forces.

TABLE 3
FRIENDLY KIA FER ENEMY INCIDENTS

•	1965	1966	1967	First Half 1968
KIA/Incident	_	_	_	•
US .	.1	.1	.2	•3
fw	.1 .	.2	.2	.2
RVN:				
Regular	•9	1.0	1.0	1.2
· RF	.8	•9	<b>.</b> 6	.8
PF	_•5	.7	.7	.7
Total	.6	.8	.8	.9
Total ,	•5	.4	.4	•5

a/ Derived from Tables 1 and 2.

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### Enemy Incidents Per Allied Troop Strength

Table 4 shows the monthly average number of enemy offensive actions per 1000 allied troop strength. The main point to emerge is the steady we of about 1 incident per 1000 RVNAF forces per month throughout the per d.

Table 5 shows that the allied KIA per 1000 allied strength from enemy actions increased 11% for US forces but only 22% for RVNAF forces in 1968. It also indicates that, per man, enemy incidents hit the FF harder than any other allied force, and that Vietnamese forces are hit about twice as hard as US forces.

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TABLE 4

## ENEMY INCIDENTS VERSUS ALLIED TROOF STRENGTH (Monthly Average)

•	2nd Half 1965	<u> 1966</u>	1967	1st Half 1968
Strength (000) a/ US FW RVN:	136.9	281.2	448.1	517.4
	12.6	35.2	55.8	61.2
ARVN	257.9	278.9		374.5
RF	104.9	141.7		168.6
PF	138.5	140.2		. 155.9
Total .  Total .  Incidents/1000 Allied Strength b	501.3	560.8	576.7	699.0
	650.8	877.2	1080.6	1277.6
US FW - RVN:	2.5	3.0	1.5	1.7
	.9	.6	.6	1.3
Reguler	.4	.6	.7	.7
RF	1.1	.9	1.1	1.3
FF	2.3	1.8	1.9	2.0
Total RVN Total	1.0	1.0	1.1	1.4

Source: OSD(C) Statistical Summary, Table 2 and SEA Statistical Tables, 4A.

#### TABLE 5

## ALLIED COMBAT DEATHS FROM VC/NVA INCIDENTS Per 1000 Strength a/

Allied KIA/1000 Allied Strength	1966	1967	19684
US	2.4	2.7	5.9
FW	. 1.2	1.2	2.9
RVM:	7.0	7.8	10.3
RF	9.8	8.5	11.5
PP	15.3	15.3	16.5
Total	9.8	9.8	12.0
Total	7.1	6.4	9.1

a/ Derived from Tables 2 and 4. b/ Estimate derived by doubling Jan-June 68 data.

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b/ Monthly average.

#### Where Incidents Occur Against Allied Forces

'The map plot and Table 6 show that 1967 VC/NVA incidents involving US forces were heavily concentrated in coastal I CTZ and in the Saigon area. I CTZ had 61% of the incidents and the five provinces surrounding Saigon had 22%. Thus, ten provinces accounted for 83% of all enemy incidents involving US forces in 1967. Quang Nam alone accounted for 40% of the total. Incidents involving Virtnamese Regular Forces occurred in the same area but with a higher proportion of the action (35%) in the areas around Saigon. The PF suffered most in IV CTZ and the PF in I CTZ.

The reasons for the different patterns are not clear, but probably can be explained by further analysis of VC/NVA strategy and capabilities in each CTZ and the numbers and effectiveness of the allied forces present in each. For example, IV CTZ has the most PF of any CTZ, and the relatively weak VC forces there probably prefer to fight the PF rather than the tougher RF and Regular Forces. In III CTZ the enemy objective is Saigon which is defended by a heavy concentration of Vietnamese Regular Forces, making them a popular target there. The high concentration of US and NVA regular forces in I CTZ, plus the US Marines' emphasis on small unit actions may help account for the high concentration of incidents against US forces in I CTZ.

#### Kill Ratios

Because of a computer error, our Table 7 in the July SEA Analysis Report article, "Enemy Initiated Incidents Against Vietnamese Armed Forces," is wrong. We have reprinted the table this month and changed our conclusions accordingly. The table compares kill ratios obtained in enemy incidents against (1) one or more Vietnamese forces, (2) Vietnamese plus US forces, (3) US forces alone, and (4) FW forces alone. It shows:

- 1. Before 1968 the best kill ratio was not achieved when Vietnamese and US forces were combined, but by US forces when alone. In 1968, however, the kill ratio for combined US-VM forces was highest.
- 2. Kill ratios on enemy initiated incidents for all allied forces except FW have improved consistently since 1965.

The corrected data still indicate how much advantage the enemy gains when he can initiate actions at a time and place of his choosing; only 8-9% of his total KIA resulted from such activity in 1967-68 versus 27-29% of total friendly KIA.



. ENEMY INCIDENTS INVOLVING U.S. FORCES

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TABLE 7

RATIOS RESULTING FROM ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS a/

•	1966 (YR)	1967		1968 (1H	
	- · · ·	tio	Ratio		Ratio
	En Fr En	/Fr En	Fr En/Pr	En Fr	En/Fr
I CTZ					
VN	1279 1158 1	.1 1321 1	308 1.0	1013 510	2.0
PW'		.0 312	24 13.0	69 31	2.2
US .		.4 1100	277 4.0	1290 440	2.9
US & VN	51 128		188 .9	267 163	1.6
Total				2639 1144	2.3
II CTZ	•	``	i		
VN	608 645			1487 757	2.0
TW		.4 3	9.3.	3 16	.2
US		3 88	73 1.2	447 224	2.0
US & VN		.1 75		1026 237	4.3
Total	1104 793	.4 641	966 .7	2963 1234	2.4
TTT 000					
III CTZ	can 1 = 1 c		, i	<b>540</b> 1000	_
) VN	623 1516	.4 803 1		740 1089	.7
'FW US	5 : 7	.7 7	22 .3	118 33	3.6
				1844 477	3.9
US & VN Total	279 77 3 1418 1995	$\frac{3.6}{.7}$ $\frac{786}{2942}$	264 3.0 _	467 119 3169 1718	3.9
TOCAL	1419 1993	.1 2342 2	201 1.3	3169 1718	1.8
IV CTZ					
VN	603 1805	.3 909 1	573 .6	1020 1178	.9
PW	0 0	0 0	0 0	0 0	.9
US	9 38	.2 66	62 1.1	222 111	2.0
US & VN	î 31	0 24	37 .6	467 166	2.8
Total	613 1874		672 .6	1709 1455	1.2
			•••	-,	
TOTAL	•				
VN	3113 5124	.6 3508 5	028 .7	4260 3534	1.2
TH :		7 322	55 <b>5.9</b>	190 80	2.4
	1290 568 2	2600 1	004 2.6	3803 1252	3.0
us & Vn			549 1.9	2227 685	3.3
Total	5172 6025	<del>.9</del> 7487 6	636 1.1 .1	0480 5551	1.9

a/ Source: VCIIA File.

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#### GVN POPULATION CONTROL AND EVERY ACCIVITY

#### Summary

SVN population regressions, as reported by HES, atrongly correlate with various measures of VC/NVA military activity. Population gains do not correlate with measures of either VC/NVA or friendly military activity.

#### Population Regressions

The regressed population is the population of hamlets whose HES ratings have declined from the previous month. It is logical to expect a connection between VC/NVA activities and population regression, and we constructed several hypotheses for this relationship and applied statistical methods to test them.

#### TABLE 1

#### REGRESSED POPULATION AGALTST VC/NVA OPERATIONS February 1967 through September 1968 by Month

	R Correlation Coefficient	R <sup>2</sup>
Regressed Population Versus		
Model 1. VC/NVA Attacks and Other . Incidents b/	.86	.74
Model 2. Kill ratio S	.82	.67
Model 3. FF/RF Casualties	.88	.77

a/ An independent variable for time is included in all three cases.

b/ Other incidents include terror, sabotage, and harassment. Attacks include large and small attacks.

c/ Kill ratio is Enemy to Friendly KIA.

Our first model relates regressed population to total enemy attacks, other incidents, and time. This model explains 74% of the variation in population regression. The most significant variable is attacks -- the greater the number of VC attacks, the more population is likely to regress.

The effect of other incidents is moderately strong and the correlation is negative; the more terror, sabotage and harasament incidents, the less population regression. This result appears contradictory at first glance, but it is reasonable when the long term trend of attacks and incidents is considered. Since 1967, non-attack incidents have been generally declining in number while attacks have been increasing. Attacks have paralleled population regressions closely (see Graph 1) and incidents, moving in the opposite direction, must show a negative correlation.

Another question arises over the large weight given to attacks. Obviously each enemy attack does not cause 4,670 people to regress in HES scores. VC/NVA attacks seem to have a strong effect because they 2/are a good over-all measure of enemy initiative and offensive activity. They seem to tell us when the VC is really on the move in all areas of endeavor that might cause HES scores to regress.

Although time is the weakest of the variables, it is not insignificant. Over time there is a negative trend which indicates that in later time periods more VC attacks or a higher level of VC activity are required to account for the same population regression. Again, this may be reasonable, assuming that allied security forces have become better able to cope with VC/NVA activities.

The second model relates population regressions to the kill ratio. Again, a high positive correlation results. The time variable is statistically insignificant in this equation. High kill ratios are associated with periods of high VC/NVA activity, so this model is consistent with the first model discussed above.

The third model accounts for 77% of the variation 'n HES population regressions using the two variables of RF/PF casualties and time. 4/ Although both variables are significant, RF/PF casualties have a far more important effect. Once again, the result accords with expectations and with the

Y Population regressions (100's) = 15,446 + 46.7 (W attacks) - 10.6 (oth- mediants) - 432 (time).


<sup>2/</sup> See Litary Initiative in South Vietnam, SEA Analysis Report, Sept moer 1968, p.6.

<sup>3/</sup> Regressed population (100's) = -11,055 + 3,600 (kill ratio) - 150 (time).

4/ Regressed population (100's) = -5,016 + 5.8 (RF/FF casualties) - 359 (time).

GRAPH 1

POPULATION REGRESSION AND VC/NVA TOTAL ATTACKS



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This situation leads us to suspect that population improvements and regressions are not associated with the same factors. This is supported by the lack of correlation between improvements and regressions within the HES. Regressions account for less than 4% of the variation in population improvements; they do not move together.

Since population regressions are linked to VC/NVA activity, we tried to link population improvement to measures of friendly activity. However, measures of small unit actions, small unit contacts, and battalion days of operation did not correlate significantly with population gains.

#### TABLE 3

#### POPULATION IMPROVEMENTS AGAINST FRIENDLY ACTIVITY

Population Improvements Versus	R Correlation Coefficient	. R <sup>2</sup>
1. ARVN small unit contacts	.41 .5	.17
2. Allied small unit operations	.16	.027
3. Friendly Bn. Days of Operation	•54	.29
4. Friendly Bn. Days of Operation (lagged)	.54	.29

Although VC/NVA activity is clearly related to population regressions, other factors govern population improvements, and we must dig further to see if we can determine what they are.

TABLE 4 REGRESSION ANALYSIS DATA

						1967	l			
•	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	A·10	Sep	Oct	ī
Population Regressions(100's) a/	4742	2513	1275	1179	3758	1176	1934	1080	1385	21
Population Improvements(100's)	3246	3778	2684	3983	8915	3859	1771	2182	868	21
Total VC Attacks b	117	219	162	193	168	197	204	260	264	i
WC Other Incidents b	1538	1894	2059	2059	1629	1880	1798	2354	. 1833	Ľ
Kill Ratio b	4.47	4.08	3.42	3.88	3.90	5.08	3.43	3.16	3.31	3.
RF/PF Casualties C/	1504	2223	1293	1573	1783	1121	1545	1733	1653	15
Total Friendly KIA b/	1642	2295	1.823	2529	1885	1559	1693	solf	1895	24
Friendly Bn Days of Operations c/	4593	5387	5296	5537	5214	5547	5587	<b>5</b> 358	5696	51
Friendly Small Unit Operations (100's) 9	1281	1465	1456	1648	1587	1786	1808	1747	1830	ış
RVW Small Unit Contacts 5/	334	477	568	420	505	51h	455	526	501	:
Time	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	

Source: a/ b/ c/

HAMIA
OSD Statistical Summary
OASD(SA) Statistical Tables
Adjusted TFES Figure

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1967	ļ								1968					
Jul	AUE	бер	Oct	VOI	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
1176	1934	1080	1385	2971	5185	2558	25842	3861	2993	4587	1754	2718	3508	2956
3959	1771	2182	868	2721	2239	2807	1553	3861	6129	3589	5723	766 <del>9</del>	5227	6703
197	204	260	264	254	286	409	570	558	391	588	288	137	242	215
1860	1798	2354	1833	1700	2051	1949	1542	3203	<b>2216</b>	2652	1621	1492	133և	1196
5.08	3.43	3.16	3.31	3.36	3.83	5.51	8.46	5.47	4.35	5.70	3.96	3.90	5.74	4.73
1121	1545	1733	1653	1978	2616	1964	34004	2807	1889	2642	2473	1803	3314	3090
1359	1693	2014	1895	2278	2075	2762	4714	3175	2807	4223	2605	1706	2697	2649
5547	5507	5358	5698	5467	5447	5623	5474	<i>7</i> 501	7809	7374	7378	7986	8530	8275
1786	1808	1747	1830	1923	1995	1875	325	756	1567	2059	1840	1804	1926	1799
514	455	526	501	501	572	461	K/A	77	158	111	111	158	171	164
6	7	8	9	10	11	1 12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20

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### ENEMY EMPHASIS ON CAUSING US CASUALTIES

#### Summary

Enemy attack and incident data confirm recent intelligence reports that VC/NVA forces are concentrating their efforts on increasing US casualties. The US portion of allied KIA from actions clearly initiated by the enemy increased from 18% in 1967 to 44% during January and February 1969.

TABLE 1

TOTAL FRIENDLY COMPAT DEATHS - SVN

	1966	1967	1968	1968 19tr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1969 10tr
Combat Deaths US S of Total	<b>4</b> 989	9358	14561	4847	4724	2945	2045	3171
	28	40	37	33	42	36	36	38
RVNAP	11953	12716	24323	9424	6241	5147	3511	5000 <u>*</u> /
% of Total	68	55	61	64	56	62	61	
3rd Nation % of Total	566	1105	979	346	262	196	175	251
	. 3	5	2	346	262	2	3	3
Total	17508	23179	39863	14617	11227	88.98	5731	84557

a/ Preliminary RVNAF KIA figure of 1263 for March has been increased 50% based on the average increase of final verified RVNAF KIA data over operational data for 1968.

Table 1 indicates that US forces consistently suffered about 37-40% of all friendly combat deaths during 1967, 1968 and first quarter 1969; the RVNAP share generally ranged from 55 to 61% of the total. Thus, the total combat death figures do not show a shift of enemy emphasis toward inflicting a higher proportion of US casualties.

However, Table 2 shows a clear and increasing enemy emphasis on inflicting a higher proportion of US casualties. The US proportion of allied combat deaths from actions clearly initiated by VC/NVA forces increased steadily from 11% in 1965 to 44% during January-February 1969. On the other hand, the proportion of RVNAF deaths decreased from 80% to 54%.

. . . . . .

TABLE 2

FRIENDLY COMBAT DEATHS FROM VC/NVA INITIATED ACTIONS a/

(Monthly Average)

Combat Deaths	1966	<u> 1967</u>	1968	10	1 20	967 30	40	10	<u>1</u>	968 <u>39</u>	40	1969 Jan- Feb	<u>b</u> ,
US % of Total	57 11	102 18	215 30	81 16	103 19	116 22	102 15	266 24	236 30	211 40	148 37	14 281	
RVNAF s of Total	443 88	463 81	483 58	416 82	451 81	398 77	589 85	843 75	527 68	317 59	243 61	3 <sup>1</sup> +3 54	
3rd Nation \$ of Total	4 1	6	11	11 2	1	5 1	5 1	14	15 2	5 1	9	10 2	
TOTAL	504	571	709	508	560	519	696	1123	778	533	400	634	

a/ Source: VC Incident Reports (VCIIA Computer File).
b/ Preliminary data.

We might expect the increases in US forces during the period to explain the increasing enemy tendency to hit US troops, because the number of US targets increased as the forces grew. However, the explanation does not work, because AVNAF strength grew much more than the US strength during the period. The US share of allied forces dropped from 41% at the end of 1967 to 37% by February of 1969. (Table 3) Thus, the increasing proportion of US combat deaths from enemy actions is most likely the result of a clear enemy intention to shift from EVNAF to US targets in order to keep US casualty rates as high as possible.

FRIENDLY TROOP STRENGTHS IN SVN a/.

(The sands)

Force	1966	1967	1968	Feb 1969
US	385	1687	53 <b>7</b>	542
% of Total	36	141	38	37
RYMAF b/	623	643	819	834
% of Total	59	54	57	58
3rd Mation 5 of Total	53	. 59	66	72
	5	. 5	5	5
TOTAL	1061	1189	1422	1448

a/ Source: OSD SEA Statistical Summary, Table 2. b/ Regular, RF and PF forces only.

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"What we should do: For each additional day's stay the US must sustain more casualties. For each additional day's stay they must spend more money and lose more equipment. Each additional day's stay the American people will adopt a stronger antiwar attitude while there is no hope to consolidate the puppet administration and Army."

"Missions for summer. --Must be higher, stronger and more painful than the spring. --It must succeed in destroying, wearing down, and disintegrating more US potential, more main force puppet personnel, and, especially, more administrative personnel at the village and hamlet levels."

Table 1 reflects the increasing enemy emphasis on inflicting US casualties indicated by the document. It shows that the US proportion of allied combat deaths from actions elearly initiated by the enemy increased steadily from 11% in 1966 to 49% during first quarter 1969. On the other hand, the proportion of RVNAF deaths decreased from 80% to 50%.

TABLE 1

FRIENDLY COMBAT DEATHS FROM VC/NVA INITIATED ACTIONS a/

(Monthly Average)

Combat		•		ı		1967	,			1968		1969
Deaths	1966	1967	1968	10	<u> 20</u>	30	40	10	56	39	40	10 100
US % of Total	. 57 . 11	102 18	215 30	16 81	108 19	22 22	102 15	266 24	236 30	211 40	148 37	315 49
RVNAF of Total	443 88	463 81	483 68	416 82	451 81	398 77	589 85	843 . 75	52 <b>7</b> 68	317 59	243 61	324 50
3rd Wation \$ of Total	4 1	6 1	11	11	0	5	5 1	14 1	15 2	5 1	9	8
TOTAL	504	571	709	508	560	519	696	1123	778	<b>533</b>	400	647 •

a/ Source: VC Incident Reports (VCII: Computer File).

Table 2 once again shows that the increasing enemy tendency to hit US troops cannot be explained by increases in the number of US troops (and therefore targets), because RVMAF strength grew faster than US strength during the period. The US share of allied forces dropped from 41% at the end of 1967 to 37% in March 1969.

TABLE 2

	FRIENDLY TROO	P STRENGTHS houselds)	IN SVN a	•
Force	1966	1967	1968	Mar 1969
US	385	487	537	540
% of Total	36	41	38	37
RVMAF b/	623	643	819	845
	59	54	<b>57</b>	58
3rd Mation for Total	53	59	66	72
	5	5	. 5	5
TOTAL	1061	. 1189	1422	1457

a/ Source: OSD SEA Statistical Summary, Table 2 b/ Regular, RF and PF forces only.

Table 3 shows the breakout of US combat deaths by type of enemy action. It indicates that:

- 1. The US share of US/RVMAF deaths from ground assaults and ambushes has steadily increased, from 10% in 1967 to 43% in first quarter 1969.
- 2. The US share of combat deaths from indirect attacks and harassment by fire only increased from 29% in 1967 to 32% in 1968, but jumped to 55% in first quarter 1969. Indirect attacks also accounted for the most US deaths, in contrast to 1968 when assaults consistently accounted for the most US deaths.
- 3. The US share of combat deaths from enemy mining, booby traps, and other explosives increased sharply after the 1968 Tet offensive and has remained fairly constant ever since.

Thus, the most pronounced change during the first quarter 1969 is the heavy enemy emphasis on inflicting US combat deaths through indirect attacks by fire -- at minimum cost to himself.

TABLE 3
US KIA BY TYPE OF ENEMY ACTION 8/

	(Qtr 1957	Avg) 1968	1963 19tr	2Qtr	32tr	4Qtr	1969 10tr
US Deaths From: Assaults Indirect Fire Mining/Explos. Other	95 143 55 8	294 227 125	447 339 29	313 249 147 0	268 197 153	147 123 166 2	39 <sup>4</sup> r 412 133
Total US/RVNAF Deaths From: Assaults Indirect Fire Mining/Explos. Other	301 979 489 206 39	1112 707 270 19	2136 1020 213 40	709 1126 878 268 61	745 524 294	438 440 405 305	911 911 742 251 15
Total  US as % of Total US/RVNAF  Assaults Indirect Fire	1713	2108	3409 21 33	2333 28 28 29	1572 36 38	1167 33 30	1919 43 55
Mining/Explos. Other Total	29 26 19 18	32 46 5 31	24 24	55 0 30	54 11 40	12 38	53 47 49

a/ Source: VCIIA Computer File.

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#### ENEMY EMPHASIS ON INPLICTING US CASUALTIES

Summary. US combat deathe reported from enemy initiated actions have tripled since 1966 and now account for 29% of all US KIA (42% in III CTZ). In contrast, RVNAF deathe reported from such actions have remained relatively unchanged. Indirect enemy fire is the leading cause of US deaths from enemy initiated actions this year. This is a reversion to the 1967 enemy pattern and contrasts with 1968, when enemy ground attacks were the leading cause of US deaths. The enemy losse only about 10% of his total KIA in incidents he initiates, compared to 25% of total RVNA? KIA and 29% of total US deaths in the same actions.

This study is based on casualty reports from VC/NVA-initiated incidents reported in the OPREP system and processed into the VCIIA computer file. The data only cover those attacks, harassment, sabotage, terror, and other actions clearly initiated by the enemy where no US operation is underway. Thus they represent a conservative view of enemy initiated actions; enemy initiated attacks (including attacks by fire and ambushes) against US forces in the field on operations are not counted. Other studies based on more meaningful data indicate that ab at 80% of US KIA are attributed to enemy initiative. Never-theless, the tooks shown by the OPREP data may be valid.

Table 1 shows that actions clearly initiated by the enemy have inflicted more US deaths each year since 1966. In 1967 such actions killed an average of 101 US troops per month; in 1969 the monthly average has risen to 303. Increases occurred in each Corps area (CTZ) during 1968, indicating a country-wide buildup of enemy effort to kill Americans that year. In 1969, further increases occurred in I and III CTZ as the enemy focused on killing US troops in these two areas.

A higher proportion of all US combat deaths also came from enemy initiated incident: each year. In 1967 only 13% of all US KIA resulted from enemy incidents. This rose to 18% in 1968 and to 29% so far in 1969, indicating that the enemy has been trying particularly hard to kill US forces this year. Again, I CTZ and III CTZ account for the increased emphasis. In III CTZ, 42% of all US KIA this year have come from enemy incidents, up from about 25% during the past two years. Similarly, in I CTZ the percentage doubled to 21% in 1969. Thus, the enemy appears to be devoting considerable effort to raising US KIA rates in these two areas. II and IV CTZ remain essentially unchanged in 1969, although US deaths in IV CTZ dropped during the 2nd quarter as US forces prepared to withdraw.

TABLE 1

# CAUSED BY ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS a/ (Monthly Average)

us ria	1967	<u>1968</u>	(Thru June) <u>1969</u>	1969 1st Qtr	2nd Qtr
I CTZ				1	
From Enemy Actions	34	72	107	107	107
From All Causes	389	674	512	488	536
% From Enemy Action	9	ii	21	22	20
II CTZ	_				
From Enemy Actions	· 8	40	. 38	36	40
From All Causes	149	119	114	119	108
% From Enemy Action	5	34	33	30	37
III CTZ		<b>A</b> 1		1	
From Enemy Actions	53	84	138	146	130
From All Causes	206	339	332	338	326
\$ From Enemy Action IV CIZ	26	25	. 42	43	40
From Enemy Actions	6	20	. 20	30 .	10
From All Causes	. 23	73	<sup>7</sup> 83	97	69
1 From Enemy Action	26	27	24	3i	14
Other US KIA from all Causes b/	15	n	16	19	13
Total					
From Enemy Actions	101	516	303	319	287
From All Causes	782	<b>357</b> 0	1057	1061	1052
§ From Enemy Action	13	18	. 29	<b>3</b> 0	27

Source: VCIIA Computer File. Includes KIA from all types of enemy incidents. US deaths from all causes are from OSD SEA Statistical Summary.
 US KIA not reported by CTZ in SVM.

In contrast to the trend in US combat deaths, EVNAF KIA from enemy initiated incidents have remained at about the same levels (417 to 487 per month) in 1967-69, and have accounted for about 25% of the total RVNAF KIA in 1968-69; in 1967, before the enemy began concentrating on US forces, they accounted for 44% (Table 2).

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#### TABLE 2

# PROPORTION OF RYMAF KIA CAUSED BY ENEMY INTRIATED INCIDENTS (Monthly Average)

RVMAP KIA	· . <u>1967</u>	<u> 1968</u>	(Thru June) <u>1969</u>	1969 1st Qtr	2nd Qtr
From Enemy Actions From All Causes From Enemy Action	470	487	417	340	494
	1060	2027	1678	1681	1674
	44	24	25	20	30

a/ Source: VCIIA Computer File, and OSD SEA Statistical Summary.

Another way to examine enemy emphasis on causing US casualties is to look at US deaths as a proportion of the total US-RVMAF deaths that reportedly result from enemy incidents. Table 3 shows that the US portion grew from 18% of total US-RVMAF deaths in 1967, to 31% in 1968, and to 42% in 1969. In the 1st quarter 1969 US deaths rose to 46% of the US-RVMAF total from enemy incidents. This was an all-time high, and shows the heavy enemy emphasis on killing US forces during the post Tet offensive.

In the 2nd quarter, the US proportion of US-RVMAF deaths dropped to 37%, reflecting a 10% drop in US KIA and a 45% increase in RVMAF KIA from enemy initiated actions. The RVMAF increase is probably not significant because (1) it simply reverted towards average 1967-68 levels, and (2) there was no significant change in the mix of Regular, Regional and Popular Forces killed by enemy initiated actions between the 1st and 2nd quarters.

Table 3 also shows that PF deaths from enemy action are down sharply since 1967. This could mean any of the following: (1) the enemy's guerrilla structure has been weakened, (2) the enemy does not consider the PF a threat worth attacking, (3) security conditions are better in the populated areas protected by the PF, or (4) the enemy is focusing on US and regular RVMAF units to gain maximum propaganda advantages.

TABLE 3

US VS. RVNAF SHARE OF KIA FROM ENEMY ACTIONS a/ (Monthly Average)

	(,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	,	·		
	1967	1968	(Thru June) 1969	1969 1st <u>Qtr</u>	2nd Qtr
US KIA From Enemy Actions	101	si <sub>2</sub>	303	319	287
RVNAF KIA From Enemy Action: Regular RF PF Subtotal	185 102 183 470	220 127 140 417	210 112 95 417	167 94 79 340	253 130 111 494
Total	572	703	720	659	781
us 🕏	18	31	42	48	37

a/ Source: VCIIA Computer File. Includes KIA from all types of enemy incidents.

Table 4 shows US combat deaths by type of enemy action. It indicates that:

- 1. US deaths from enemy ground attacks have steadily increased (from 32 per month in 1967 to 123 in 1969), and the US share of US-RVNAF deaths from ground attacks has increased from a 1967 average of 10% to 35% in 1969.
- 2. Indirect fire has also caused more US combat deaths each year, and is the leading cause of US deaths caused by enemy incidents in 1969. This is a reversion to the 1967 pattern and contrasts with 1968, when ground attacks were the leading cause of death. The US share of US/RVNAF combat deaths from indirect fire increased from 29% in 1967 to 52% in 1969.
- 3. The US combat death pattern has changed, but the RYMAF pattern has remain fairly constant throughout the 2g year period, with assaults accounting for about 60% of the RYMAF deaths, and indirect fire accounting for 30%.
- 4. US combat deaths from enemy mining, booby traps, and other explosives increased sharply after the 1968 Tet offensive and have remained fairly constant ever since.

Thus, the most pronounced change during 1969 is a reversion to the 1967 pattern of inflicting US casualties through indirect attacks by fire, but at a much higher rate.

TABLE 4

# US & RVNAF KIA BY TYPE OF ENEMY INITIATED ACTION a/ (Monthly Average)

•	<u>1967</u>	1968	(Thru June) <u>1969</u>	1969 1st Qtr	2nd Qtr
US Deaths From Assaults	20	08	102	322	221.
Indirect Fire	32 48	98 76	123 137	132 139 46	114 134
Mines/Explosives Other	18 3_	42 0	41	46	37 2
Total	101	216	<del>2</del> <del>303</del>	319	287
RVNAF Deaths From					
Assaults	295	273	230	182	277
Indirect Fire	115	160	127	114	140
Nines/Explosives Other	50 10	48 6	54	41	67
Total	470	487	417	340	10 494

a/ Source: VCIIA Computer File.

Table 5 provides additional evidence that the enemy has reverted to his 1967 pattern of action, but with considerably greater emphasis on killing US troops. It shows that the average enemy/US kill ratio rose to 3 to 1 in 1968 and dropped back to 1967 levels in 1969. The ratio in second quarter 1969 rose again to 3.1 to 1. Kill ratios seem to vary somewhat with the enemy's emphasis on ground attacks or attacks by fire. As would be expected, our kill ratios are less favorable when the enemy emphasizes attacks by fire.

#### TABLE 5

# ENERY/US KILL RATIO IN VC/NVA INITIATED ACTIONS (Monthly Average)

	1967	1968	(Thru June) 1969	1969 1st Qtr	. 2nd Qtr
Rneay KIA in Incidents Initiated Against US Forces	220	648	736	585	887
US KTA in Same Incidents	101	216	303	319	287
Rnemy/US KIA Ratio	2.2	3 PASTIAR	2.4	1.8	3.1
· ;	POWIN	FUINT			.54

Table 6 indicates that the proportion of enemy KIA lost at enemy initiative has been nearly constant during the 1967-1969 period, ranging from 9.4% of total enemy KIA to 9.9%. This compares to the 25% of total RVNAF KIA and 29% of total US deaths lost in the same incidents.

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## EMEMY KIA FROM EMEMY INITIATED ACTIONS (Monthly Average)

7n 433 m	1967	1968	(Thru June) 1969	1969 1st 9tr	2nd Qtr
In All Enemy Initiated Incidents a/	.727	1423	1496	1151	1841
Total Enemy KIA From All Causes b/	7342	15094	15609	14949	16269
% KIA in Enemy Initiated Incidents	9.9	9.4	, 9 <b>.</b> 6	7.7	11.3

a/ Source: VCIIA Computer file. b/ OSD SEA Statistical Summary.

#### ENEMY TARGETING OF US AND RVNAF FORCES

In November, 52% of U.S. KIR care from enemy initiated actions, a sharp rise from past patterns and an indication that U.S. offensive combat activity may be tapering off.

Based on very preliminary data Table 1 indicates that over half (52%) of the US combat dear is in November came from actions clearly initiated by the enemy; this repre ents a sharp rise from past patterns. The change could have resulted from her view enemy targeting of US units, or a decrease in US initiated combat operations.

Tables 2, 3, and 4 suggest that a reduction in US operations is rust likely the explanation. They also suggest that the enemy is concentrating his attention on RVM/F forces.

Tables 2 and 3 indicate that RVNAF was targeted much more than US forces in November; 43% of all RVNAF deaths (in preliminary report) came from enemy initiated action and RVNAF absorbed 72% of all the total allied (US-RVNAF) deaths from enemy actions.

Finally, Table 4 indicates that U.S. deaths from mines and booby traps. a mark of offensive activity in VC or contested areas, seem to be dropping since redeployments began in the third quarter of this year. It also indicates heavy enemy emphasis on ground attacks against RVMAF.

TABLE 1

PROPORTION OF TOTAL US KIA

	CAUSED		EWA IMI		LICIDEN	13			
			(Monthl						
				(Thru					
•	126	1967	1968	1969	1969 10tr	20tr	30tr	Oct	Novª/
From Enemy Actions From Enemy Action	11%	101 782 13	215 1216 18	30 852 520	319 1061 30	29 <del>4</del> 1052 28	196 637 31	93 377 25	230 446 52
a/ Preliminary date	l.		•		•				

#### TABLE 2

# PROPORTION OF RVNAF KIA CAUSED BY ENEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS (Monthly Avg)

	1967	1968	(Thru Nov) 1969	1969 10tr	29tr	30tr	<u>Oct</u>	Nova/
RVNAF FTA From Enemy Actions From All Causes From Enemy Actions  a/ Preliminary data.	470	487	419	340	529	361	342	582
	1060	2027	1523	1681	1678	1348	1274	1356
	44	24	28	20	32	27	27	43

#### TABLE 3

### US VS. RVNAF SHARE OF KTA FROM ENEMY ACTIONS (Monthly Avg)

US KIA From En Actions RVNAF KIA From Ene Action	1967 101 470	1968 215 487	(Thru Nov) 1969 250 419	1969 10tr 319 340	20tr 294 529	30tr 196 361	0et 93 3112	Nove/ 230 582
Total US \$	(18)	72	669 T	659 48	823 <b>36</b>	557 35	435 21	<b>58</b> 815

a/ Preliminary data.

### TABLE 4

US & RVNAF KIA BY TYPE OF ENEMY INITIATED ACTION										
(Nouthly Average)										
(thru Roy) 1969										
	1967	1968`		lQtr		30tr	Oct.	Nov.		
US Deaths From		_						•		
Assaults	32	98	99	132	118	76	25	85		
Indirect Fire	32 48	98 76	116	139	137	98	35	115		
Hines/Explosives	18	41	34	46	37	22	33	30		
Other	3	0	ī	2	2	0	0	0		
Total	101	215	250	319	294	196	93	230		
RVNAF Deaths From										
Assaults	295	273	220	182	301	169	178	300		
Indirect Fire	295 115	160	132	114	147	127	106	179		
Mines/Explosives	50	. 48	59	41	70	59	<b>ķķ</b>	91		
Other	10	Ĺ	<del>59</del> 8	3	11	6	14	12		
Total	410	487	419	340	529	361.	342	582		

a Preliminary data.

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#### ENEMY TARGETING OF US AND RVNAF FORCES

Swmary. RVNAF is taking an increasing percentage of friendly KIA from enemy activity, as US deaths decline, reaching 85% according to preliminary January data. RVNAF deaths from indirect fire attacks in January were up sharply—3.5 times the 1969 monthly average.

Table 1 indicates that total US KIA and US KIA from enemy activity steadily declined during 1969. Preliminary 1970 data indicates this declining trend is continuing. However, the proportion of US combat deaths from enemy incidents remained about the same through January of this year.

The proportion of RVKAF KIA from enemy initiated activity in January increased over the 4th quarter level (Table 2). This resulted from an increase in RVNAF deaths from enemy actions. Table 4 shows that most of the RVNAF KIA from enemy actions resulted from indirect fire--3 times the 4th quarter rate.

Table 3 indicates RVNAF suffered about 85, of all US-RVNAF combat deaths from enemy activity during January. The US share of deaths from such activities has declined from a peak of 48, during 1st quarter 1969 to 15% in January of this year. The shift stems primarily from a steady reduction in the absolute number of US deaths, while RVNAF deaths remained relatively constant. The sharpest reductions in US deaths occurred in the last half of the year as US redeployments began.

Table 4 indicates that deaths from mining and booby traps dropped for both US and RVNAF in January. Indirect fire deaths increased for both, and assault deaths were down significantly.

TABLE 1

# PROPORTION OF TOTAL US KIA CAUSED BY ENEMY INITIATED LECIDENTS (monthly average)

	1967	1968	1969	1969 1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr	1970 Jan e/
From Enemy Actions From 111 Causes from Enemy Actions	101	215	231	319	294	196	129	101
	782	1216	785	1061	1052	637	388	343
	13	18	29	30	28	31	33	29

a/ Preliminary data.

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TABLE 2

# PROPORTION OF RVNAF KIA CAUSED BY EXEMY INITIATED INCIDENTS (monthly average)

	1967	1968	1969	1969 1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr	1970 Jan a/
From Enemy Actions From All Causes % from Enemy Actions	470	487	400	340	529	361	422	572
	1060	2027	1572	1681	1678	1348	1581	1548b/
	44	24	25	20	32	27	27	37

a/ Preliminary data.

b/ Preliminary reports increased 58% to put them on a par with the verified last half 1969 data which was 50% higher than last half 1969 preliminary data.

Table 3

US VS. RVNAF SHARE OF KIA FROM ENEMY ACTIONS (monthly average)

	1967	1968	1969	1969 1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr	1970 Jan a/
US KIA from Enemy Actions RVNAF KIA from Enemy Actions Total US \$ //	101	215	231	319	294	196	129	101
	470	487	400	340	529	361	422	572
	571	702	631	659	823	557	551	673
	18	31	37	48	36	35	23	15

a Preliminary data.

TABLE 4


US AND RVIIAP	KIA BY T	ype of	ENEMY	ALTINI	TED ACT	ION				
(monthly average)										
	1967	1968	1969	1969 1 Qtr	2 Qtr	3 Qtr	4 Qtr	1970 Jan <sup>®</sup>		
US Deaths from Assaults Indirect Pire Mines/Explosives Other Total	32 48 18 3	98 76 41 0	91 105 34 1 231	132 139 45 2 319	118 137 37 2 294	76 98 22 0	44 51 34 0	12 70 19 0		
RVNAP Deaths from Assault Indirect Fire Mines/Explosives Other Total	295 115 50 10 470	273 160 48 6	207 125 60 8	182 114 41 3	301 147 70 11 529	169 127 59 6 361	213 122 74 13 422	84 430 48 10 572		


a/ Preliminary data.

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


TABLE 1 ...
VC/NVA ATTACKS 3/
(Monthly Average)

		CY 1	965			1966	1966				
	•	10_	20	30_	40	1 <u>0</u>	20	30_	<u> 70</u>	Total 1966	
BN & Larger		2.3	7.0	5.3	9.7	6.3	5.0	1.7	0.7	3.4	
Small Scale* Total		74.7 77.0	44.6 56.6	38.3 43.6	<u>41.3</u> 51.0	57.3 63.6	61.0 65.	80.3	102.0 102.7	75.2 78.6	

a/ Source: Table 8 & 8A OSD SEA Statistical Summary

Chart 1 and Table 1 indicate that the VC/NVA have shifted their emp: usis from large scale attacks to small scale attacks. In CY 1966 VC/NVA battalion sized and larger attacks decreased from a monthly average of 6.3 in the lat quarter to .7 per month in the 4th quarter. Conversely, VC/NVA small scale attacks increased from 57 to 102 per month in the same period.

#### TABLE 2

# CONTACTS WITH VC/NVA BATTALIONS IN WHICH VC/NVA UNIT IS IDENTIFIED (Jan-Nov 1966)

	Jan	Feb	<u> Mar</u>	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	vcii	Total
Nr. Battalions	118	133	149	153	162	177	178	181	186	185	185	-
Contacts	3	15	15	13	24	33	22	42	4	14	17	208
Bns Contacted	9	15	15	13	24	33	22	41	4	14	17	207
Bns Contacted First Time in 1966	9	15	15	13	22	13	14	17	0	4	3	126

MACV data available for the period February through August 1966, indicates that friendly forces contacted VC/NVA battalions 239 times, or an average of 34 times per month. If each contact represented a different battalion, the contact rate would equal about 20% of the average reported total VC/NVA battalions; at best we would contact each battalion on an average of once every five months.

Table 2, which is based on analysis of CY 1966 month! MACV Order of Battie (OB) reports through November (except for September and October reports, which are unavailable), indicates that only 126 of the 185 battalions carried in the November OB have been positively identified as contacted during the 11-month period; the 59 other battalions snow no record of contact. Table 2 also indicates that the rate of positively identified contacts is about 19 per month, or 15 less than the total battalion contacts per month for the Feb-Aug period. Of the 59 battalions not contacted, 38 are combat battalions, 11 are combat support battalions, and 10 are service support battalions. Further information on bettalion contacts is shown below. It indicates that 71 battalions were positively identified as contacted once, and 55 were contacted more than once during the period. Table 2 indicates that only one battalion was identified in two contacts during a single month (Aug).

## CONTACTS IN WHICH VC/NVA BATTALION WAS IDENTIFIED (CY 1966 Thru Nov)

		Mumb	er of	Times	Contac	ted	
	_0	1	5	_3	4	_5	Total Bns
Combat Rns	38	67	36	12	ढ	I	160
Other Bus	21	4	0	_0	0	0	25
	<del>59</del>	71	36	12	76	I	185

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
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
Other battalions in addition to the 126 positively identified were undoubtedly active during the period. Nevertheless, it appears that the actual existence, or ability to operate, of some of the 59 units (particularly the 38 combat battalions) with no records of contact with friendly forces is open to question. Moreover, enemy activity rates reflected in the Peb-Aug average of 34 contacts per month and in Table 1 do not show the increases we might expect as the result of the 67 battalion increase reflected in the VC/NVA OB.

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VC/NVA ATTACKS





# VC/NVA ATTACKS<sup>8</sup>/ (Monthly Average)

	1965						1	198			
	lst Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	Total 1965	lst Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	Total 1966	
Bn & Larger Small Scale Total	74.7	7.0 49.7 56.7	5.3 38.3 43.6	9.7 41.3 51.0	6.1 51.0 57.1	7.0 56.7 63.7	4.7 61.3 66.0	1.7 78.7 80.3	1.3 102.0 103.3	3.7 74.7 78.3	156.

a/ Source: Table 2 OSD SEA Statistical Summary

large scale attacks have significantly increased over the third and fourth quarters of 1966 but have not yet reached the CY 1966 average (Table 1 and Graph 1). The emphasis on small scale attacks has continued and is nearly three times the monthly average in the first quarter 1966.

#### ENEMY INCIDENTS IN I CORPS

Coincident with the buildup of allied forces in I Corps, and particularly the introduction of the III MAF in March 1965, there has been a shift from incidents against civilians to incidents against military targets. For example, the table shows in second quarter 1965, only 25% of the total incidents in I Corps were actions against military units, personnel and aircraft. By second quarter 1966, it was at a peak of 87% (3430 incidents out of a total of 3956). Incidents involving the military have risen faster than friendly force strength. There were only 1.5 times as many maneuver battalions (weighted) at the end of 1966 as at the end of 1965 while total incidents in 1966 were 2.3 times what they were in 1965.

Incidents involving fixed and rotary wing aircraft were fairly stable through the first half of 1965 at about 4% of I Corps incidents. They jumped to 40% in first quarter 1966 and have remained in the 40-50% range since then. Incidents involving helicopters alone (excluding fixed wing) went from virtually none in third quarter 1965 to 12% in fourth quarter to 27% in first quarter 1966 and have remained roughly at that proportion since then.

Even more striking changes in the pattern occurred with incidents against other military targets. Incidents against all military units and personnel rose from 325 (24%) in first quarter 1965 to 1108 (34%) in first quarter 1966 and reached a peak in third quarter 1966 at 2139 (52%). Incidents involving company size or larger units only increased more than five times between first quarter 1966 and second quarter (308 or 9%) to 1694 or 43%).

The number of important non-military incidents such as terror and harassment of hamlets reached a peak in 1964, declined in 1965 by more than 50% with the exception of fourth quarter and by the end of 1966 had returned to near 1963 levels. Sabotage incidents show a more direct (and inverse) relationship to the increase in military and aircraft incidents as a result of the troop buildup. The peak level of 195 (15%) incidents occurred in second quarter 1965 at the beginning of the buildup. Subsequently, sabotage incidents dropped off rapidly to less than 2% in first quarter 1967 (77 incidents).

Although incidents involving hemlets, sabotage and civilians are down to near 1963 levels, it cannot be assumed that this is a permanent situation. It is highly likely that military activity is diverting the Viet Cong from terrorism and the withdrawal of friendly forces would probably lead to a reemphasis on terrorist activity.

ly joughas Pike in his recent book on the Viet Cong likens this phenomenon to Greshem's Law, violent military acts tend to drive violent political acts out of circulation.

INCIDENTS IN I CTZ (Quarterly Totals)

	1963 10	<b>2</b> Q	32	40	1964 10	5 <b>đ</b>	<b>3</b> Q	<b>4</b> Q
INCIDENTS INVOLVING:		···········		<del></del>	<del></del>			
Aircraft =/	36	16	4	20	27	92	78	69
Other D	106	91	94	184	317	139	229	251
Subtotal	142	107	98	204	344	231	307	320
Non-Military							1	
Hamlets C,	21	36	69	302	224	318	481	360
Sabotage 🖭	2	17	8	16	16	15	99	
Subtotal	30	53	77	318	240	333	550	175 535
TOTAL =/  \$ Hilitary of Total .	213 67	191 56	210 47	592 34	650 53	1010 23	11462	1404
h married or loost .	<b>~</b> ;	,,,	71	<b></b>	73	2.0	1 51	23

Source: NMCC VCJSA File
a/ Includes helicopters.
b/ Includes personnel and units.

c/ Includes hamlets, MRL hamlets, security fences.
d/ Includes roads, bridges, railroad bridges, railroad tracks.
e/ All incidents are not included in the preceding four categories; therefore totals do n

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•	•		1955				1966		CONFID	ENTIAL	1967
56	30	40	1955 12	2Q	3Q	40	1966 1Q	<b>5d</b>	39	4Q	2.Q
92 139	78 229	69 251	<b>53</b> <b>3</b> 25	58 265	117 :386	489 597	1293 1108	1342 2088	1202	1106 1346	2242 1384
537	307	320	373	323	503	1056	2401	3430	3341	2452	1384 3626
318 15	181 99	360 175	244 263	130 195	64 118	190 158	3h 134	39 100	69 100	43 117	51 77
15 333	350	535	407	325	185	348	168	139	169	160	128
1010 23	1462 21	1404 23	1343 28	1308 25	1247 <b>5</b> 0	2408 45	3245 74	3956 97	4134 81	3176 77	4356 83

; therefore totals do not add.

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#### VC/NVA INCIDENTS IN 11 CORPS

Despite a greater increase in friendly maneuver battalions in II Corps, the VC/NVA incident rate there has not reacted with the strong upward trend found in I Corps, nor has the II Corps' shift of incidents from civiliar to military targets been as strong. However, the pattern of II Corps and I Corps incidents against hamlets and lines of communications are very similar.

In I CTZ Table 1 and graph A show that incidents have steadily increased since the entry of U.S. troops to five times their previous rate (from 436/mo to 2180/mo). II CTZ incident rates, however, doubled after the entry of U.S. troops, dropped back to previous rates and then doubled again in January-February of this year (graph B).

Graph C shows military incidents compared with growth in friendly battalion strength in II Corps. When U.S. forces entered II Corps, 23% of all II Corps incidents were directed at military targets; this rose to 47% by January-February 1967. In I Corps, military incidents rose from 25% to 83% of the total. In II Corps, the shift to military incidents has been slower than the friendly force buildup. II Corps maneuver battalion strength increased 2.2 times between the entry of U.S. forces and first quarter 1967; the proportion of military incidents increased cally 1.7 times. In I Corps, maneuver battalions increased 1.8 times; the proportion of military incidents increased 3.3 times.

(Monthly Average by Quarter)

(Monthly Average by Quarter)										
	1969	j	•		1 1966		• ••	1	1967	
	lst	2nd	3rd	4th	lst	2nd	3rd	4th	Jan	
	Qtr	Qtr	Qtr	Çtr	Qtr	Qtr	Qtr	Qtr	Feb	
I CORPS	201	200	-/0		000		1	0	. 00-	
Military Incidents	126	108	168	52	800	1143	1114	817	1813	
Other Incidents	_351	328	247	441	282	175	264	243	366	
Total	447	436	415	803	1082	1318	1378	1060	2179	
Mil as \$ of Total	28	25	40	45	74	87	81.	77	83	
Maneuver Bns b		29.8	35.3	35.3	41.0	45.1	52.8	52.8	54.0	
II CORFS Military Incidents Other Incidents	79 295	342 84	121 308	152 360		168 _333	154 258	141 215	368 419	
Total	374	.426	429c	512	834	501	412	356	787	
Mil as \$ of Total	<b>S1</b> .	20	28	30	39	34	37	40	47	
Maneuver Bns b/			25.8	36.8	41.0	44.0	49.3	57.7	57.7	

Source: NACC VCJSA File

/ Introduction of III MAP 8 March.

Introduction of U.S. Army in July.


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b/ Weighted: U.S. Army = 1, USMC = 1.5, ARVN = 0.59, ROK = 1, ROK MC = 1.5.

VC/NVA INCIDENTS (Monthly Average)

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


Incidents involving fixed and rotary wing aircraft in II Corps (Table 2) have fluctuated with the peaks and declines of the overall incident rate, with a sharp increase in January-February 1967. In contrast, I Corps incidents increased and remained at high levels throughout 1966, reaching an extremely high rate (2240 per month) in January-February 1967. Reported incidents involving helicopters alone (excluding fixed wing) also fluctuated at low levels in II Corps instead of growing to the sustained high rates in I Corps. Helicopter incidents in II Corps peaked at 11% (173) of the total in January-February 1967 in contrast to the I Corps rate of about 27% throughout 1966.

Incidents against military units and personnel peaked in 1st quarter 1966 at 165 per month or 21% of the total. Before 4th quarter 1965 virtually no incidents against company size or larger military units were reported. In 4th quarter 1965, 23 such incidents occurred per month and in 1st quarter 1966

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they peaked at 88 per month and then declined to 36 per month in January-February 1967. In I Corps incidents against company sized and larger units started at a rate of 27 per month, rose to 575 per month (3rd quarter 1966) and declined to 480 per month in January-February 1967.



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TABLE 2

#### II CORPS INCIDENTS (Monthly Average by Quarter)

	1963 10	<b>2Q</b>	32	40	1964 1Q	20	39	hq	1965 1Q
INCIDENTS INVOLVING: Military Aircraft a/ Other	15 50 65	16 45	2 60	11 174	14 179	25 109	14 115	12 66	19 60
Subtotal	65	61	62	185	193	134	129	78	79
Non-Military Hamlets S LOCs Other	22 4 37	24 5 37	43 6 36	222 20 50	168 35 63	166 17 1 <b>7</b> 9	224 57 213	132 68 114	137 48 111
Subtotal	63	66	85	292	266	362	494	344	296
TOTAL S Military of Total	128 51	127 48	147 42	477 39	459	496 27	623 21	422 18	3,5 21

Bource: NMCC VCJSA File

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a/ Includes helicopters.
b/ Includes outposts, facilities, camps, bivouac, units, personnel. company or larger and less than company.

c/ Includes MRL Hamlet, security fences, hamlets.
d/ Includes roads, all bridges, RR tracks and facilities, communication lines.

			_					ÇO	NFIDE	NTIAL	
50	39	40	1965 1Q	20	3Q	40	1966 1Q	2Q	3Q	40	Jan Zeb
25		12	19 60	27 57	35 86	68 84	159 165	57 111	87 67	91 50	278 90
109	129	78	79	57 84	121	152	324	168	154	141	368
					•						
166 17		132 68	137 48	110 75	46 87	47 50	46 49	36 45	25 27	35 14	38 7
	213	144	111	157	174	264	415	252	206	167	374
179 362	494	344	596	342	307	361	510	333	258	516	419
ارد	623	422	275	426	428	E3 2	921.	E01	1:20	250	<b>707</b>
496 27	21	18	375 21	20	28	513 30	834 39	501 34	412 37	357 40	787 47

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#### ENEMY INCIDENTS IN IV CORPS

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The introduction of U.S. combat forces into IV Corps early this year may have sparked a sharp reaction by the Viet Cong. January and February 1967 incident rates in IV CTZ were up nearly 30% over the levels of a year earlier and the last quarter of CY 1966. Total military and civilian incidents per month almost matched the peak level of the final quarter of 1965 (866 vs 386). The high rate in early 1967 is due to a new peak in military incidents (740 vs 651); non-military incidents were below the levels of the past two years. Aircraft incidents account for most of the increase; the 272 incidents were 101 over the Oct-Dec 1966 level and 193 over the level of a year ago.

This increase in aircraft incidents continues the generally upward pattern of the past 4 years. The pattern has been one of sharp increases to new levels: a jump from 17 to 50 (194% increase) in the 2nd quarter of 1964; an increase from 52 to 103 (98% increase) in the 4th quarter of 1965; and a jump from 103 to 171 (66% increase) in the 4th quarter of 1966. A further increase of 59% took place during the first two months of this year. These increases reflect the increases in tactical air and helicopter sorties that have occurred during this period. For example, helicopter flying hours in IV CTZ increased from 11,800 in the 4th quarter of 1965 to 16,700 during the 2nd quarter of 1966 and about 21,000 per quarter during the last half of 1966. Other factors may be changes in VC tactics and availability of new weapons and ammunition.

Among non-military targets in IV corps the overall trend is downward: 126 per month in the 1st two months of this year compared to 200 per month during CY 1965. Hamlets and villages were primary objects from April 1963 through June 1964. Beginning in July 1964, the emphasis shifted to sabotage (against roads, bridges, and railroad facilities), which suddenly and sharply increased (a 261% increase over the previous quarter's sabotage level) as incidents against hamlets and villages took a downward turn (from 52% to 32% of non-military incidents).

#### INCIDENTS IN IV CTZ

(Monthly Average by Quarter)

•			1967	1964				
	10	20	3C,	40	10	20	30	
Incidents Involving:				•				
Military								
Aircraft	n	6 <sup>.</sup>	. 12	QE	17	50	74	
Outposts	37	72	136	230	116	170	361	:
Personnel & Units	46	.'3	73	94	61	51	55	
Subtotal	94	151	221	334	194	271	490	:
Non-Military		•	٠					
Hamlet & Villages	13	81.	95	77	49	65	69	
Roads, Bridges & RR	2	4	16	23	<b>21</b>	32	118	
e/ Ci.ilians	6	15	12	2	3	27	28	
Subtotal.	21	100	123	102	73	124	215	
TOTAL.	115	251	344	436	267	395	765	ŧ
Military of Total	82	60	64	77	73	69	70	

Source: NMCC YCJSA File

Includes helicopters

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Includes watchtowers

Includes hamlets, NRL Hamlets and facilities, security fences.
Includes vehicular and railroad bridges, railroad tracks and facilities

Includes officials and inhabitants.

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
	196	4		1965					1		1967	
10	20	39	la Q	10	20	30	40	· 1Q	20	3Q	40	Jan-Feb
											v	
17.	50	74	35	37	38	52	103	79	85	103	171	272
116	170	361	385	397	447	328	479	385	430	260	275	330
61.	51	55	94	93	77	60	69	76	118	72	93	138
194	271	490	535	527	562	μμO	651	540	633	435	539	740
49	65	69	2	<b>5</b> 5	43	28	41	24	29	17	ध	29
ध्य	32	118	97	91	115	104	141	63	140	76	. 87	62
3	27	26	25	26	53	37	53	60	50	27	27	35
73	124	215	14	174	511	169	235	147	219	120	135	126
267	395	705	669	701	773	<b>609</b> .	886	687	852	555	674	866
73	69	70	77	75 -	73	72	73	79	74	78	80	85

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## VO/NVA ATTACKS



## VC/NVA ATTACKS 3/ (Monthly Average)

			1965				1966				704
		lst Half	2nd Half	Total 1965	lst Qtr	2nd Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	Total 1966	lst Qtr	194
Rn & Larger Small Scale Total		4.7 62.1	7.5 39.8	6.1 51.0	7.0 55.7	4.7 61.3	1.7 78.6	1.3	3.7	3.3	169
		00.0	47.3	57•1	63.7	66.0	w.3	2705.7	70.2	159.3	174
e/ Source: T	able 2	OSD SEA	Stati	stical	Summe	ry	1	(9, mi	Me.~~	•	1

a/ Source: Table 2 OSD SEA Statistical Summery

Large scale attacks continued increasing in the second quarter of 1967 and surpassed the CY 1966 average (Table and Graph 1). The emphasis on small scale attacks is continuing and is nearly three times the monthly average in the first half of 1966 (Graph 2).

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#### VC/NVA Incidents 1963-1967

Areas of high enemy incident activity in Vietnam have remained virtually the same since 1963, but some shifts in intensity between the areas are evident. The number of incidents has increased greatly over time, and are becoming concentrated in smaller areas. The greatest proportion of incidents now occurs in I Corps; in 1963 and 1964 IV Corps had the largest proportion.

The tables and accompanying computer plots indicate the increasing concentration of incident activity since 1963, particularly in I CTZ in the southeastern part of Quang Nam and eastern Quang Ngsi, and other centers of activity in the Northern Delta and northwest of Saigon.

The computer plots depict total incidents minus anti-aircraft fire, ambushes, anti-aircraft fire alone, attacks, and incidents against lines of communication (roads, railroads, etc.) by year from 1963 through April 1967. Anti-aircraft fire is considered separately from all other incidents against targets on the ground since the rapid growth of such incidents distorts the overall incident picture, and because AA fire is a direct reaction to friendly initiated air activity. The totals in the tables do not necessarily correspond to those found in the Southeast Asia Statistical Summary since Statistical Summary numbers are refined to eleminate double counting while the VCJSA computer file numbers are not (for example an incident where the VC enter a hamlet, propagandize, and kidnap might be counted 3 times, or once for each action).

#### Total Incidents (Minus Anti-aircraft Fire)


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#### Table 1.

•					
	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967 Jan-April
Total (minus AA fire) I Corps	878	3461	5539	10658	3995
II Corps	1001	4368	4607	5493	1665
III Corps	1530	3930	4890	- 7498	2684
IV Corps	<u>2572</u> 5981	<u>5626</u>	9597	8662	2331
Total	5981	17385	24633	32311	10675

As Table 1 and the computer plots show, total incidents \* increased each year, the largest increase occurring in 1964 with almost three times the 1963 total (17385 vs. 5981). The major centers of VC incident activity have remained approximately the same over the years. These centers are

<sup>\*</sup> Anti-aircraft incidents are not included in any of the statistics discussed in this section.




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# SOUTH VIETNAM

INCIDENTS FOR 1963

ALL IUCIDENTS EXCEPT AA FIRE

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generally found in the most populous areas of the country -- the I Corps coastal area \*\*, Gis Dinh and surrounding area and the Delta. It is interesting to note the activity in the War Zone C area of Tay Ninh province in 1967, an area where incidents did not occur before. This indicates that War Zone C has changed from an absolutely VC controlled area to a contested area.

The most notable change in the pattern over the years is the rapid buildup of incident activity in I Corps toth in total numbers of incidents. and in the proportion of all incidents which occurred. In 1963 IV CTZ accounted for 43% (2572 out of 5981) of all incidents and I Corps accounted for 15% (878). In 1967 IV CTZ is down to 22% (2331 out of 10675 for Jan-Apr) and I CTZ now accounts for 35% or 3995.

Within I Corps the Marine Tactical Areas of Responsibility (TAOR) comprise only 16% of the area of I Corps and contain 4% of the population. Yet, as Table 2 shows, in 1966 79% of all I Corps incidents occurred in these TAOR's and the Danang TACR accounted for half of these. Countrywide, the Danang TAOR accounted for more than 16% (1702 out of 8372) of incidents during 1966.

#### TABLE 2

#### INCIDENTS IN USMC TAORS IN I CORPS

(Quarterly Totals)

	1965 12	22	30	40	Total	1966 10		32	40	Total	1967 10
All Incidents Except AA Fire				·							
Denang TÀOR Chu Lai TAOR Phu Bai TAOR	208 94 124	214 145 123	380 124 63	584 291 183		1093 518 123		564	352	5302 2072 541	1223 555 114
Total TAORS	426	482	567.	1058	2533	1734	2115	2431	1635	7915	1892
Total I Corps % Total TAORS of I Corps			1132 50.1		5677 44.6	2338 74.2	2793 75.7	3165 76.8	2277 71.8	10573 74.9	2923 64.7

SOURCE: JCS - VCJEA Computer File.

\*\* Difficulties of registration between the plots and basic maps make the I Corps incidents in some cases appear to be slightly further from the coast than they actually ares.

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#### Anti-aircraft Fize

#### TABLE 3

AA Fire	1963	1964	1965	1966	<u> 1967</u> Jan-Apr
I Corps II Corps III Corps IV Corps Total	150	78	337	4288	2683
	49	155	90	1031	575
	62	205	109	1397	835
	<u>89</u>	362	131	997	636
	350	800	667	7713	4729

Table 3 shows that reported anti-aircraft fire in 1963 was very low - 350 incidents for the year. There was a scattering of such incidents north of Gia Dinh and some concentration along the Queng Ngai - Binh Dinh border. 1964 showed a rapid increase in the Delta and Gia Dinh area but still very little in I Corps. 1965 showed a rapid increase in I Corps (78 in 1964 to 3 337 in 1965) while the IV Corps total dropped from 362 to 131. The computer plots show that the I Corps increase was concentrated on the Quang Nam - Quang Tin border. Countrywide, 1966 AA fire incidents were more than 11 times the 1965 total (7713 over 667 in 1965), reflecting the arrival of US forces with fixed wing and helicopter support. Again, the heaviest concentration was in I Corps, notably the area south of Danang. An interesting line of incidents also appeared for the first time along the Iaos - Thua Thien province border. Thus far in 1967, 56.7% (2683 of 4729) AA fire incidents occurred in I Corps.

#### Attacks

Attacks
I Corps
II Corps
III Corps

IV Corpe Total

` 3	CABLE 4			1060
963	1964	. 1965	1966	1967 (Jan-Apr)
278	112	149	195	223
107	101	162	108	60

152 278

As Table 4 shows, reported attacks were at their lowest point in 1965 (561 down from 1065 in 1964) but were back up in 1966 to 733 and are continuing up in 1967. However, 4th quarter 1966 and all 1967 numbers contain incidents of mortar fire without intent to assault, a type of incident defined as harassing fire in 1964-65. About 28% of attacks in this period are mortar fire only. In 1963 many incidents of harassing fire were listed as attacks, a factor which probably accounts for the large number of attacks reported in that year.


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# SOUTH VIETNAM

INCIDENTS FOR 1964

ATTACKS

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The computer plots for reported attacks show the Delta, the area north of Saigon, Quang Ngai, Quang Tin, and Quang Nam in I Corps, and Binh Dinh in II Corps reporting high attack rates over the years. The concentrations in I Corps noted in 1963 and 1964 became more scattered in 1965 and 1966. Thus far in 1967, however, 41% (223 of 5-2) of reported attacks occurred in I Corps with the province closest to the DMZ, Grang Tin, leading with 68 attacks. This is partially due to the number of mortar and rocket attacks occurring in this province. While attacks in I Corps in 1967 have almost reached the 1963 level (223 vs 278), IV Corps, which had 1426 (59.7%) attacks reported in 1963, reported only 141 in the first four months of 1967. In 1963, 5 IV Corps provinces accounted for 974 or 41% of all reported attacks. By 1967 the five I Corps provinces accounted for 41% or 223 of 542 attacks.

#### Lines of Communication

TABIE 5

	1963	1954	1965	1966	1967 (Jan-Apr)
Lines of Communication I Corps II Corps III Corps	102 216 125	489 839 1032	1005 1162 1406	986 851 1301	444 230 448 470
IV Corps Total	243 686	1146 35%	1780 535 <b>3</b>	1615 4753	1592

Incidents against LOC's peaked in 1965 with 5353 that year and declined since (Table 5). The 1965 plot shows distinct patterns of incidents along railroads and roads; by 1966 and 1967 these lines have become somewhat diffused, reflecting the decreasing frequency of such incidents. This indicates real progress in opening LOC's to friendly traffic. II Corps incidents against LOC's have dropped over time as a percentage of the total -- 32% in 1963 to 14% in 1967. Conversely, I Corps has increased its percentage of the total -- 14.9% in 1963 to 27.5% in 1967. IV Corps, however, has consistently led in LOC incidents varying between 29.5% (1967) and 35.4% (1963) of the total.

In the first four months of 1967 Quang Ham accounted for 11.4% or 182 of 1592 such incidents. Altogether Quang Ham and Thua Thien in I Corps, Tay Winh, Binh Duong and Bien How in III Corps and Vinh Binh in IV Corps made up 44% or 697 of the 1592 incidents in Jan-Apr 1967.

#### Ambushes

TABLE 6


	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967 (Jan-Apr)
Ambushes I Corps II Corps III Corps IV Corps	75 133 156 291	77 124 182 163	30 78 55 51	56 32 72 44	9 11 24
Total	655	51.5	214	204	46

SOUTH VIET NAM INCIDENTS FOR 1947 Lines of Communication LEGEND

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CONFIDENTIAL SOUTH VIETNAM INCIDENTS FOR 1963 .Lines of Communication







Table 6 shows that reported ambushes have declined over the years. Given the high rates of general incident activity in 1966 and 1967, some incidents formerly reported as ambushes may now be reported under other categories. It does not seem likely, for example, that only to ambushes occurred in IV Corps during the first four months of 1967.

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SOUTH VIET NAM INCIDENTS FOR 1946 AMBUSHES 106

## VC/NVA Patterns of Activity

Systematic analysis of VC incident reports will yield patterns which may indicate the enemy's intent and capabilities in South Vietnam. These patterns also may help in assessing the progress of the war. Countrywide summary statistics are not sufficient since they mask regional patterns. A recent IDA/WSEC\_ study bears this out.

## Incident Concentrations

The IDA study analyzed three lunar years - LY 1964-1966. Throughout this period the VC/NVA initiated a consistently high level of activity averaging 1900 incidents per month, excluding anti-aircraft incidents. (Only the AA fire section below discusses these incidents.) The incidents clustered in the same general areas over time, with the patterns becoming more concentrated since LY 1965; 90% of all incidents in any given lunar quarter normally took place in 10% of the country; 25% regularly took place in only 1% of the country. (Map 3 shows the pattern for LY 1966.) In other words, incidents tend to occur where they have occurred before and areas afflicted with many incidents of one type tend to have many incidents of all other types as well. No patterns were found of one type of incident being unique to a particular area.

Incident density (incidents per squere kilometer) indicates a great deal about the nature of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnam (SVN). In the most active SVN incident areas, one incident every other month (0.5 incidents per month) per square kilometer is a high rate of activity, representing a mature guerrilla war. The worst road segments averaged only one incident per kilometer per month. This helps to explain why it is so difficult to find guerrillas in action at any given place and time.

Thus, VC/NVA initiated incidents viewed over a short period seem to indicate no orderly pursuit of enemy objectives. But when they are examined over three to twelve months, patterns become strikingly evident. This implies that the enemy anticipates that the cumulative effect over long periods vill be sufficient to achieve his goals.


### Targets of Enemy Incidents

The study divides incidents into "assaults" and "harassments," and the targets or "objectives" into (1) "military facilities and personnel," (2) "civil facilities and personnel" and (3) "transportation and communication." The purpose of these divisions was to determine the changes in the patterns of the enemy's actions -- harassments being supposedly less intense than "assaults" -- and shifts among targets of enemy actions.

1/ A. I. Schwartz, Selected Characteristics of VC Incidents, WSEG Staff Study No. 137, September 1967.

2/ All calculations in the IDA study are based on the Vietnamese lunar calendar.

The study covers Gregorian calendar period 13 February 1964 - 8 February 1967.



The analysis showed a sharp rise in assaults against military targets in LY 1956. Conversely, assaults against the other two classes declined after LY 1955 (Figure 5). Table 1 and Figure 7 show that assualts against military targets rose sharply to a peak in the second quarter of LY 1966 and declined shrily thereafter. By LY 1966, harassments against all three types of objectives fell well below their LY 1964 levels (Figure 6).




FIGURE 5 (C). Action Employing Weapons or Explosives Against Objectives (All SVN, 11964-11966)(U)





FIGURE 6 (C). Harassment Against Objectives (All SVN, L1964-L1966) (U)

Note: "F and P" means "facilities and personnel".



PLIMS INCLUDES 13 MONTHS F. J. TING IN AN EXTRA MONTH IN THE SECOND QUARTER, DATA FOR THE SECOND QUARTER WERE NORMALIZED TO BE ROUNALENT TO A THREE MONTH PERIOD.

FIGURE 7 (C). Actions Employing Weepons or Explosives Agulinit Military Facilities and Personnel (F and P) (All SVN, L1964-L1966 by Lunar Quarter)(U)

TABLE 1

Actions Involving Weapons or Explosives (Assault)

Against Military Facilities and Personnel

(By Lunar Qtr in Thousands)

IX 1964			LY :	1965				LY :			
70 20 30 40	Total	10	55	36	-3	Total	1Q	20	3Q	40	Total
1.7 2.2 2.2 2.3	8.4	1.9	2.5	2.2	3.5	10.1	4.0	5.3	4.4	3.7	17.4

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#### Time of Day

Two-thirds of the VC/NVA incidents occurred at night, with a peak right after dark. Another peak of activity occurred at mid-morning. Individual types of actions had distinctive patterns: attacks occurred most frequently between 2-00 and 0400 hours, ambushes from 0700 through 0900 hours. Night incidents did not vary with the amount of moonlight. Nor was there any other obvious cycle: on most days (two-thirds) the number of incidents in all South Vietnam varied from 45 to 80 per day, with low incident activity during Tet and the 1965 truce periods.

## Anti-Aircraft Fire

From about August 1965 through February 1967 the 9500 anti-aircraft fire cidents represented 17 to 35 percent of the total incidents reported every writer. A comparison of the geographic distribution of anti-aircraft inci. Att and all others shows that, although occasional AA fire incidents are allowed clusters of such incidents tend to be peripheral to concentration of other actions (donut shape). The Danang area in LY 1966 is a notable exception. There, AA fire incidents clustered throughout the area where all other incidents are concentrated.

#### SEAPRO Comment

Enemy activity must decrease, and GVN security must improve if US/GVN objectives are to be achieved in SVN. A decline in VC incidents in an area over a reasonable period is a significant indicator of a change in the situation -- one side or the other has gained control. The IDA study shows that such changes can be readily identified, using computerized data, and brought to the attention of the operator, planner and policy maker. Analyzed in conjunction with other information (status of hamlets, friendly operations, captured documents, etc.), incident data should give us important clues about who controls which areas of South Vietnam, which areas are most highly contested (high incident rates signify contested areas), and where progress is being made.

The substantive findings of the IDA study are distressing, because they show that the enemy can still maintain a high rate of incidents in the same areas year after year. The 1967 incident rate is comparable to that of 1965 and 1966; no dramatic decline is evident. (Investigation is underway to see if the geographical patterns remain the same.) Obviously, the guerrillas are as active as they ever were, although they have shifted their activity increasingly from civilian to military targets.

The IDA study also hints at substantial inadequacies in incident reporting. Incomplete reporting, changes in reporting criteria and definition, and changes in computer coding procedures have all occurred. These make comparison of incident data over time difficult. We have encountered similar problems with the data over time difficult. These make comparison of incident data over time difficult. The same all other incidents.

(although we find it very useful as is) and some indications that its quality has declined during 1967. In view of the importance of detailed incident data, we are working with DIA to develop a series of simple changes in coding and other procedures which might bring about substantial improvement in the data without further reporting burdens on field reporters. We hope to discuss these changes with MACV and CINCPAC in January 1965.

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## YE/TYA ATTACKS. IN III CTZ

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VC/NVA attacks in III CTZ have increased steadily since 1965. They sharply increased in 1967, primarily due to increased small unit attacks employing mortar fire. In the four III CTZ provinces bordering Cambodia the 1967 attack rate increased seven times the 1968 rate; elsewhere in III CTZ attacks doubled. In 1967 the border provinces accounted for half of the III CTZ attacks, compared to 24% in 1966 and 1965. The attacks in the last quarter of 1969 hit a three-year peak. The pattern suggests that VC/NVA forces may have greatly increased their attacks in the border areas in order to disperse alied forces away from the heavily populated areas around Saigon.

## A Word About the Attack Data

Two sets of somewhat inconsistent VC/NVA incident data are used in this article. Tables 1 and 5 are based on summary data from the daily MACV OPREP report. The summary data represents the "official" incident count, but limits analysis of attacks to large-scale versus small-scale attacks by corps area. In order to analyze attacks by province, by target, by type (mortar fire versus assault), etc., we must turn to e computer file which reports each incident separately on the basis of a detailed annex to the daily OPREP. Invariably, the totals from this data do not agree with the summary data. The computer data used in this article shows lower attack figures, because ambushes have not been counted as attacks, and we suspect the enemy attacks in reaction to allied operations have not been included in the file. Future articles will attempt to narrow the discrepancies and to address the ambush reports. In the meantime, we note that both sels of data show the same basic trends. Therefore, they are useful for trend snalysis even though specific figures disagree.

## Rise in Attacks

VC/NVA attacks in III CTZ have increased consistently each quarter since mid-1965. The 1967 attack rate was 2.4 times the 1966 rate and 4.2 times the 1965 rate. The Yourth quarter 1967 rate rose so sharply that it almost equalled the 1966 total. Small unit attacks account for the increases. Battalion-sized and larger attacks hit a three-year peak in fourth quarter 1965 but do not show a significant upward trend during the three-year period.

#### TABLE 1

### TOTAL VC/NVA ATTACKS IN III CTZ (Summary Data)

	1965	1966	1967	196 10	2 20	30	40	196 10	<u>20</u>	35.	40	196 10	7 20	39	40
Battalion & Larger Small	25 136	15 269	23 655	2 34	8 39	6 31	9 32	#5 8	4 58	2 78	1 91	3 123	118 118	6 154	260 260
Total	161	284	678	36	47	37	42	50	62	80	92	126	122	160	270

Source: (F.3D SA) SEA Statistical Table 3A and DIA Weekly Worksheets.

(In comparison with the other corps areas, the TII CTZ suffered about the same number of attacks as I and IV CTZ during the 1965-67 period, with II CTZ well below all other CTZ. However, III CTZ reported more battalion and larger attacks than any other corps area during 1965, 1966 and 1967, and accounted for 37% of all large attacks during that period. Moreover, its share increased from 3-% in 1965-66 to 43% in 1967.)

Table 2, based on our computer file of VC/EVA incidents, also shows the strong upward trend in attacks. Assaults increased abruptly each year, with the 1967 rate about double the 1966 rate, and three times the 1965 rate. Most of the sharp 1967 rise in total attacks is caused by the increasing mortar attacks. Finally, attacks of both types reached a three-year peak during fourth quarter 1967.

### TABLE 2

## ATTACKS IN III CTZ a/b/ (Computer Data)

•	1965	1966	1967	196	22 2	39	40	196 10	<u>8</u> 0	3Q	4Q	196 10	<u>7</u> 20	30	ЦQ
Mortar Attacks c/ Assaults b/	86	13 145	259 265	25	27	21	15	36	33	8 31	5 45	24 66	50 54	76 59	109 86
Total	88	158	524	25	27	21	15	36	33	39	50	90	104	135	195

a/ Source: NMCSSC-VCJSA Computer File, derived from VNDBA file.

Does not include ambushes or, we suspect, attacks occurring in presence of friendly operations.

### Targets of VC/NVA Attacks

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During 1967, VC/NVA attacks against both population centers and military targets increased sharply due largely to increased mortar incidents. Attacks against district towns, military personnel, military headquarters, camps (primarily CIDG and US base camps), and outposts accounted for most of the increase (Table 3).

c/ Mortar attacks of 20 or more rounds began to be counted as attacks during third quarter 1966. Before, they were counted as harassing fire; less than 20 rounds still counts as harassing fire.

TABLE 3 TARGETS OF ENERY ATTACKS IN III CTZ (Computer Data)

				196	<u>.</u>			196	<u>6</u>		
<u>.</u>	1965	1966	1967	10	20	30	4Q	10	55	3Q	40
Population Centers											İ
Hamlets Villages District Towns Other a/	16 1 3 8	6 0 2 5	17 7 22 8	6. 0 0 3	4 0 2 3	3 1 1 0	3 0 0 2	0 0 0 0 0	0 0	1 0 1 1	2 0 1 0
Total	28	13	54	9	9	5	5	2	5	3	3
Military Facilities  Headquarters b/ Training Center Base Airfield Military Post Outpost Camp c/	0 1 0 0 35 7	1 4 2 1 35 29 3	29 12 8 4 49 75	0 0 0 0 10	0 1 0 0 10 3	000731	0 0 0 8 1 0	0100.751	000860	1 1 0 11 3 2	0 2 1 1 9 15 0
Other	4	1	10	0	3	1	G	1	0	0	0
Total	48	76	258	10	17	12	9	15	14	19	26
Military Personnel	8	43	183	3	1	3	1	10	9	12	12
Total Military	56	119	441	13	18	15	10	25	23	31	40
Other d/	4	26	55	1	2	1	0	6	5	6	9
Total e/	88	158	550	23	29	21	15	33	33	40	52

Source: MMCSSC-VCJSA file, derived from VIDBA file.

Schools, markets, village and district offices.
Includes command posts.
Primarily Special Forces and CIDG camps.

Civilians, police, vehicles, area.

Totals do not agree with Tables 2 and 4 due to multiple targets for some attacks

CTZ

	196	<u>6</u>			196	7		
40	10	23	30	40	12	20	32	40
3 0 0 2	2000	1 0 0	101111111111111111111111111111111111111	2 0 1 0	2 0 1 0	0 3 4 1	7 2 6 5	8 2 11 2
		5		3	3		20	23
00008100	01007511	0 0 0 8 6 0 0	1 1 0 11 3 2 0	0 2 1 9 15 0	3 1 10 10 7 1	1 1 9 12 15	9 4 2 2 10 25 19 5	12 5 2 1 20 28 30
9 _1	15	14	19 12	28	38 41	46 40	76 36	98 66
10	න 6	23	31 6	40 9	79 14	86	112	164 18
15	33	33	40	52	96	105	144	

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In 1967, military targets accounted for 441 (80%) of the 550 total targets attacked and for 82% of the 1967 increase in targets. Military personnel accounted for a third of all 1967 targets and showed the greatest increase (+140) ever 1966, followed by camps (+68), outposts (+46) and military head-quarters (+28). Altogether, the foregoing military targets accounted for about 90% of the increased attacks against military targets in 1967, and for 72% of the military-civilian target increase. The sharp increase in attacks against military headquarters and military camps is a departure from 1965-1966 attack patterns, and is probably due to the increase in mortar incidents, which in 1967 were counted as attacks.

The increase in attacks against district towns also represents a distinct departure from past attack patterns. District towns were targets for 22 attacks (mortar fire only) in 1967; only five attacks of any kind against district towns were reported during all of 1965-1966. The increase in 1967 may have signified the increasing enemy willingness to attack populated areas which culminated in the Tet offensive. (During the last half of 1967 there were 17 attacks against district towns and 15 against hamlets in III CTZ.) In the 22 attacks, five district towns were hit twice (each in a different province). The attacks were spread fairly evenly throughout III CTZ.

## Where Attacks Occur

Attacks in the four provinces of III CTZ which border Cambodia increased significantly during 1967, compared to 1966 levels and to the rest of III CTZ. In terms of total attacks, Table 4 shows that the border provinces in 1967 suffered seven times the 1966 attack rate. The rate doubled in the rest of III CTZ. As a result, the border provinces accounted for over half (52%) of the 1967 attacks in III CTZ, compared to one-fourth (24%) in both 1965 and 1966.

If we exclude mortar fire incidents and run the comparisons using assaults only, the pattern is the same. The border provinces had three times as many assaults in 1967; the other provinces only had 1.4 times as many. As a result, the border provinces accounted for 43% of the 1967 assaults, compared to 23-25% in 1965 and 1966. The four border provinces also accounted for 61% of the 1967 attacks by mortar fire only. (160 versus 99 elsewhere in III CTZ.)

Some assaults occurred against other types of targets which were near district towns but are not classified as an assault against a district town in the reporting system - the Loc Ninh attack, for example.

TABLE 4

ATTACKS BY PROVINCE IN III CTZ

(Computer Data)


	1965 YR	1966 YR	1967 YR	1965 10tr	20tr	3Ctr	40tr	1966 10tr	20tr	30tr	40tr	1967	20tr	30tr	4Qtr
Border Provinces				-		<u> </u>				74,55					
Phuoc Long	9	1	32	2	3	3	1	0	0	1	0 /	4	3	9	16
Binh Long	0	ક	57	0	0	0	0	5	1	1	1'	4	6	20	27
Tay Ninh	4	11	97	1	2	1	0	0	0	6	5	20	25	17	35
Hau Nghia	_8	18_	87_	1	6_	1	0	4	3	6	. 5	15	18	24	30
Subtotal.	21	38	273	4	11	5	1	9	4	14	11	43	52	70	108
Other Provinces															
Long An	18	26	71	5	5	4	4	7	6	6	7	16	14	15	26
Bien Hoa	9	12	46	5	4	0	3	2	4	4	2	10	9	10	17
Gia Dinh	12	35	25	0	2	7	3	4	11	21	9	4	4	7	10
Binh Duong	11	26	67	5	2	3	1	- 8	3	2	13	12	12	16	27
Phuoc Tuy	1	10	22	ì	0	0	0	0	2	2	6	2	6	10	Å
Binh Tuy	5	5	4	1 4	1	0	0	3	1	0	1	0	2	2	0
Long Khanh	11	6_	<u> 16</u>	4	5	5	3	3_	2	0	1	3	j j	5	<b>4</b>
Subtotal	67	120	251	21	16	16	14	27	29	25	39	47	51	65	88
*/								-							
Total	88	158	524	25	27	21	15	36	33	39	50	90	103	135	196

a/ Includes mortar attacks Source: VCJSA file.

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As Table 1 showed, large-scale attacks in 1967 were 1.5 times the 1966 rate, but were still slightly lower than the 1965 level. Ten of the 23 large attacks in 1967 occurred in the fourth quarter; at least five occurred in the four border provinces. Table 5 displays the available data on large-scale attacks by province in III CZ; it shows that large-scale attacks in 1967 increased in the border provinces but declined elsewhere in III CZ.

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TABLE 5

VC/NVA PATTALION SIZE OR LARGER ATTACKS IN III. CTZ a/
(Summery Data)

Border Frovinces	1965	1966	<u> 1967</u>
Hau Nghia	6	2	2
Tay Ninh	ŏ	1	
Binh Long	i	2	3 3 2
Phuoe Long	2	ō	2
Subtotal	9	5	10
Other Provinces			
Gia Dinh	ı	1	0
Long An	1	1	0
Bien Hoa	2	0	1
Binh Duong	6	3	3
Long Khanh	1	ž	ŏ
Phuoc Tuy	0	1	1
Binh Tuy	1	2	1
Subtotal	12	10.	- 6
Total <sup>b</sup>	21 <sub>p</sub> /	15	16 <sub>P</sub> /

The military targets data also reflects the 1967 increase in border province attacks. During the year, the four border provinces accounted for: (1) more than half of the military targets attacked in III CTZ, (2) talf of the attacks against military personnel, (3) 80% of the attacks against CIDG and other camps (Tay Ninh alone accounted for 43% of the III CTZ camps attacked), (4) 38% of the attacks against military posts and outposts, and (5) 59% of the attacks against military headquarters.

Thus, all of the data show a dramatic increase in enemy attacks in the four border provinces of III CTZ during 1967, and particularly during the fourth quarter. Attacks elsewhere in III CTZ increased but at a much slower rate, contiming at the rate of growth between 1965 and 1966. The map plots show the change in graphic fashion.

s/ Source: Summary data from DIA weekly worksheets.
b/ Includes only 21 of 25 attacks in 1965 and 16 of 23 large attacks in 1967.

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III CORPS
ENEMY ATTACKS
1967

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TABLE 6

				<u> 11</u>	II CTZ /				Attack
						(Compute	er Data		
	<u>1965</u> YR	1966 YR	<u>1957</u>	1965 13tr	004-	204	liot	1966 10tr	004
	IR	IR	- 25	TATE	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	TOCK	2Qtr
Attacks				l					
Mortar	0	13	259	0	0	0	0	0	0
Assaults	88	145	255	25	27	21	15	36	33
Total	88	158	524	25	27	21	15	36	33
			i		•		•	_	
Casualties									
Mortar:		_		:					
KTA	0	26	278	0	0	0	0	0	0
· WIA	0	106	1572	0	0	0	0	0	0
XIA Mada 3	- 0	320	16 1000	0	0	<u> </u>	0	<u> </u>	0
Total	U	132	1000	0	0	0	0	0	0
Assaults:									
KIA	868	776	757	147	.422	217	82	267	240
WIA	795	1185	1909	192	313	204	86	565	182
HTA	891	386	239	312	378	155	46	163	51
Total	2554	2347	2915	651	1113	576	214	995	473
•						<b>,</b> , ,			1.5
All Attacks:		•							
XTA	868	802	1045	147	422	217	82	267	240
WIA .	795	1291	31-31	192	313	204	86	565	182
MIA	891	386	255	312	378	155	46	163	<u>51</u> 473
Total	2554	2479	4701	-651	1113	576	214	995	473
Casualties per Attack									
Mortar:	•					•			
KIA	0	2.0	1.1	0	0	0	0	0	0.
All Casualties	0	10.2	7.2	0	0	0	.0	0.	. 0
Asseulte:					•				
KTA	9.9	5.4	2.9	5.9	15.0	10.3		<b>— 1</b> .	
All Casualties	29.0	16.2	11.0	26.0	15.9 41.2	10.3 27.4	5.5	7.4	7.3
	-3.4	_		٠٠	71.6	21.4	14.3	27.6	14.3
All Attacks:									
KTA	9.9	.5.1	2.0	5.9	15.6	10.3	5.5	7.4	7.3
All Casualties	29.0	15.7	9.1	26.0	41.2	27.4	14.3	27.6	14.3
								-,,,,	

Source: IDICSSC VCJSA computer file, tased on VIDBA file.

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	es Per	Attack						
ata)	1966				1967			
tr	10tr	<u> </u>	30tz	Lotr	<u>1967</u> 1Çtr	2Qtr	30tr	4Qtr
			,		. •		_	
9 15	ა 36	0 33	8 31	5 45	24 66 90	50 54	76 59	109 86
<u>15</u> 15	<u>36</u> 36	33 33	39	50	90	5 <sup>1</sup> 4	59 135	195
u	0	0 .	24	5	50	45	94	89
0	0.	0	72	3 <b>4</b>	159 15	267 1	518 0	628 0
<del>-0</del>	8	Ö.	96	36	224	313	612	717
86 88	267 565	185 540	98 174	171 264	169 326	184 354	142 441	272 788
46 214	163 995	<u>51</u> 473	283	161 596	<u>77</u> 572	<u>57</u> 595	4 <u>1</u> 624	64 1124
STA	777	413		750	712	797	024	1124
82 86 46	267 565 163	240 182 51	546 135	173 298 161	219 . 485 92	223 621 58	236 959 41	361 1416 64
श्रम	995	473	379	12	796	908	1236	1841
0	9	0	3.0 12.0	0. <b>4</b> 7. <b>2</b>	2.1 9.3	.9 6.3	1.2 8.1	.8 6.6
5.5 14.3	7.4 27.6	7.3 14.3	3.2 9.1	3.8 13.2	2.6 8.7	3.4 11.1	2.4 10.6	13.1 3.2
5.5 14.3	7.4 27.6		3.1 9.7	3.5	2. <b>4</b> 8.8	2.2 8.7	1.7	1.9 9.4

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## Allied Casualties From VC/NVA Attacks

Table 6 divides the attacks for the 1965-1967 period into mortar fire and assaults, gives total allied losses for each type of attack and the average losses per attack. It shows that:

- 1. Total attacks increased sharply in 1966 and 1967, but did not inflict additional allied casualties until 1967; mortar attacks accounted for 75% of the additional allied casualties in 1967.
- 2. Allied personnel killed in all attacks dropped slightly in 1966 and rose only 30% in 1967, despite a threefold increase in 1967 attacks. Allied KIA from enemy assaults actually decreased slightly in 1967.
- 3. Average casualties per mortar attack in 1967 were 7.2 (1.1 KIA) versus average casualties of 11 (2.9 KIA) per assault in 1967. Thus, assaults are only 1.5 times as effective as mortar attacks in inflicting total allied losses, and only 2.6 times as effective in killing allied personnel. This makes VC/NVA mortar attacks much more profitable to the VC/NVA than assaults, because they can reduce their casualties to practically nothing and still inflict worthwhile losses on allied forces.

#### TABLE 7

Total Allied	Casualties From Compute		- 111 CTZ <sup>2</sup> /
	1965	1966	1967
Border Provinces Phuoc Long Binh Long Tay Hinh Hau Hghia Subtotal	841.b/ 0 74 180 1098	3 155 134 197 489	257 556 717 915 2445
Other Provinces Gia Dinh Binh Duong Long An Bien Hoa France Tuy Long Khanh Binh Tuy	180 250 277 154 29 385 181	321 443 353 159 272 264 178	162 673 899 338 106 115 43
Total	2554	2479	4781

Source: NVCSSC-VCJSA computer file. Includes killed, wounded and missing.
b/ Phwoc Long suffered at least two attacks in 1965 which involved mass kidnappings and therefore a large number of MIA. Other attacks in Phwoc
Long the same year caused large numbers of KIA and WIA. The result was
that only nine attacks caused 844 casualties that year.

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## VC/SVA ATTACK PATTER'S 1965-1967

The February SEA Analysis report noted a steady increase in enemy attacks in the III CTZ area since 1965, primarily due to increased small unit attacks employing mortar fire. The rapidly increasing number of attacks in the sparsely populated border areas indicated to us a possible 70 strategy move to draw U.S. forces away from the urban populated areas centered shound Saigon.

Since February we have completed a preliminary analysis of attack patterns throughout Vietnam. Much of what we discovered about attacks in III CTZ holds true for the country as a whole. For example: (1) VC attacks have increased steadily since 1965; (2) the 1967 total was 2.6 times 1966, primarily due to a doubling of assaults and the inclusion of large mortar barrages in the attack data for the first time, (3) attacks against population centers quadrupled throughout the country during 1967, (4) allied casualties from enemy attacks increased in 1967, but casualties per attack continued to decline.

We also find a high concentration of attacks in certain areas of SVN; eight (18%) provinces accounted for 44% of all enemy attacks in 1967. Finally, a comparison of attacks with enemy battalion and combat personnel strength indicates that the enemy attack effort (attacks per enemy unit/strength) increased 60-70% in 1967. The data also indicate that the enemy was too pre-occupied with building up his combat forces to generate a high attack effort between July 1965 (when US forces entered combat) and September 1966. By fourth quarter 1966 he had most of his forces in place and they began to generate higher attack rates.

What is clear from our study so far is the continued ability of the enemy to launch attacks in 1967 and even markedly step up his efforts. His choice of targets reflects his initiative and possibly his strategy. The increasing use of mortar fire reflects his ability to obtain and employ this weapon and thereby gain the advantage of inflicting maximum destruction and casualties at minimum cost to himself. At the same time, he is able to terrorize the population and dramatize the basic insecurity of the towns.

On the other hand, the attack data reflect the success of allied forces in preventing the increasing number of VC/NVA battalions in South Vietnam from launching a higher rate of large attacks; the number of battalions doubled between 1966-67, but the 1967 battalion sized attack rate 1 emained below the 1965 rate. The sharp rise in small attacks and employment of mortar fire, accompanied by less friendly casualties per attack, further indicate that the enemy was forced to operate in smaller units with less effectiveness.

### A Word About the Attack Data

The February 1968 SEA Analysis Report article on attacks in III CTZ noted major differences between the VC/NVA attack data reported in the VMDBA computer file and in the OSD Southeast Asia Statistical Summary, the official OSD source of attack data. At that time, we speculated that adding ambushes to the computer's attack figures would bring them

closer to the statistical summary figures. It brought them within 6% for this article.\* This indicates that the attack data in the computer file is quite good for trend analysis in conjunction with the Statistical Summary rate and can be used to break cut the summary data by province, type of attack, type of target, resulting carnelties, etc., in order to obtain a comprehensive picture of VC/NUA attack patterns. It is likely, however, that both sets of data understate actual enemy attacks, because attacks against military personnel and facilities engaged in allied offensive operations are usually reported as part of the operation rather than as an enemy initiated action.

## Large Versus Small Attacks

Table 1 shows the consistent increase in attacks since mid-1965. The 1967 attack rate was 2.6 times the 1966 rate, with all 4 CTZ showing increases.

#### TABLE 1

# VC/MVA Attacks 1965-67

	1965	1566	1967	1965 10tr	23tr	3 <b>2</b> 75	4 <u>C</u> tr	1366 11tr	20tr	3Çtr	4Qtr	1967 10tr	2Qt:	32tr	LQtr
Bn Size Small Scale	73 612	44 894	54 2422	7 224	21 149	16 115	29 124	21 170	14 184	236	4 304	10 468	13 510	13 840	∷.8 736
Total	685	938	2476	231	170	1:1	153	191	198	241	308	478	523	661	वाय

a/ Source: OSD SEA Statistical Surary.

### Assaults, Ambushes and Mortar Attacks

Table 2 shows that mortar attacks and assaults account for the large increase in attacks during 1967; ambushes declined. Assaults increased each year, with the 1967 rate about double the 1966 rate. Mortar attacks accounted for more than half the 1967 attack gain. Moreover, they rose to 45% of the total attacks in the final quarter of 1967.

<sup>\*</sup> Except for fourth quarter 1957 for which computer data is 20% lower than the statistical summary, because of still preliminary reports. We expect the final data for the record to be close to the statistical summary data.

#### TABLE 2

# Assaults, Ambushes and Mortar Attacks in SVN

	1965	1966	1967	1955 19tr	20tr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1966 10tr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1967 19tr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtra/
Countrywide Mortar Attach Assaults Ambushes Total	488 182 670	518	822 1315 188 2325	160 60	106 55 161	94 36 130	128 31 159	141 40 181	150 54 204	8 153 65 226	24 237 59 380	101 334 42 477	181 318 30 529	246 374 51 671	294 289 65 648c/

a/ Source: N/CSSC-VCIIA File, derived from VNDHA file.

The reporting of twenty or more mortar rounds as attacks (instead of harassing fire) began during the third quarter 1966. Less than 20 rounds still counts as harassing fire.

c/ Fourth quarter 1967 data incomplete by about 166 incidents or 20% of summary data in Table 1.

## VC/NVA Attack Effort per Battalion and Strength

Table 3 shows that VC/NVA forces worked 60%-70% harder (in terms of attacks per 1000 VC/NVA combat personnel or per battalion) at generating ground attacks during 1967 that they did in 1966. The quarterly figures show that the VC/NVA ground attack effort dropped significantly during the summer of 1965, when US forces first entered combat. The enemy effort remained at a low level until fourth quarter 1966 when an upward trend began, lasting through 1967. The table further indicates that the enemy was probably too pre-occupied with building up his combat forces to generate a high attack effort during the 15 month period from July 1965 (when US forces entered combat) through September 1966; he added 86 battalions and 56,000 personnel to his combat force during the period. By fourth quarter 1966 most of his forces were in place and he began working harder; he added only 12 battalions (and lost about 11,000 combat personnel) thereafter.

#### Targets of VC Attacks

Table 4 shows that attacks against population centers increased faster in 1967 than attacks against military targets. In every CTZ in SVN, population centers sustained nearly four times as many attacks in 1967 as in 1966. District towns were attacked 7.7 times as often in 1967, mostly by mortar fire; they accounted for half of all attacks against population centers in 1967. Attacks against military facilities tripled and attacks against military units/personnel doubled.

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TABLE 3

VC/NVA GROUND ATTACK EFFORT

		Total 1965	1967 <sub>1</sub>	1965 1Q	2Q_	<b>3Q</b>	4	
Ground Attacks Battalion & Larger Small Scale 2	73 612	44 862	54 1525	7 22 <sup>1</sup> 4	21 149	16 115	1	94
Total	685	906	1579	231	170	131	1	3
VC/NVA Combat Bns b/ Ground Attacks Per Bn	104 6.6	188 4.8	205 7.7	106 2.2	117 1.5	134	1	10
Confirmed VC/NVA Com- bat Strength (OOO) b/ Ground Attacks Per	70	111	114	59.9	68.8	76.7	90	la,
1000 Combat Strength	9.8	8.2	13.9	3.9	2.5	1.7	1	7

Calculated by subtracting Table 2 mortar attacks from Table 1 small Pourth quarter mortar incidents were increased by 25% before being cause Table 1 total attacks are 25% higher than the Table 2 attack uncorrected data.

b/ Source: Table 105, GSD SEA Statistical Summary. Yearly figures a Quarterly figures are end of quarter.

<u>2Q</u>	3Q	Ļ,	1966 10	20	3Q	ЦQ	1967 10	2Q	<u> 32</u>	ЦQ
21 149	16 115	19 114	21 170	14 184	5 228	4 280	10 367	13 329	13 Ŀ02	18 427 <u>3</u> /
170	131	113	191	198	233	284	377	342	415	445
117	134 1.0	111 110	182	202 1.0	203 1.1	193 1.5	199 1.9	206 1.7	210	215 2.1
<b>8.8</b>	76.7	904	104.8	119.1	124.8	113.9	112.5	114.6	115.6	114.1
2.5	1.7	4.	1 1.3	1.7	1.9	2.5	3.4	3.0	3.6	3.9

from Table I small scale actions.

y 25% before being subtracted, bethe Table 2 stacks, which are from

. Yearly figures are averages.

TABLE 4

TARGETS OF VC ATTACKS IN SVN
(Computer Data)

	1965	1956	1967	1965 10tr	20tr	30tr	4Ctr	1956  10:r	20tr	3Qtr	49tr	1967 110tr	2Qtr	3Qtr	40trb
Pop Centers			- 4	41				4				,			
Mil Facilities				. 8				•				1			
Mil Personnel	244	401	758	80	59	58	47	59	90	127	125	198	148	219	193
Other	77	146	320	34	26	£	9	28	41	32	45	77	56	93	94
TOTAL <sup>2</sup>	645	950	2397	219	161	131	134	172	196	249	333	491	531	700	675 <u>b</u> /

a/ Totals do not agree with Table 1 because of multiple targets for some attacks and missing data for 1965.

### Friendly Casualties from Enemy Attacks

Enemy attacks caused about 45,000 allied casualties (14,500 KIA) during the 1965-67 period (Table 5). Total casualties from enemy attacks increased about 40% in 1967 over the 1965-66 rate, because the friendly personnel wounded in action (WIA) doubled in 1967; the mortar attacks probably account for most of the WIA increase. The average casualties per attack has declined each year indicating that attacks are more frequent but less serious.

Friendly KIA from enemy attacks remained quite constant (within a 10% range) during 1965-67; only in I CTZ did the KIA from enemy attacks increase significantly (27%) during 1967. Missing in action figures declined throughout the period.

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b/ Fourth quarter 1967 data is preliminary and is incomplete by about 20%.

TABLE 5

# FRIENDLY CASUALTIES FROM ENEMY ATTACKS (Computer Data)

property to the braiding sincial son to 2 hours

	1965	1966	1967	1965 10	2Q	3Q	.49_
Attacks	670	931	2325	220	161	130	159
Casualties						063	1200
KIA WIA MIA	4839 4663 4296	4577 5822 2266	5100 12246 1312	969 1303 1249	1517 998 858	961 922 1322	1392 1440 867
Total	13798	12665	18658	3521	3373	3205	3699
Cesualties Per Attack		•					
KIA Per Attack WIA Per Attack MIA Per Attack	7.2 7.0 6.4	4.9 6.3 2.4	2.2 5.3 .6	4.4 5.9 5.7	9.4 6.2 5.3	7.4 7.1 10.2	8.8 9.1 5.5
Total Per Attack	20.6	13.6	8.0	16.0	21.0	24.7	23.3

Fourth quarter data in preliminary and is incomplete by about 20%.

1965 10	Sď	32	,4Q	1	66 Q	<b>2Q</b>	3Q	40	1967 12	55	32	4Q 8/
220	161	130	159		81	204	226	320	477	529	671	648
969 1303 1249	1517 998 858	961 922 1322	1392 1440 867	1	166 765 810	1218 1350 489	796 1323 359	1097 1384 608	1295 2317 300	1332 2918 355	1365 3914 214	1108 3067 442
3521	3373	3205	3699		041	3057	2478	3089	3912	4636	5493	4617
4.4 5.9 <u>5.7</u>	9.4 6.2 5.3	7.4 7.1 10.2	8.8 9.1 5.5		8.1 9.8	6.0 6.6 2.4	3.5 5.9 1.6	3.4 4.3 1.9	2.7 4.9 .6	2.5 5.6 .7	2.0 5.8 •3	1.7 4.7
16.0	21.0	24.7	23.3		2.3		11.0	9.7	8.2	8.8	8.2	7.1

complete by about 20%.

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
134

TABLE 6

## 1967 VC/NVA ATTACKS BY PROVINCE

		Attack	<u>s</u>		Attacks					
	Mortar	Ground	Total		Mortar	Ground	Total			
Quanty Tri Thua Thien Quanty Nam Quanty Tin Quanty Ngai Total	139 50 32 25 25 271	1 <sup>1</sup> 47 51 100 59 10 <sup>4</sup> 451	286 101 132 84 129 732	Binh Dinh Kontum Pleiku Phu Bon Phu Yen Khanh Hoa Ninh Thuan Darlac Quang Duc Tuyen Duc Lam Dong Binh Thuan Total	22 13 2 4 1 0 6 3 1 3 0	59 23 19 5 52 17 7 23 6 11 12 31	63 45 32 7 56 18 17 29 9 12 15 31			
Binh Tuy Phuoc Long Binh Long Long Khanh Phuoc Tuy Bien Hoa Tay Ninh Binh Duong Hau Nghia Long An Gia Dinh Total	1 16 35 9 3 19 62 34 41 15 7	7 21 27 19 17 45 51 45 55 72 30	8 37 28 28 25 63 113 79 87 37 635	IV CTZ Sa Dec Dinh Tuong Go Cong Kien Hoa Kien Phong Chau Doc An Giang Vinh Bing Vinh Long Phong Dinh Chuong Thien Ba Xuyen Bac Lieu	1 41 0 35 19 13 0 11 12 15 20 11	16 42 3 51 10 10 59 43 24 22 19	17 83 36 35 23 10 70 55 39 49 14			
All SVM	822	1503	2325	An Kuyen Kien Tuong Kien Giang Total	34 6 15 245	15 8 24 379	· 14 39 624			

**ENEMY ATTACKS** 



#### Where / tracks Occur

During 1967, five (4 in I CTZ) SVN provinces received more than 160 attacks each and together accounted for a third of all attacks in South Vietnam. Quang Tri, adjacent to the DMZ, led with 286 attacks, more than double the rate in second place Quang Nam. Quang Ngai, Tay Ninh, and Thua Thien trailed the leaders in that older. Mortar attacks were also highest in Quang Tri, followed by Tay Ninh, Thua Thien, Hau Nghia and Dinh Tuong. Ground attacks (assaults and ambushes) were highest in Quang Tri, Quang Ngai, Quang Nam, and Long An. The eight provinces (18% of SVN) listed above accounted for 44% of the 1967 attacks in SVN, including 49% of the mortar attacks and 41% of the ground attacks. (Table 6 shows 1967 attacks for each province in SVN. The map plots show the distribution of total VC/NVA attacks by year for 1965-1967.)

A very preliminary correlation analysis of province attack data with a few other factors indicates that:

- 1. High rates of mortar attacks tend to occur in provinces with large numbers of: enemy, VC population, and ARVN forces.
- 2. High rates of ground attacks tend to occur in provinces with large number of: enemy, contested and VC population, and RWMAF forces (particularly PF).

The correlation findings are tenuous at best. A time series analysis was not performed and many possibly relevant factors have not been examined yet (US-FW force strength by province, for example, was not readily available). A more complete analysis will be performed in the future.

#### REDUCED ENEMY ACTIVITY RATE

The July 1968 enemy incident total (2338) was the lowest since Nay 1965. The decline started in June, is noticeable in all four CTZs, and has continued into September.

In Table 1 we have eliminated anti-aircraft fire incidents from the basic incident data, because it has different characteristics from other incidents. Attacks, terror, sabotage, etc., are planned activities, but AA fire seems to be a reaction to allied air sorties.

#### TABLE 1

#### TOTAL ENEMY INCIDENTS MINUS AA FIRE

	1967 Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Xov	Dec	1968 Jan	Feb	Mar	Aptr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug
IA CIZ III CIZ II CIZ	777 344 501 516	784 338 506 470	1027 362 561 729	750 283 618 487	617 290 491 602	603 318 432 955	767 416 595 673	751 335 598 435	856 485 773 1676	867 273 548 931	1086 435 965 761	614 235 539 526	569 243 394 425	690 190 375 323
Total	2138	2098	2679	2138	2000	2378	2390	5113	3790	2619	3247	1914	1631	1578
Total With AA Fire	3078	3271	3757	3130	2759	3320	3631		5i84		4190	3474	2330	2403

Source: OSD(C) Statistical Summary, Table 2 and OSD(SA) Statistical Tables, 2D.

Table 1 shows the steady decline of VC/NVA incidents since May. The totals for the first two week of September indicate the decline is continuing (about 1300 incidents estimated for September, not counting AA fire). The rate is down in all four CTZs; the July total for I CTZ was a 33 month low and the August totals for II, III, and IV CTZ were 23, 39 and 43 menth lows, respectively.

Table 2 shows that every type of incident has declined, with sabotage and attacks returning to early 1967 levels, and the number of terror incidents sinking even lower.

TABLE 2

# ENFMY ACTIVITY a/ (Monthly Avg. By Quarter)

·	1967 1st Qtr	2nd Otr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	1968 1st Qtr	2uď Qtr	3rd <u>b</u> / Qtr
Attacks Terror Sabokage Propaganda AA Fire Harassment Total	159	174	220	271	512	422	189
	123	187	203	142	114	83	60
	53	71	164	193	288	189	51
	83	71	74	39	23	8	2
	1310	1159	1064	898	1423	1178	765
	1582	1658	1644	1526	1830	1891	1303
	3310	3320	3369	3069	4190	3771	2370

<sup>3/</sup> Source: OSD/SA Statistical Tables.

The low June to September incident rates are unusual. There are three obvious possible explanations for the summer slowdown:

- 1. Rest and recuperation after the exertions of Tet and May.
- 2. The calm before the storm, i.e., another offensive is in the making.
- 3. Response to our bombing restrictions.

Reasons 1 and 2 are not mutually exclusive. We have seen reports stating the enemy needs about 90 days to recover after suffering severe losses. More than 90 days have passed since May. Reports have also indicated that some large VC/NVA units have withdrawn to sanctuary in Laos and Cambodia. Recent intelligence reports point toward a new offensive which has yet to materalize.

On the other hand, the low incident rate during the summer could reflect enemy decisions to respond to our bombing restrictions or could otherwise be tied to Paris. The fact that the numbers are record lows, and have remained low for over three months throughout the whole country, lends some credence to this hypothesis. But the statements from Paris and our intelligence reports do not confirm this.

b/ July and August.

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#### COMPARISON OF ENEMY ACTIVITY LEVELS WITH PRIOR YEARS

Summary. For the past few weeks we have been experiencing some of this year's highest enamy activity rates. However, enemy activity so far in 1970 is generally well below that for the comparable periods in 1988 and 1989. This indicates our long term efforts to wind down the war are succeeding. Two recent high points (March 31-April 2 and May 2-9) were part of the current enemy spring offensive. These high points were not unusually intense or sustained when compared with earlier peaks of enemy activity. Moreover, activity during the first six weeks of the spring offensive was less intense than during most similar periods in 1968 and 1969. If past patterns hold, we may see a lull in casualties and enemy action in July and early August followed by a high point in mid-August. Enemy terrorism has been increasing in recent weeks, though the member of terrorist victime remains below the same periods in previous years.

#### Spring Offensive and High Points

With a few exceptions, the intensity of enemy activity during the first six weeks of the Spring 1970 offensive was below previous periods of offensive activity (each considered to have lasted six weeks). Table 1 indicates:

- There were far fewer combat deaths for US and 3rd nation troops than in previous peak periods. US combat deaths were less than half of previous levels.
- There were fewer enemy deaths.
- RVMAF deaths exceeded all but the Tet 1968 offensive, but the higher casualty rate reflects increasing RVMAF participation in cambat plus a 12% increase in force strength since last year. VC/MVA incident data do not indicate the enemy is largeting RVMAF forces more frequently the perfore.
- The enemy continues to suffer 4 to 5 times the level of combat deaths suffered by our side.
- Although the August 1968 and Post-Tet 1969 offensives had fewer total attacks, this year had the fewest large scale attacks and the lowest expenditures of ordinance.

accords well with the efforts of the VC/NVA to counter the pacification program.

Data on enemy target priorities further emphasize his economy of force tactics during the April high point. In the three day period nearly half of enemy attacks were against pacification targets, a significantly higher proportion than in previous high points. In addition, most of the attacks against US military bases and installations were only attacks by fire while most attacks against pacification targets were ground attacks.

Various intelligence information indicates the enemy was satisfied with their "victories" in the April high point. However, the high point appears to have little or no military significance. The volume of incidents was high, but in general the intensity of the individual attacks was low. The impact of the attacks on the RVKAF ability to fight was, with few exceptions, almost negligible. The high point appears primarily to have been a political-psychological warfare action.

TABLE 2
ENEMY HIGH POINTS

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	1969				1970
	11-13 May	5-7 June	11-13 Aug	4-6 Sept	31Mar-2 Apr
Attacks				-	
Battalion	0	1	0	0	1
Small Scale	6 <del>9</del>	45 60 106	60	43	76
By Fire	_ 91	_60	_39	24	Ĝ
Total	160	106	<del>-39</del> <del>-99</del>	43 24 67	76 64 141
Targets of Attacks					
Pop. Centerr	22	15	13	5	16
ARVIS	23	14	. 10	9	17
Pacification	<b>5</b> 5	34 40	43	28	72
US	55 56	40	33	9 28 23 27	72 35
Other		3	_0	2	1
Total	160	102	33	67	TAI
Casualties 5					•
US/3rd Watios	316	220 267 487	183 284	121	130
GVÍ	351 667	267	284	267	396
Total Friendly	667	487	467	121 267 358	130 395 326
Znouy	3995	3240	2767	1.889	248c
XIA Retio	6.0	6.7	<b>5.9</b>	4.9	4.7

Source: DIA a/ Setimates obtained by factoring weekly data into days.

TABLE 1

# COMPARISON OF ENEMY OFFENSIVES (Weekly Average - each period is 6 weeks)

		1968		1969	1970
Combat Deaths	Tet	May	Aug	Post-Tet	Apr-May a
Allied: US RVMAF 3rd Nation	504 973 231	420 595 140	273 518 98	322 441 147	128 627 19
Total	1708	1155	859	910	774
Enemy	7616	4830	3766	4634	3563
Enemy/Friendly Kill Ratio	4.5	4.2	4.2	5.1	4.6
Enemy Attacks Ground: Battalion Spail	5 63 84	3 28	3 14	1.5 35	1 67
Attacks by Fire		84	35	70	67 46
Total	152	115	52	107	114
Number Rounds Fired	7427	6265	4200	4417	1914

a/ Through May 9.

High points of enemy activity are active periods of short duration (usually about three days), characterized by intensive activity such as small stacks and attacks by fire on selected targets (population centers, isolated centers, isolated outposts, etc.). They are designed to demonstrate enemy strength, boost VC/NVA morale and perhaps influence US public opinion.

High points have occurred during each of the enemy's seasonal campaigns. He seems to open each campaign with a high point, followed by a second one about four weeks later. In the first two or three weeks after the April high point, intelligence reports indicated we could expect another one in early May. It did in fact occur during the first ten days of May.

A comparison of the April high point with the four previous high points in 1969 (Table 2) indicates that:

- It was slightly more intense than most of them in terms of total attacks.
- It was highest of the four in terms of RYMAP combat deaths but less costly in terms of US deaths. South Vietnamese deaths were higher by 104 than the average of the previous four high ponts; US/IW deaths were lower by 80.
- Nore pacification targets were hit than in previous high points. This CONFIDENTIAL

The May high point differed from earlier high points in one very important respect: it was not well coordinated. It began on May 3 in II and IV Corps, on May 6 in Northern I Corps and on the 8th in Southern I Corps. Apparently no high point activity occurred in III CTZ. Because of its poor coordination, we do not have data which would compare exactly with earlier three day high points. However, Table 3 shows the data by week from March 22 through May 16, 1970. During the week of the May high point (ending May 9):

- Total US and RVNAF KIA exceeded the levels of the April high point. However, 44 US were killed in Cambodia that week. If we subtract them, US combat deaths in Vietnam (124) were about the same as in the April high point week (138).
- A few more small attacks were reported than during the April high point, but only two battalion sized attacks have been reported so far in May, compared to five in the April high point.
- Attacks against population centers were comparable to those in the April high point.
- In both instances, abductions were very high during the week prior to the high point. This is what usually happens, since the enemy needs the extra labor for his preparations.

### TABLE 3

#### INDICATORS OF ENEMY ACTIVITY LEVEL IN SVN

	Weeks E 28 Mar	hding: 4 Apre/	11 Apr	18 Apr	25 Apr	2 May	9 Maye/	16 May
US/RYMAF KIA US RYMAF a/ Total	79 232 311	138 848 986	141 586 727	101 458 559	386 505 64	123 553 676	168 1027 1195	217 384 601
Attacks b/ Bn Size Small Scale Total	0 -31 -31	5 116 121	0 137 137	0 124 124	0 84 84	80 81	1 137 138	0 124 124
Attacks on Fop. Centers	0	23	10	3	2	•	27	6
Harassment/Terror Babotage	464	567	421	667	686	537	597	579
Terror Assassinations Abductions	111 365	66 119	383 265	185 272	165 187	97 317	99 158	456 320

a) Freilminary reports, increased 50% to put them on a per with the verified, last half 1969 data which was 50% higher than last half 1969 preliminary data.

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b/ Attacks are by date reported, not by date of actual occurence.

#### Comparison with Prior Years

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In assessing the tempo of current enemy actions, it is helpful to view them in the context of enemy activity levels in similar pariols of previous years. A comparison of enemy activity in South Vietnam during the first lour months of this year with the same periods in 1968 and 1969 shows that enemy activity this year is considerably less intense than in 1969 or 1968. The war appears to be winding down. Table 4 below indicates that:

- The number of large-scale attacks was half that of last year and only 13% of the 1968 total for the four month period.
- Small scale attacks were at about the same level as last year but well below the 196d level.
- Attacks by fire and attacks against population centers were at the lowest levels in three years.
- The weekly average of US combat deaths was less than half of the 1969 average and 27% of the 1968 levels.
- The average number of enemy killed is about 30% lower than last year,
- To AVHAF weekly combat death rate is 1/2 higher than last year, but Roulf strength has increased about 12% and RVHAF is much more active than in prior years. In terms of RVHAF combat deaths per 1000 troop strength, the RVHAF death rate was actually 20% lower than last year and 60% below the 1968 mate.

#### TABLE 4

#### EMENY ACTIVITY (Weekly Average)

	Janua	ry through Apr	11
Incidents	1968	1969	1970
Attacks: In Size	4.0	1.1	.5
Suell	10 <b>5</b> 61	75 17	72 34 6
By Fire On Pop. Centers	\$0 or	n n	<i>5</i> 76
Marassment/Terror/Sabotage	520	127	443
<u>EZA</u>			
Combat Deathst	~~		
us Rviap	365 652 4965	236 384 3465	99 400
Enery	4965	3465	2413
KIA/1000 troop Strengths			
<b>US</b>	.7	.4	2
RYKAP Econy	1.0	, 13.4	<b>.</b>
Marie Company		7 13.4	9.7
	,		

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While less intense this year, the pattern and timing of enemy activity has been quite similar to those in 1968 and 1969. This raises the question of what we might expect in future weeks.

If the past patterns hold in 19/0, we can expect a hull beginning about the last week in June, lasting about 7 or 8 weeks, and ending with a high point in mid-August. An analysis of 1968 and 1969 statistics (Table 5) reveals that all activity and casualty indicators dropped sharply in both years during the hull period (drop of 50-70% for 1968 and 38-55% for 1969) followed by a high point in mid-August. Moreover, a detailed study of the weekly data shows that the timing of the changes was almost precisely the same both years.

TABLE 5

# TEMPO OF ENEMY ACTIVITY (Weekly Average)

	Active Period	Iull	Active Period
	(May-June) a	(July-Mid Aug.) b/	(Mid August) e/
Attacks		_	<del>-</del>
Ba Site			
1968	3.4	.6	5.5
1969	1.3	0	0
Small.	_		
1958	105	32	73
1969	105 304	32 47	73 87
Combat Deaths	t	•	
US	-		
1968	420	178	358
1969	272	153	217
RYNAP	•		
1968	376	188	<b>463</b> ·
1969	299	184	309
Zaemy			
1968	4108	1553	4890
1969	3939	2435	0013

a/ April 28 - June 22, 1968 and April 27 - June 21, 1969. b/ June 23 - August 17, 1968 and June 22 - August 9, 1969. c/ August 18 - September 1, 1968 and August 10 - 24, 1969.

Mosever, April has traditionally been a lull month in the past, after very high levels of enemy activity in February and March. The lateness of the April high point this year disrupted this pattern and may indicate a delay or lag in the enemy's activity patterns. Moreover, the May high point was a week late and poorly coordinated, and the allied offensive into Cambodia may cause changes or disruptions of enemy plans. It is too soon to tell. Thus, if the active-lull-active pattern occurs again this summer, it may not be as clear as in earlier years or the timing may be different.

#### Increase in Terrorism

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Waster Continues

Intelligence reports indicate that one possible new direction of enemy activity may be an increase in sabotage, haracament and terrorism in order to disrupt the pacification program. These incidents averaged 600 per week during May, about 25% above the average for last May. Table 6 shows that:

- The 1970 weekly average of casualties from terrorism for the first five months of the year is significantly below that for 1968 and 1969.
- On the other hand, the number of South Vietnamese civilians assassinated or wounded has risen significantly in April and May. Abductions have been constant and fairly high in the past three mouths.
- The May assassination rate was the highest in two years.

#### TABLE 6

# (Weekly Average)

	(Jan-May) 1968 a/	1969	19702	1970 Jan	Yeb	Mar	Apr	May b
Assessinated	154	144	126	69	71.	100	195	255
Abducted	265	191	165	56	76	243	237	249
Wound	426	361	273	· 179	110	231	425	543

Excludes February when no terrorist data was reported due to the Tet offensive disruptions.

b/ Through May 16.

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#### STANDOFF ATTACKS: A MAJOR ELEMENT OF VC/NVA STRATEGY IN RVN

Summary. Much has been said about the enemy's reversion to a low level, protracted war strategy. An important element in this strategy is pressure on the GVN by standoff attacks by fire. The enemy is continuing to inflict significant friendly casualties with these tactics.

The major findings emerging from this analysis are:

- COSVN Rescultion #9 (which laid out the enemy strategy) has reduced the number of attacks by fire. !
- The level of harassment by indirect fire has not changed in three years and has shown the same pattern each year.
  - Incidents of standoff fire have decline substantially in MR 3, but have increased in MR 4. Casualties and amunition expended in the incidents show the same pattern.
  - RF/PF forces are more frequent targets of indirect five attacks than Lever before.
    - The protracted warfare style of fighting is a more efficient mode for the enemy. He uses fewer rounds to obtain each KIA, probably the result of his concentrating on more vulnerable targets-civilians and RF/PF.
    - In ground attacks he initiates, the enemy has reduced his own losses. The enemy-to-friendly kill ratio dropped out of the 0.5-0.9 to 1 range (which held for nearly three years) to 0.3 to 1 in second half 1970.

#### Historical Patterns

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Typically an attack by fire consists of about thirty rounds. Although military in style--requiring advanced planning, logistic support, etc.--there is no attempt to assault the target. This type of attack is generally a means of exerting military pressure on a target which the enemy cannot hope (or does not desire) to defeat. The enemy inflicts a friendly combat death for every 50-60 rounds he fires. He, in turn, often accepts casualties as a result of allied counter-battery fire.

Harassments, by indirect fire, are usually isolated incidents, not coordinated with other types of military action. Essentially they are an extension of terrorist activity. Using a small (81/82mm mortar), the enemy fires about six or seven rounds. For every twenty-five rounds fired, he kills a friendly soldier or civilian, usually at no cost to himself, except for ammunition.

If An attack by fire is arbitrarily defined as one in which 20 or more rounds are fired. A harassment consists of indirect fire of fewer than 20 rounds. The distinction is purely arbitrary, but it does provide a convenient frame of reference and permits us to gain a bit more insight into how the energy is fighting.

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#### Table 1 indicates that:

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- There has been a year to year decline in total indirect fire incidents in the first half of each year, in keeping with seasonal patterns and long term down trend of most enemy activity.
- COSVN Resolution #9, calling for low level protracted warfare, apparently led to a reduction in the number of attacks by fire, while haressments by fire continued unabated. Prior to COSVN 9, there were 5.6 harassments for each attack, compared to 7.6 afterwards.
- Both attacks and harassments by fire dropped sharply in MR 3 starting in 1969.
- Both attacks and harassments leveled out in MR 4 in 1969 and have increased during 1970. MR 4 accounted for 53% of such incidents in the 2nd half or 1970 and is the only area where they increased.

TABLE 1

ENEMY ATTACKS AND HARASSMENT BY FIRE

(Monthly Average)

	19	968	196	59	1970	0
	lst	2nd	lst	2nd	lst	2nd
	Half	Half	Half	Half	Half	Half a/
Attacks by fire		,				
MR 1	75	28 -	45	23	49	31.
MR 2	32	13	39	25	34	13 14
MR 3	92	47	101	54	31	14
MR 4	<u>85</u>	30 118	· 46	<del>39</del>	48	54 112
RVM	284 85 85 32	118	231	141	49 34 31 48 162	112
Harassment by fire						
MR 1	474	218	433	249	424	222
MR 2	170	115	159	133	575	113
MR 3	341	179	379	293	149 448	102
MR 4	547	195	335	322	448	502
RVN	547 1532	ाल	335 1306	<u>322</u> 997	1233	<u>502</u> 939
Total						
MR 1	549	246	478	272	473	253
JOR 2	505 243	128 -	198	158	246	126
MR 3	433	226	480	347 <u>361</u>	189	116
30R 4	632	225	381	<b>361</b>	495	556
RVW	1816 1816	825	1537	1138	49 <u>5</u> 1395	<u>556</u> 1051
				_		-

Source: SEAPES Computer File.
a/ Thru November.

Friendly deaths as a result of enery standoff fire follow nearly the same patterns observed in the incident data. Deaths from standoff attacks show a modest year-to-year decline in the first half of each year; the number of deaths in the second halves of the past three years has been virtually constant at about 320 per month. Table 2 also shows that 60-70% of the KIA from standoff fire are the result of harassing fire. Again, the contrasting trends in MR's 3 and 4 are most dramatic, with KIA in MR 3 going down and KIA in MR 4 going up to the highest point since the lst half of 1968.

TABLE ?

FRIENDLY KIA FROM ENLY ATTACKS AND HARASSMENTS

BY FIRE

(Monthly Average)

	196	58	1969	9	19	
	lst.	2nd	lst	2nd	lst	2nd
	Half	Half	Half	Half	Half	Half a/
Attacks by fire MR 1 MR 2 MR 3 MR 4 RVN	49	22	26	19	57	21
	22	12	23	26	52	26
	54	31	34	32	19	14
	53	29	32	25	37	54
	178	94	115	102	165	115
Harassment by fire MR 1 MR 2 MR 3 MR 4 RVM	70	58	73	30	68	30
	59	48	62	31	63	48
	133	61	132	89	49	31
	<u>126</u>	52	99	<u>76</u>	112	100
	388	218	366	226	292	209
Total MR 1 MR 2 MR 3 MR 4 RVN	119 81 187 179 566	80 60 92 80 312	99 85 166 131 401	49 57 121 101 328	125 115 68 149	51 74 45 154 324

Source: SEAFRS Computer File.
a/ Thru November.

Civilians and the RF/FF who defend them bear the brunt of the enemy's indirect fire actions. Together, they accounted for 66% of the casualties from January 1938 through November 1970.

TABLE 3

# FRIEDLY DEATHS FROM STANDOFF FIRE ACTIONS (Total KIA)

	US/FW	ARVM	RF/P?	OTHER b/	Total
Attack oy fire 1900 196 197 / a/ To al	390	220	204	808	1622
	290	238	192	572	1292
	209	269	408	677	1563
	889	727	804	207	4477
Herassed by fire 1968 1969 1970 // Total	541	516	991	1586	3634
	1016	403	638	1508	3565
	487	327	886	1101	2801
	2044	1246	2515	4195	10000
Total KIA 1968 1969 1970 a/ GRAND TOTAL	931 1306 <u>696</u> 2933	736 641 596 1973	1195 830 1294 3319	2394 2080 1778 6252	5256 4857 4364 14477

a/ Thru November.

The RF/PF increasingly became a target in 1970, accounting for 30% of all the combat deaths (compared to 23% and 17% in 1968 and 1969) and suffering their highest totals in the past three years. The increase stems from a doubling of their deaths from attacks by fire and a 40% increase over 1969 in their casualties from harassments.

The remainder of this analysis shows the impact of the enemy's change in strategy on his costs. First, a word about the data is in order. While the KIA and incident counts presented above are fairly complete, the estimate of assumition expended by the enemy is reported in only 40% of the incidents. Fürthermore, it must be recognized that a precise count of incoming rounds is not likely when a position is receiving fire. However, we believe that:

- a 40% sample is large enough to support the analysis that follows,
- it is reasonable to assume that there is no systematic statistical bias in the data.

Enemy Ammunition Expenditures. Over 95% of enemy attacks by fire in 1969 and 1970 were conducted with 81/82 mm mortars. Harassments involved the use of these same small caliber, man-portable weapons in about 90% of the cases; rockets are the main weapon in the remaining incidents. Small

D/ Civilians comprise the bulk of this category.

arms fire and grenades are seldom employed in standoff attacks. The enemy's reliance on small mortars is significant—these weapons are light, easy to use and fairly easy to resupply—they are particularly well suited to use by a small, mobile force.

\*

The enemy's rate of ammunition expenditure in standoff fire actions is shown in Table 4. On a countrywide basis, the enemy has used less and less ammunition in attacks by fire, both on a year to year comparison and in comparing similar periods. The seasonal pattern is evident. The reduction in this type of attack is most obvious in the first half trends—lst half 1969 down 31%, lst half 1970 down 41%.

On the other hand, his use of amunition for <u>harassment</u> was nearly constant during 1968 and 1969, and the first half of 1970 was only 6% below 1st half 1969 usage. Second half 1970 was 21% lower than 2nd half 1969.

Table 4 also shows that MR III has had a decline in ammunition expenditures in both types of action that is so sharp that the seasonal pattern has broken:

- Rounds fired in attacks by fire in 2nd half 1970 were 76% below 2nd half 1969 and 84% lower than 2nd half 1968.
- Rounds fired in harassment during 2nd half 1970 were 69% lower than the second half of either 1968 or 1969.

In contrast, 2nd half 1970 in MR IV saw more rounds fired in attacks by fire than in any period since TET 68. And rounds fired in harassing fire reached a three year high during 1970. (A DMAC Periodic Intelligence report dated 7 Feb 71 shows that VC forces expended nearly 116 tons of ordnance (excluding small arms) in MR IV from March-Dec 1970. Twenty-five tons were used in April, the peak month of the year.)

Based on these data, it appears that friendly operations in Cambodia may have reduced the flow of ammunition into that region, and that most of the available ammunitions has been redirected into the higher rate of activity in MR 4.

TABLE 4

ENEMY AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES IN STANDOFF ACTIONS a/

(Monthly Average)

	196	58	190	59	19	
	1st Haif	2nd Half	lat Half	2nd Half	lst Half	2nd Half b/
Rounds fired in: Attacks by fire						
MR 1	2097	686	:1123	517	1229	971
MR 2	822	326	815	361	388	294
MR 3	2475	1482	2 <b>3</b> 66	1012	623	244
MR 4	2231	<u>762</u> 3256	937	750	. <u>878</u>	1040
RVN	7625	3256	5241	2640	3118	2549
Harassments by fire				•		
MR 1	1238	892	1249	498	1033	495
NOR 2	388	357	560	424	833	290
MR 3	958	732	1139	733	462	230
MR 4	<u> 1188</u>	534	<u>·755</u>	918	<u> 1156</u>	1027
EAN	3772	2515	3703	2573	3484	5045
Total Standoff Actions	<u>.</u>			•		
MR 1	3335	1578	2372	1015	2262	1466
XCB 5	1210	683	1375	795	1557	584
KR 3	3433	2214	3505	1745	1085	474
MR 4	<u> 3419</u>	1296	<u>,1632</u>	<u> 1668</u>	<u> 2034</u>	<u> 2067</u>
. RVM	11397	5771	. <del>8944</del>	5213	6602	4591

Source: VCIIA, prioritized to eliminate double counting.

b/ Thru Hovember.

#### Intensity of Enery Attacks

One measure of the intensity of enemy standoff attacks is the number of rounds fixed per attack. Table 5 shows that the patterns for both attacks by fire and harassments are quite regular:

- From 30 to 35 rounds per attack by fire.
- From 7 to 8 rounds per harassment.

Intensity of attacks by fire has been steadily increasing in R 1 and has been declining in MRs 2, 3, and 4 (although first half increases occurred during 1970 in MRs 3 and 4).

a/ Estimated to represent about 40% of the ammunition fired in standoff attacks, based on the number of incidents reporting a round count.

The constant number (7-8) of rounds per harassment in all regions in all years suggests that the enemy may have a standard operating procedure for this type of action.

TABLE 5

INTENSITY OF ENERGY STANDOFF ATTACKS

(Rounds fired per attack)

	199	58	196	59	1970		
	lst 2nd Half Half		lst Half	2nd Half	lst Half	2nd Half a/	
			ستحبب			<u>===</u> 9	
Attack by fire (20 rounds or more)							
MR 1	37	33	34	35	39	42	
MR 2 MR 3	33 38 <u>32</u> 35	38 38 31	33 33	29 30	28 33	27 27	
MR 4	32	35	<u>31</u> 33	30 28 30	<u> 32</u>	27 27 31	
RVN	37	34	33	30	35	31	
Harassment (less than 20 rounds)							
MR 1	7.1 7.4	7.0	6.9 8.2	6.4	6.9	6.4 6.3	
MR 2 MR 3	7.4 7.8	7.0 8.5	8.2 8.1	6.9 7.9	7.3 7.7		
MR 4	7.3	7.9 7.6	7.4	6.9	6.7	7.2 6.5	
RVN .	7.5	7.6	7.5	7.1	<b>7.0</b> .	6.3	

a/ Thru November.

# Efficiency 2/of Enemy Attacks

Enemy efficiency in his attacks by fire seems to have improved markedly. The improvement is coincident with his return to the protracted war strategy set forth by COSVN #9 in July 1969. It is probably the direct result of his targeting of civilians and territorial forces noted earlier.

Prior to July 1969, the enemy fired an average of 110 rounds to inflict a single casualty in an attack by fire. After July, the number dropped to about 60. Harassments are even more efficient; the enemy consistently gets a KIA for every 25-30 rounds fired. It seems reasonable that his efficiency in harassments should not have been affected by the strategy change--they

Efficiency is used here in a very narrow sense--it is defined as the number of rounds required to achieve a KIA. Since EIA were reported for all incidents and summittion expended in only 40%, the following adjustment was used:

rounds wer KIA = 2.5 x number of rounds fired
Total KIA

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are essentially a guerrilla-type activity that has persisted beneath the . ebb and flow of more conventional military activity.

TABLE 6

EFFICIENCY OF FNEMY STANDOFF ATTACKS a/

(Rounds fired per KIA)

	190	58	19	969	1970		
	1st Half			2nd Half	1st Half	2nd Half	
Attacks by fire MR 1 MR 2 MR 3 MR 4 RVM	107	79	110	69	54	114	
	93	69	89	35	19	28	
	115	120	176	79	67	44	
	106	66	73	75	60	48	
	111	88	142	65	51	66	
Harassment MR 1 MR 2 MR 3 MR 4 RVN	44	38	50	42	38	41	
	17	19	10	31	33	15	
	18	30	13	20	24	18	
	24	26	13	30	26	26	
	25	29	13	- 28	30	26	

Source: VCIIA prioritized to eliminate double counting.

The enemy has achieved lower costs by his change in strategy in one other way:

- Enemy KIA during ground attacks fell from 700-1700 per month in 1968 thru mid 1970, to only 300 per month in the second half of 1970, even though the number of ground attacks remained within the historical range of 130-190 per month.
- The enemy-to-friendly kill ratio in those attacks, ranging from 0.5-0.9 to 1 during 1968 thru mid 1970, dropped to 0.3 to 1 in the 2nd half of 1970.

a/ Data are scaled to permit comparability. KIA are from all incidents, ammunition expenditures are available for 40% of the incidents. The ratio was computed as follows

2.5 x rounds fired = # Rounds/KIA

Total KIA reported

### ENEMY ATTACK PATTERNS IN SOUTH VIETNAM 1967 - 1970

In 1970, enemy attacks vere only 7% lover than the average of the previous two years, and remained 40% nighter than in 1967. They were more efficient in inflicting friendly casalities, partly because they were concentrated on softer targets.

The slight decrease in 1970 stermed from a 24% drop in attacks by fire, partially off et by a 19% increase in small ground attacks. (Harassments by fire-less than 20 rounds-were down a little bit, but not much.) Thus, the enemy apparently shifted to a greater emphasis on small ground attacks in 1970-or was unable to keep up a high rate of attacks by fire. Enemy ground attacks reached a four year peak in 1970, and the ratio of ground attacks to attacks by fire was the highest since 1957.

The enemy's reduced reliance on attacks by fire could be an indication of possible enemy ammunition problems—at least in the calibers he needs for stand off attacks.

### Geographical Distribution of Enemy Attacks

Table 1 shows that the attack patterns vary among the military regions. Comparing 1970 to 1969:

- In MR's I and IV energy ground attacks and attacks by fire rose in 1970. MR IV led the MR's in attacks by fire.
- In MR II enemy ground attacks rose sharply for the fourth year in a row, but attacks by fire dropped, breaking a three year trend. MR II had the most ground attacks.
- In AR III both kinds of enemy attacks ere down harply (attacks by fire declined by 6%).

Defined as ground assaults and arbushes, plus attacks by fire of 20 rounds or more.

TABLE 1

## ETENY ATTACKS BY MILITARY REGION 1967 - 1970

Groun: Attacksa/	1967	1968	1969	19706/
KY I	468	305	305	367
MR II MR III	288 426	391 438	<i>5</i> 72 393	702 <b>24</b> 5
MR IV	416	366	342	447
Unk/Out-country	0	0	2	85
Total RVN	1538	1500	1614	1846
Attacks by Fire			·	
MR I	367	616	409	456
MR II	74	270	387	299
MR III	267 284	831 692	929 513	267 604
MR IV Unk/Out-country	204	7	513 0	134
Unit/Cuc-country				
Total RVN	992	2410	2238	1760
Total Attacks				_
MR I	775	921	714	823
MR II	362 602	661	959	1001
MR III MR IV	693 700	1269 1058	1322 855	512 1051
Unk/Cut-country	100	10,00	2	219
one/cut-country	<u>`</u>		<del></del>	
Total RVN	2530	3910	3852	3606
Ratio of Ground Attacks				
to Attacks by Fire	1.6	0.6	0.7	1.0

Source: VCIIA File

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a/ Enemy assaults plus ambushes.

Table 2 shows the steady buildup of attacks in 1967 which culminated in the 1968 Tet Offensive. It also indicates the relative stability of the total attack rate in the April-June period of the last three years.

b/ 1970 figures include attacks reported against RVNAF forces operating in Cambodia and Laos.

TABLE 2

ENEMY ATTACKS BY QUARTER, 1967 - 19708

	Ground Attacks	Attacks by Fire	Total Attacks
<u> 1967</u>	_	_	
1st Qtr	380	98	478
2nd Qtr	322	212	534
3rd Qtr	368	302	670
4th Qtr	468	380	848
Total	1538	992	2530
1968			_
1st Qtr	743	894	1637
2nd Qtr	393	811	1204
3rd Qur	503	375	578
4th Qtr	<u>161</u>	_330	491
Total	1500	2410	3910
1969		_	
let Qtr	322	622	<b>9</b> /1/1
2nd Qtr	490	768	1258
3rd Qtr	317	<u>!</u> :41	758
4th Qtr	485	407	892
Total	1614	<i>2</i> 238	3852
1970			
1st Qtr	391	297	688
2nd Qtr	659	721	1380
3rd Qtr	488	502	990
4th Qtr	308	240	548
Total	1846	1760	3606

a/ Source: VCIIA File

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#### Efficiency of Enemy Attacks

The enemy has increased his efficiency in producing friendly combat deaths. The overall enemy-to-friendly kill ratio in enemy attacks for 1970 was 1.14 to 1, the best achieved by the enemy since 1967 (0.98:1) and much better than the 1.9 to 1 ratios of 1969 and 1970.1 The sharp drop in 4th Quarter of 1970 (to 0.51 to 1) reflects the combined impact of reduced activity (typical of that time of the year) and the enemy's economy of force tactics.

If when this statistic is low, the sucry is doing well. CONFIDENTIAL

#### TABLE 3

# KILL RATIOS IN ENEMY ATTACKS (Ratio of Enemy KIA to Friendly KIA)

Activity	1967	1968	1969	1970
Ground Attacks Attacks by Fire	1.11	2.37 .21	2.34 .31	1.53 .08
Total Attacks	•98	1.93	1.94	1.14

a/ Source: SEAPRS File.

The enemy seems to have increased his efficiency by a more effective use of attacks by fire (targeting the more vulnerable RF/PF and civilian populace) rather than by a more efficient overall effort in ground attacks. In 1970, the enemy achieved an average of 2.5 friendly KIA for each of his ground attacks, a four year low. But the enemy's record in attacks by fire improved noticeably during 1970, regaining its 1967 level of 1 friendly KIA in each attack by fire. This gain offset the loss of efficiency in ground attacks and enabled the enemy to stabilize at a constant 1.7 friendly KIA per attack for his overall attack effor 'n 1969 and in 1970.

#### TABLE 4

## FRIENDLY KIA PER ENEMY ATTACK

. Had and the VTA Dam	1967	1968	1969	1970
Friendly KTA Per Ground Attack	3.7	4.2	3.3	2.5
Attack by Fire	1.0	_ <b>.7</b>	6	1.0
Total	2.7	2.0	. <del>1.7</del>	1.7

a/ Source: SEAPRS File.

#### Enemy Targeting

Table 5 shows that US-FW and RF/PF deaths from enemy incidents reverted to the 1967 pattern last year. The Vistnamess regular force losses declined for the third consecutive year. The figures suggest that the enemy is systematically targeting the RF/PF forces. Recent reports, particularly from HR IV, support this interpretation.

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
	FRIENDLY DE	EATHS FROM E	HENY ATTACKS	<u>a/</u>
Former	1967	<u>1968</u>	1969	1970
US/FWMAF VN Regulars RF/PF Civlian/Paramil. Unknown	635 1511 2334 1423 849	16½5 1739 1961 1577 1059	1406 1315 1598 1395 836	642 1080 2441 1634 510
Total	6752	7961	6550	6307

a/ Source: SEAPRS File.

### VC ASSASSIBATION AND ADDUCTION OF GVN PERSONNEL

CPAPE 1

GRAPH 2



A review of the Assassination and Abduction statistics suggests that there has been no change in the VC strategy toward SVN civilians but possibly an increase in incidents against GVN officials and employees, there were different terror patterns in each of the VC Military Regions, and about 17% of the incidents against GVN personnel are directed against RD Cadre.

Assassinations (not death due to accident or military action) are deaths presumed or known to be VC caused. Both Table 1 and Graphs 1 and 2 summarize the assassination and abduction of GVN government officials, employees and the general populace since July 1965. The total assassination data is not suggestive of a trend.

Assassinations and abductions of government officials and employees seem, however, to have increased since March 1966. A portion of this increase may be due to a change in the reporting system. The USAID Office of Public Safety, the source since August 1966, has backdated the statistics to July 1965 from MACV data, but it is possible that slightly different reporting definitions were in use before August 1966.

Table 2 shows assassinations and abductions since August 1966 by VC Military Region. It appears that MR's 5 and 6 (from the DMZ to northern III CTZ) account for approximately half of the assassinations and two-thirds of the abductions, (while encompassing only about 30% of the population of SVM). In MR 6 assassinations are 14 times abductions, 4 times in MR 3, —12—

2.5 times in MR 5, about equal in MR's 1 and 2, and in MR 4, which is approximately the same area as the GMM province of Gia Dinh surrounding Seigon, assassinations run 5 times abductions.

TABLE 1.
ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS IN SVN

		65		19	966		1967	1366
	Jul- Sep	Oct- Dec	Jan- Mar	<u>vīri</u> ¥⊃r−	Jul- Sev C	Oct- Dec	Jan- Mord/	Average Quarter
Assessinations _	,							
Govt Officiaus	/ 30	36	31	38	41	58	58	42
Employeesb	<u>32</u>	30	17	ΓO	57	88	58	51
Cub_total .	62	66	48	73	98	146	.115	93
Gen Populace	308	375	366	44.7	239	310	334	340
Total	370	441	414	525	337	456	450	433
Abductions								
Govt Officials	19	24	37	39	30	70	ъ 55	44
Employees	22	20	55	ðá	23	41	23	24
Sub-total	41	एंग	59	47	53	111	78	68
Gen Populace	1919	1615	1131	655	511_	1244	912	885
Total	1960	1059	1190	702	564	1355	990	953
Total Assassina-								
tions and Abduct	-							
tions	2330	2100	1604	1227	901	1811	1440	1386

a/ The Government official category consists of titled officials at the National, Corps, Region, Province, District, Village and Hamlet levels.

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Source: USAID Office of Public Safety-US Reporting of VC Assassinations and Abductions of GVN Personnel.

b/ Government employees include National, Corps, Regional, etc employes civil servants (school teachers, health workers, etc.) national police (when not on military operations) and RD Cadre.

of Reporting system changed in August 1966.

d/ January and February X 150%.

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# ASSASSIVATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS

VC MILITARY PEGICA									
	Aug	Sep	1966 Oct	Koy	Dec	Jan	1.967 Feb	Total Aug-Fed	
Military Region 18/									
Assessinations	5 1	28	8	12	7	25	15	- 97	
Abductions	1	12	25 ·	12	25	. 3	21	<u>100</u> 197	
Military Region 20								197	
Assassinations	17	16	74	41	38	38	31	255	
Abductions	70	14	40	<b>72</b>	15.	36	28	255 510	
Militery Region 35								סוב	
Assassinations	17	27	20	12	27	5	14	122	
Aoductions	51	34	40	211	. 137	20	44	507 629	
Military Region 4d/						_		629	
Assassinations	7	10	21	10	6	<b>~</b> <sup>3</sup>	14	72	
Abductions	7	3	0	. 5	ĭ	5	. 1	73 14 87	
		•	-		_	•	-	· ਸ਼ੌਨੋਂ ·	
Military Region 58/								0,	
Assessinations	75	46	55	37.	- 62	53	97	426	
Abductions	84	130	210	174	115	227	152	1092	
								1518	
Militer Region 62	_	_			_				
Assassinations	0	8	11	'n	4	. 5	2 88	41	
Abductions	123	26	173	119	70	40	88	<u>569</u>	
<u>TOTAL</u>								. 010	
Assassinations	122	135	189	123	144	128	173	i014	
Aboretions	303 425	219 354	489	503 626	363 507	326 454	334	2537	
	425	354	678	626	507	454	507	3551	
								-a	

Source: USAID Office of Public Safety
a/ Center section III Corps, but not Gia Dink Province surrounding Saigon.
b/ Southern III Corps and Morthbern IV Corps.

Southern IV Corps.

GVH Gis Dinh Province, which surrounds Seigns.

All I Corps and northern half of II Corps.

Northern section of III Corps and southern II Corps.

ASSASSIMATIONS AND ABOUCTIONS OF RD CADRE

	J:ユー <sub>E</sub> /	Oct- Dec	Jan-b/	Total Aug - Feb
RD Caire				
Assassinations Abductions	79 5 <del>7</del>	29 .5	14 19	53 44
Total	46	34	33	97
RD Cadre as a % of Government Officials and Employees				
Assassinations Abductions	17 31	20 14	12 25	17 16
Total	<u>31</u> 22	13	17	17

a/ (August & September) x 150%. b/ (January & February) x 150%.

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Table 3 summarizes assassinations and abductions of RD Cadre. There is a suggestion of a decreasing assassination rate of PD Cadre but with the short period covered it is difficult to be sure. A comparison of RD Cadre with all government officials and employees indicates that RD Cadre account for 53 of the 311 assassinations, or 17%. There are approximately 20,000 RD Cadre in SVM. Of these in 1966 there were 593 killed compared to the 44 assassinated in the period from August to December. Clearly the death rate from military actions is far greater than that due to assassinations.

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# VC/NVA ASSASSINATIONS AND ABOUCTIONS IN SVN (Monthly Average)

	19	965	1966				1.967		967
	3rd Qtr	4th Etr	lst Qtr	2nd 2tr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr	Avg 1956	1st Qtr	Apr-
Assassinations of:	3		- <u>", " - </u>	<u> </u>	401	V01	1930	Q.C.I	May
Govt Officials b/	0.0	12	10	13	14	19	14	20	25
Employees c	11	10	6	13	19	30	17	25	37
Gen Populace	103	125	122	_149_	79	103	113	116	183
Total	124	147	133	175	112	152	144	161	245
Abductions Govt Officials b/	6	8	13	13	10	23	15	15	17
Employees c/		7	7	3	8	14	8	8	17
Gen Populace Total	639 653	538	377	218	170	415	295	267	247
Total	653	553	397	234	183	452	318	290	281
Total Assassinations and Abductions	777	700	535	409	300	604	462	451	526

A Reporting system changed in August 1966.

The Government official category consists of titled officials at the National, Corps, Region, Province, District, Village and Hamlet levels.

C. Government employees include National, Corps, Regional, etc. employees, civil servants (schools teachers, health workers, etc.) national police (when not on military operations) and ED Cadre.

Source: USAID Office of Public Safety-US Reporting of VC Assassinations and Abductions of GVN Personnel.

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#### VC/NVA ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS

In the first 8 months of 1967 the VC/NVA assassinated 20% more people in SVN than they assassinated in all of 1966. The sharpest increase was in the rate of assassination (deaths not due to accident or military action and presumed or known to be VC caused) of government officials and employees which was double the 1966 rate (61 per month to 31 per month). Total abductions have maintained their 1966 rate, although the rate in July and August 1967 for abductions of government officials and employees was 32% below the 2nd quarter 1967 rate and 17% below the 1966 rate.

Table 1

VC/NVA ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS IN SVN 4/

(Monthly Average)

_	1965		1966					1967			
	3rd	4th	lst	2nd	3rd	4th	Avg	let	2nd	Jul-	Jan-Aug
	Qtr	Qtr	Otr	Otr	Otr	Qtr	1966	Qtr	Qtr	Aug	Avg
Assassination of:											
Govt Officials b	10	12	10	13	14	19	14	20	25	19	21
Govt Employees d/	11	10	6	13	19	30	17	25	46	53	40
Gen Populace	103	125	122	149	79	103	113	116	239	263	199
Total	124	147	138	175	112	152	144	161	310	335	260
49.9						Ť					
Abductions of:											
Govt Officials b	6	8	13	, 13	10	23	15		14	9	13
Covt Employees S	8	7	7	3	8	14	. 8	_	14	10	11
Gen Populace	639	538	377	218	170	215	<b>29</b> 5	267	302	329	296
Total	653	553	397	234	188	452	318	290	330	348	320
		i	l								
Total Assassinations							İ	l			
and Abductions	777	700	533	409	300	604	462	451	640	683	580
											_

a/ Source: USAID Office of Public Safety - US Reporting of VC Assassinations and Abductions.

b/ The Government official category consists of titled officials at the Kational, Corps, Region, Province, Astrict, Village, and Hamlet levels.

c/ Government employees include National, Corps, Regional, etc., employees, civil servants (school teachers, health workers, etc.), national police (when not on military operations), and RD Cadre.

In August 40 RD Cadre were assassinated, 41% of all GVN officials and employees assassinated. Table 2 shows the sharply rising trend of RD Cadre assassinations over the past 13 months.

VC/NVA ASSASSINATIONS OF RD CADRE
(August 1966 to August 1967)

	1966					<u>196</u> 7							
	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug
Assassinations of RD Cadre	12	3	18	8	3	5	4	24	24	16	41	17	40
As a % of Govt Officials + En- ployees Assas- inated	23	9	23	20	11	13	10	42	31	35	46	36	41

Source: USAID Office of Public Safety -- US Reporting of VC Assassinations and Abductions.

Table 3 shows assassination and abduction data over the period 1958 to 1967. Although the data prior to 1964 is sketchy, and the data since 1964 is from different sources and may thus suffer from inconsistencies, assassinations were quite level in 1962-66, jumping sharly this year; abductions were substantially level in 1962-65, and then were halved in the last two years. A major reason for the upsurge in assassinations during 1967 is the VC/NVA terrorist campaign against the South Vietnamese elactions, both during the 2nd quarter and also in August and September. June and August 1967 were the peak months for assassinations in the past 26 months.

Table 3

#### CIVILIAN VIETNAMESE VICTIMS OF VIET CONG TERROR, 1958-1965-

	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967b/
Assassinated Officials	па	114	na	na	na.	na.	436	209	168	258
Other Civilians	na	na	na	na	rs	na.	1359	1691	1564	-2864
Total	193	239	1400	1000	1719	2073		1900	1732	3122
Abducted										
Officials Other	na	na	na	na	na.	na	1131	323	167	159
Civilians	na	' na	na	na	na	na	8423	7992	3558	3675
Total	236	364	700	2000	9688	7262	9554	8315	3725	2834
Combined										
Total	429	583	2100	3000	11407	9335	11349	10215	5457	6956

a/ Source: Department of State Airgram "Viet Cong Terrorist Casualties,"
12 April 1967, for data through 1965. 1966-67 data from USAID Office
of Public Safety - US Reporting of VC assassinations and Abductions.
b/ Based on Jan - Aug rate.

## VC ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS

Victory in Vietnam means, more than anything else, protecting government officials and other civilians from the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong killed or kidnapped 9091 South Vietnamese in 1967, 34 percent more than in 1966. The loss rate rose in every quarter in 1967. Assassinations more than doubled in 1967; the rate in October-December 1967 was the highest in two and one half years. Abductions were 41 percent higher in 1967, due primarily to the large number of kidnappings of non-government civilians.

## TABLE 19/

### VC/NVA ASSASSIBATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS IN SVN

	1366	1967	1965 30tr	40jtr	<u>1966</u> 10tr	20tr	3Qtr	4Qtr	<u>1967</u> 19tr	2Qtr	3Qtr	liQtr
Assassinations	1732	3702 538 <del>3</del>	370	1417.J	414	525	337	456	482	928	1115	1183
Abductions	3810	538 <del>\$</del>	1960	1659	1190	701	564	1355	870	1005	1666	1842
Total	5542	509E	2330	2100	1604	1226	901	1811	1352	1933 1933	5181	3025

Source for all tables: UEADD, Office of Public Safety - US Reporting of VC Assassinations and Abductions.

### Government Officials

Table 2 shows the 70 percent rise between 1966 and 1967 of assassinations of government officials (168 to 285) and the 17 percent increase in abductions (176 to 206). This category includes officials of all levels of GVN government.

b/ A discrepancy in the source document accounts for the difference of lip between these numbers shown and those in the OSD SEA Statistical Summary.

### TABLE 2

# ASSASSINATIONS AND ARDUCTIONS OF COVERNMENT OFFICIALS

	1966	1967	1965 39tr	4Qtr	1966 19tr	20tr	<u> ვ</u> დალ	40tr	1967 10tr	2Qtr	30tr	40tr
Assessinations	168	285 <u>D</u> /206	30	36	31	38	41	58	61	74	61	89
Abductions	176	<u>⊅</u> 206	19	24	37	39	30	70	45	57 <u>b</u>	63	40
Total	344	<u>b/</u> 491	49	60	68	77	71	128	107	b/ <sub>131</sub>	124	129

a Includes titled officials at national, curps, region, province, district, village and hamlet levels.

Village and hamlet officials have been the key target among government officials, since this aids the VC to intimidate and control the rural population. They represented 92 percent of all officials killed and kidnapped in 1967. Table 3 shows that assassinations and abductions against all village and hamlet officials have been remarkably steady, centering around 120 such incidents each quarter. However, during the year there was a shift in the proportion of these incidents which were directed toward hamlet and village chiefs: 13 percent in the fire half of the year and 42 percent in the second half.

#### TABLE 3

# VILLAGE AND HANLET CHIEFS AND OFFICIALS KILLED/KIDNAPPED BY VC

	1966	1967					
	40tr	1Qtr	20tr	3Qtr	4Qtr	YR	
Village and Hamlet Chiefs	50	13	15	53	49	130	
Other Village & Hamlet Officials	7C	79	105	<i>6</i> 9	70	323	
Total	120	92	120	122	119	453	•

Assassinations of hamlet and village officials in 1967 outnumbered abductions by 254 to 199. Table 4 indicates the VC sharply increased the proportion of assassinations to abductions in the last three months of 1967, perhaps as part of the sharply stepped up attack on GVM population control that we have noted in other statistics. Abductions hit a five quarter low in fourth quarter 1957.

b/ A discrepancy in the source document accounts for the difference of 14 between these numbers shown and those in the OSD SEA Statistical Summary.

TABLE 4

# ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS OF HAMILE DIVILLAGE OFFICIALS

1966	1967			-4	
49tr	19tr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	YR
53	48	64	60	82	254
67	##	56	62	37	199
120	92	120	122	119	453

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### Government Employees

Total

Assassinations

Abductions

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Assassinations of government employees (excluding "officials") tripled in 1967 over 1966 and abductions were up almost one and a half times (Table 5). This category includes civil servants (teachers, health workers, etc.), national police (when not on military operations) and RD workers.

#### TABLE 5

# ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES®

	1966	EARS 1967	1965 30tr	4Qtr	1966 19tr	29tr	3Qtr	liQtr	<u>1967</u> 10tr	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr
Assassinations		603										
Abductions	93	136	55	50	55	7	23	41	23	42	30	41
Total.	295	739	, 54	50	39	47	80	129	97	180	217	245.

a/ Includes national, corps, regional, etc., employees, civil servants (school teachers, health workers, etc.), national police (when not on military operations), and RD cadre.

Within these totals, Table 6 focuses on national police and RD cadre, two groups which are increasingly targets of VC activity and together accounted for 12% of government employees killed or kidnapped in 1967. Assassinations of national police nearly doubled in the second half of 1967 and abductions almost quadrupled. Assassinations of RD workers doubled by abductions showed an erratic pattern.

TABLE 6

NATIONAL POLICE AND RD CADRE KILLED/KIDNAPPED BY VC

	1966	1967				
	4Qtr	1Qtr	20tr	3Qtr	4Qtr	YR
National Police		<u> </u>				
Killed	42	51	31	36	65	153
Kidnapped	8	1	9	20	18	48
Subtotal	50	22	40	56	83	201
RD Cadre						
Killed	. 29	36	81	119	122	358
Kidnapped	6.	14	14	4	18	50
Subtotal	35	50	95	123	140	408
Total	:85	72	135	179	223	609

Clearly, the VC are increasing their pressure on the GVM pacification program. This program threatens the VC infrastructure and thus the VC control over the people in the rural areas. By showing that the National Police and ED cadro are vulnerable to VC terrorism, the VC increase insecurity in the countryside.

#### General Populace

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Assassinations of Vietnamese non-government civilians rose sharply in the second quarter of 1967 and continued upward to the end of the year. Abductions hit their highest level since mid-1965 in the fourth quarter with 1761 civilians kidnapped. (See Table 7)

TABLE 7

### ASSASSINATION AND ABDUCTIONS OF THE GENERAL POPULACE

Assassinations Abductions	Y 1966	EAR 1967	1965 30tr	4Qtr	<u> 1965</u> 19tr	20tr	32tr	4Qtr	<u>1967</u> 19tr	2Qtr	3Çtr	4Qtr
Assassinations	1362	2820	308	315	366	447	239	310	347	716	867	890
Abductions	3541	5041	1919	1615	1131	655	511	1244	801	906	1573	1761
Total		7861										

Three incidents in December 1967 accounted for 614 civilians killed or kidnapped, 23 percent of the non-government assassinations and abductions in the fourth quarter. These incidents were the Dak Son massacre of 114 killed, the 200 Montagnards in Kontum province forced into Viet Cong military service, and the 300 refugees kidnapped in Binh Dinh province. Such incidents of mass kidnappings are reminiscent of 1965 when the VC attacked and kidnapped 1269 persons in five provinces in only six separate incidents.

The above statistics show that the VC improved their ability to terrorize the population in 1967. They increased the absolute number of assassinations and abductions and the proportion of assassinations.

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### VC ASSASSIBATIONS AND ABSUCTIONS

In the March SFA Analysis Report we noted that assassinations and abductions in SVN ross every quarter in 1967, up 64% over 1966. The Viet Cong struck hardest at PD cadre, national volice and hamlet and village chiefs. Purther review shows that strength increases of these grows account for only a small part of the 1967 rise. Assassinations and abductions rose 3 to 4 fold while strengths increased 13% to 20%. The combination of a stepped-up enemy effort and GVM assignment of officials to more insecure areas probably account for the rest of the increase.

Assassination and abductions of Revolutionary Development (RD) cadre tripled between first and fourth quarter 1967 while total RD cadre strength rose 20% (Table 1); assassinations and abductions per 1000 RD cadre rose from 1.5 to 3.6.

TABLE 1

### RD CADRE

	1967							
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th				
	Qtr	Qtr	Qtr	Qtr				
Assassination & Abductions &	.50	. : 95	123	140				
Strength (000) b/ c/	33.9	34.3	36.7	38.9				
Casualties/1000 RD	1.5	2.8	3.4	3.6				

Source: USAID, Office of Public Safety - US Reporting of VC Assassinations and Abductions.

Hational police strength increased 13%, but assassination and abductions almost quadrupled. The police casualties per 1000 strength tripled.

b/ Quarterly average.

c/ Source: CIA.

### TABLE 2

### MACIONAL FOLICE

	1967					
	lst	and	3rd	4th		
	ətr	Ctr	0tr	Qtr		
Assassinations & Abductions a/ NP Strength (000) b/ c/ Casualties/1000 NP	50.8 .h	40 63.9 .6	56 65.6 •9	83 69.0 1.2		

Source: USAID, Office of Public Safety - US Reporting of VC Assassinations & Abductions.

b/ Quarterly average.

Quarterly data on the number of GTM harlet and village chiefs and officials are not available in Washington. However, by using the Hamlet Evaluation System we were able to compare the assassinations and abductions of hamlet chiefs with the number of harlets which had elected hamlet chiefs.\* The basic weakness of this method is that it relates total terrorism to only a segment of the exposed population -- assassinations and abductions are also committed against appointed hamlet chiefs and elected and appointed village officials, of which there are a considerable number. However, we doubt that the additional data would change the basic trends shown in Table 3.

### TABLE 3

### HAMLET\_CHIEFS

	1967							
	ls <b>t</b> Çtr	2nd T Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr				
Assassinations & Abductions a/ Hamlets with Elected Chiefs	13	9	48	35	_			
(000) b/ c/	2.6	2.9	3.3	3.3				
Casualties/1000 Hamlets with Elected Chiefs	5.0	3.1	14.5	10.6				

a/ Source: USAID, Office of Public Safety - US Reporting of VC Assassinations & Abductions.

b/ Quarterly average.

c/ Source: OSD SEA Statistical Summary, Table 2.

c/ Source: Hamlet Evaluation System, Indicator 4A - Governmental Management - all hamlets rated A or B for this indicator.

<sup>\*</sup> Hamlets with A or B rating for indicator ! A (governmental management).
The hamlet must have an elected hamlet chief to obtain an A or B rating for this indicator.

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### ASSASSINATIONS AND ABDUCTIONS IN SVN

### Summary

Prior to July 1968, less than 60% of the assassinations and inductions of GVN officials, employees and members of the South Vietnamese population were reported in the official figures. Moreover, even MACV's new Terrorism Incident Reporting System (TIRS) understates the attrition of GVN officials and civil servants because about two thirds of them are killed by enemy attacks and other actions which are not considered assassinations.

### **Details**

As now reported by TIRS, there were 3711 assassinations and 6764 abductions of SVN civilians in the March - July 1968 period, compared to the 2240 assassinations and 3949 abductions previously reported. This level of terrorism is about 70% higher than the earlier estimates, but the increase represents reporting omissions, not a real increase in terrorism.

The greatest part of the increase in reported terrorism came against the general population and GVN employees (RD cadre, National Police, Civil Servants). The increase in reported assassinations of GVN officials is small.

Assassinations and abductions in August and September resumed high levels after a significant decline in July, as shown in Tables 1 and 3. (No TIRS data for October is yet available.)

The new TIRS data will enable us to improve our analysis of VC terrorism. However, the reported levels of terrorism still significantly understate the numbers of GVN officials and civil servants who are being killed. Many are not assassinated in the strictest sense but are killed by VC military and paramilitary activities. Table 4 indicates that only a third of the National Police and Expolutionary Development Cadre killed by the VC were reported as assassinations. Calculation of attrition and its impact is further complicated by the lack of any reliable accorating system for the strengths of GVN officials and civil servants.

If the figures in the tables that follow do not agree entirely with the figures reported in the monthly Assassinations and Abductions Airgram, which is the source of the CSD Southeast Asia Statistical Summary figures. The airgrams report from the 26th of one month through the 25th of the following month, but the TIRS figures are from the first day of the month to the last day of the month. This presumably accounts for the differences, which are significant.

TABLE 1

COMPARISON OF STATE DEFARITION AND TIRS 2/ b/
ASSASSINATION ESTIMATES - BY CORPS

					1968				Cumulative Total
		Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	(Mar-Jul)
I Corps State TIRS		92 140	41 86	121 318	112 221	172 117	266	219	538 882
II Corps State TIRS	1	153 263	83 96	66 152	66 120	58 <b>7</b> 5	111	140	426 706
III Corps State TIRS		170 192	94 137	189 545	296 216	64 73	94	205	813 1,163
IV Corps State TIRS		128 166	69 75	103 206	94 4 <b>3</b> 5	69 77	179	148	463 960
SVN State TIRS		543 761	287 394	479 1,221	568 993	363 342	65ú	712	2,240 3,711
State as % of TIRS		71	,73·	<b>39</b> .	57	105		-	60

a Both State and TIRS estimates include GVE officials, employees, and members of the general population killed by the VC.

b/ No State Department data available for August or September.

TABLE 2

### COMPARISON OF STATE DEPARTMENT AND TIRS ASSASSINATION ESTIMATES - BY TYPE

	1968							Cumulative Total		
	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug 5	Sep &	(Mar-Jul)		
SVN										
Gov <sup>†</sup> t Officials State TIRS	39 35	21 32	28 38	39 29	32 33	36	30	158 167		
Gov't Employees State TIRS	50 79	28 67	62 144	38 70	21 18	·. 42	65	199 378		
Gen'l Population State TIRS	454 647	238 295	389 1,039	491 894	276 291	562	617	1,848 3,166		

a/ No State data available for August or September.

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TABLE 3

COMPARISON OF STATE DEPAREMENT AND TIRS \*\*
ABDUCTION ESTIMATES

				1968				Cumulative Total
	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	(Mar-Jul)
I Corps								
State	130	158	321	113	102			824
TIRS	245	331	393	82	98	419	383	1,149
II Corps								
State	785	376	242	267	310			1,980
TTRS	2,548	367	277	420	201	319	436	3,813
III Corps								
State	86	83	215	104	94			582
TIRS	70	106	811	71	129	123	147	1,187
IV Corps								
State	132	211	93	104	23			563
TIRS	283	105	130	75	55	92	92	615
SVN		,						
State	1,133	828	871	588	529			3,949
TIRS	3,146	909	1,611	648	450	953	1,058	6,764
State as. % of					_			-0
TIRS	36	91	54	91	118			58

a/ Both State and TIRS estimates include GVN officials, employees, and members of the general population abducted by the VC.

table 4 gvn edgloyees assassinated versus total killed a/

	Mar	Apr	May	1968 Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Total ( <u>Mar-Sep</u> )
National Police Assassinated (TIRS) General Selective Total	11 22 33	2 11 13	4 <u>68</u> 72	13 22 35	5 <u>7</u> 12	8 6 14	17 4 21	60 <u>140</u> 200
Killed a/ By VC Not VC Total	126 11 137	126 30 156	99 12 111	52 11 63	32 14 46	15 39 54	27 19 46	477 136 613
RD Cadre  Assassinated (TIRS)  General  Selective  Total	22 24 46	25 27 52	20 13 33	14 - <u>17</u> - <u>21</u>	2 	14 10 14	31 8 39	108 102 210
Killed 3	149	67	134	75	80	69	98	672

a/ Total killed inc.udes assassinations.

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TABLE 5
ABBASSINATIONS IN SVN - 1968
(TIRS)

				1968			
	Mar	Apr	Hay	Juc	ग्रा	Aug	Sep
I Corps							
Gov't Officials	4	5 9	16	8	10	10	7
Gov't Employees	12 <u>126</u>	9	21	4	5	8	14
General Populace	126	72	281	209	102	248	198
Total	140	86	318	221	117	<b>ટ</b> ઇક	219
II Corps							
Gov't Officials	31.	12	14	12	10	16	15
Gov't Employees	39	29 55	, K	12	1	8	14
General Populace	217	_22	132	96	64	87	111
Total	263	95	152	120	75	$\mathfrak{m}$	140
III Corps							
Covit Officials	8	12	4	3	6	5	6
Gov't Employees	24	24	81	20	<u>61</u>	¥ 86	11 188
General Populace	160	101	460	193		85	700
Total	192	137	545	216	73	94	205
IV Corps				_			
Gov't Officials	6	3 5	i.	6	7	5	2 26
Gov't Employees	16	5	36	396 34	6	162 162	25 120
General Populace	<u> 144</u>	67	166	350	64	102	120
Total	166	75	206	436	<b>77</b>	179	148
SVE							
Gov't Officials	35	32 67	38 144	29 70	33 18	#5 36	30 65
Gov't Employees	79	67		70		42	65
General Populace	647	295	1,039	<u>894</u>	<u> </u>	<u> 582</u>	<u>617</u>
Total	761	394	1,221	993	342	650	712

Bource: TIRS Tile, MACV (CORDS).

TABLE 5
ABDUCTIONS IN SVN - 1968
(TIRS)

	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	<u>Jul</u>	Aug	Sep
I Corps Cov't Officials Gov't Employees General Populace	3 4 238	2 2 <u>327</u>	12 3 <u>378</u>	10 0 72	1 8 89	3 2 414	3 1 <u>379</u>
Total	245	331	393	82	98	419	383
II Corps Gov't Officials Gov't Employees General Populace	7 3 <u>2,53</u> 8	3 4 <u>360</u>	13 4 260	3 0 <u>417</u>	0 1 200	6 2 <u>311</u>	45 <u>6</u> 5 8
.Total	2,548	367	277	420	201	319	436
Cov't Officials jov't Employeesneral Populace Total	4 0 <u>£6</u> 70	3 1 102 106	0 13 798 811	1 0 70 71	2 2 125 129	2 1 120 123	0 8 <u>139</u> 147
IV Corps Gov't Officials Gov't Employees General Populace	7 0 <u>27</u> 6	8 0 <u>97</u>	0 6 124	3 3 <u>69</u>	2 1 19	7 . <u>81</u>	0 2 <u>90</u>
Total	253	105	130	75	22	<b>9</b> 2	92
SVN Gov't Officials Gov't Employees General Populace	21 7 3,118	16 7 896	25 26 1,560	17 3 628	5 12 433	18 9 <u>92</u> 6	11 13 1,034
Total.	3,146	909	1,611	648	450	953	1,058

Source: TIRS file, MACV (COPDS).

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### TERRORISM IN SVN

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Summary. Nore than 35,000 Vietnames: were assassinated, abdusted, or wounded by VC terror actions in 1968. About 7-10% of the victims were GVN officials or employees, mostly hamlet and village officials, police, and Revolutionary Development cadre. About 2-3% of the South Vietnamese village and hamlet chiefs were terror victims in 1968.

### Functions of Terror

Terror is a traditional weapon of the insurgent. In South Vietnam the communists began using terror again in 1957 as part of their renewed campaign to unite Vietnam under a communist government. General Giap recognized the value of terror as a guerrilla war tactic when he said, ". . . the most correct path to be followed by the peoples to liberate themselves is revolutionary violence (terror) and revolutionary war."

The use of terror in South Vietnam aims at several important goals:

- 1. Intimidation of the people. The VC assassinate, abduct, threaten and harass the people in order to force their cooperation, to obtain laborers and porters when needed, to collect taxes, food and other supplies, and to prevent the local inhabitants from giving intelligence to allied forces.
- 2. Elimination of enemies. Certain individuals, particularly GVN officials (hamlet and village chiefs, for exemple), national police, RD cadre, school teachers, and individual citizens who defy VC threats are specifically marked for elimination. If the individual is unpopular, so much the better, since the VC can claim credit for removing an "enemy" of the people.
- 3. Propaganda. Within Vietnam, the VC point to their terror tactics as signs of their strength and presence throughout the country, even in the cities which are traditional government strongholds. The VC also try to influence external factors such as the Paris Peace Talks and world public opinion, by terror attacks on well-known US and Vietnamese personalities (such as those on the Commander of US Naval Forces in Vietnam and on several high GVN officials). Such actions give the VC publicity and help boost their morale.

According to Bernard Fall and Jay Mallin, terror is used in Vietnam as a tactic to isolate the rural areas from the cities. The rural areas are easier for the VC to control since the people have lacked security from the GVM in the past. The elimination of a few key GVM people (the hamlet chief, police chief, local schoolteacher, etc.) is usually all that is necessary to intimidate the people. Once rural bases are set up, so the theory goes, the

Bernard Fall, The Two Vietnams (New York: Praeger, 1967). Jay Mallin, Terror in Vietnam (Princeton: D. Van Hostrand, 1966).

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cities are isolated and will eventually fall to VC control by economic pressure, terror tactics and lack of popular support for the government. The rural terror campaign is complimented by terror tactics in the cities which serve a different purpose from terror in the countryside. In the cities, the Communists seek to discredit the Government and to undermine the economy by discouraging business activity, causing investment captual to flee and disrupting transportation and communication.

### Terrorism Reports

Incidents of terror have been individually reported from South Vietnam for several years. Before mid-1968, two sets of terrorist incident data were reported and used separately. One set consisted of Vietnamese national police data which was reported to Washington in the USAID monthly report of assassinations and abductions. The other set was reported through US and Vietnamese military channels and came to Washington in the OFREP-5 reports. Consolidation of these two sets of information resulted in the Terrorist Incident Reporting System (TIRS) which covers the period from 4th quarter 1967 to the present. This study examines the statistical patterns of terrorism in South Vietnam, based on data from the TIRS.

### Trends

Terror incidents declined throughout 1968 (Table 1) after a peak of 1500 per month during the Tet offensive in the 1st quarter; by the 4th quarter, they were down to 800 per month. They rose 25% in 1st quarter 1969, in conjunction with the 1969 post-Tet offensive. (The incidents in Table 1 include some harassment incidents as well as assassinations and abductions.)

About half of the incidents resulted in friendly casualties (KIA, WIA or MIA) and more than 35,000 Vietnamese were assassinated (7000), abducted (12,000) or wounded (17,500) in 1968. The indirect effects from these incidents, particularly on the families of the victims, were undoubtedly much larger.

### TABLE 1

# TERROR INCIDENTS AND FRIENDLY CASUALITIES (Monthly Avg.)

	1967 49tr	1968 19tra/	20tr	3Qtr	<u> 4Qtr</u>	1969 19tr
INCIDENTS	1199	1506	1390	914	805	1005
CAFUALTIES Assassinated Abducted Wounded Sub-Total	537 1050 1329 2916	706 1669 1659 4034	754 952 2071 3777	515 766 1268 2549	699 922 2034	652 1066 1590 3308

a/ February 1968 data was incomplete due to the Tet offensive, so lst quarter is an average of January and March only. This probably understates the terror incidents and casualties during the 1st quarter.

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### Targets of Terror Incidents

Table 2 indicates that about 7-10% of all terror casualties are GVN official: or employees. It also shows that their proportion of the total has declined steadily, from 12% in 4th quarter 1967 to 6.6% in the first quarter of 1969.

# TABLE 2

### TERROR CASUALTIES BY TYPE (Monthly Avg.)

	1967	1968				1969
	4Qtr	10tra/	2Ctr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1Qtr
Government Officials	72	101	63	54	49	51
Government Employees	281	306	325	169	97	167
Civilians	2563	3627	3389	2326	1888	3090
TOTAL	2916	4034	3777	2549	2734	3308

Jan. and Mar.

The government officials category in lable 2 includes appointed or elected officials at all levels of government, but most of the casualties (86-96%) are hamlet and village chiefs (Table 3). If we compare the 1968 total casualties of village and hamlet officials with the estimated number elected or appointed by the GVM, we find that between 2-3% of the chiefs became casualties in 1968 and a little more than 1% of the other officials were terrorist victims.

# TERROR CASUALITIES: VILLAGE AND HANGET OFFICIALS

	<u> 1967</u> 49tr	<u>1968</u> 10tr	20tr	30tr	<u> </u>	1969 19tr
Chiefs	122	91	n	60	48	74
Other Officials	85	93	101	87	90	58
TOTAL	207	184	172	147	138	132

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The government employees category includes civil servants through province level, school teachers, national police and RD cadre. RD cadre and police represent the GVN presence in rural areas and they are easily identifiable as prime targets by their uniform and their duties. Thus, RD cadre and national police account for 90-98% of the terrorist casualties who are government employees. Both suffer about the same number of total casualties, but the casualty rate for RD cadre is much higher. They suffer about 80% more casualties per 1000 strength than do the police. Terrorism against both declined in the second half of 1968 and rose slightly in first quarter 1969, but did not approach early 1968 levels (Table 4).

TABLE 4

### TERROR CASUALTIES: RD CADRE AND NATIONAL POLICE

	1967	1968				1969
	4Qtr	19tr	2QTR	3Qtr	49tr	10tr
RD Cadre						
RD Terror Casualties		271	480	241	119	225
RD Personnel Strengt: (000)2/ Casualties/1000 RD	27.4	30.3 9	37.7 13	46.5 5	46.5 3	47.3 5
National Police						
MP Terror Casualties MP Strength (000) <sup>2</sup> / Casualties/1000 MP	272 69.0 4	325 72.9 4	483 78.1 6	245 80.6 3	144 79.2 2	269 77.5 3

<sup>2</sup> Quarterly average.

The civilians category in Table 2 includes news executives, prominent citizens, election candidates, Hoi Chanh, combat youth, refugees, People's Self-Defense Force (PSDF) and civilians in general. About 90% of all terror casualties fall in this category. Table 5 indicates that refugee and PBDF casualties from terrorism increased markedly during first quarter 1969.

TABLE 5
TERROR CASUALTIES: CIVILIANS

	1967 4Qtr	<u>1968</u> 19tr	2QIR	3QTR	4Qtr	1969 10tr
Civilians	3348	2652	5375	3370	2473	3784
Refugees	86	199	114	39	55	368
PSDF	0	0	0	0	11	268
Total	3434	2851	5469	3409	2539	4420

### Where Terror Incidents Occur

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The plot shows the distribution of terror incidents which caused casualties during 1968. These appear to occur most frequently in areas of dense population such as coastal I ani II CTZ, around Saigon and in the Delta. Terror incidents also occur frequently along lines of communication (note Route 4 in the Delta and Route 19 in II CTZ).


In 1968 each CTZ had about an equal proportion of terror casualties (Table 6). In the first quarter 1969, however, I CTZ had 31% of the terror casualties and III CTZ dropped to 17%. The increase in I CTZ was due to an increase in abductions to a record high monthly average of 428. Previously, II CTZ accounted for more than half of all abductions.

TABLE 6
TERROR CASUALTIES BY CTZ
(Monthly Average)

		1967	1968				1969
		49	199/	20	39	49	10
1	CTZ	569	595	854	836	531	1039
II	CIZ	867	1677	664	559	630	844
III	CIZ.	533	678	1469	552	423	567
IA	CIZ	947	1084	790	602	450	858
	TOTAL	2916	4034	3777	2549	2034	3308

a/ Jan. and Mar. only.

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TERRORISM IN SVN

VC/NVA abductions have decreased 33% in 1963, but the number of people assessinated or wounded has remained closs to 1968 rates. The IV Corps share of terror victims is increasing relative to the other Corps areas in 1969.

Table 1 shows that abductions by the VC/NVA have decreased 33% in 1969, but the number of people assassinated or wounded has remained close to 1968 rates. Detailed quarterly data for 1968 and 1969 indicates that the general pattern is about the same for both years; a sharp rise in terror casualties in the first quarter is followed by a continuous decline in the following quarters. So far, however, casualties for each 1969 quarter are below the same periods last year.

### TABLE 1

## FRIEDLY CASUALTIES FROM TERRORISM (Monthly Average)

	1968	(Thru July) 1959	1969 10tr	20tr	July
Casualties Assassinated Wounded Abducted	602 1498 1025	578 1457 685	652 1590 1068	1442 1445 262	407 1100 273
Total	3125	2720	3310	5444	1780

Source: TIRS Computer File.

The distribution of terror casualties for each Corps area as a percentage of the country as a whole is shown in Table 2. The IV share has increased consistently in 1969. In July, IV CTZ accounted for 41% of all terror victims in the country, because the wounded increased, and assassinations continued at a high rate while declining in the other three Corps.

### TABLE 2

### \* TERROR CASUALTIES BY CTZ

	1967 40tr	1968 10tr	20tr	<u> 30tr</u>	<u> 4Qtr</u>	1969 10tr	20tr	July
I CTZ	19	15	<b>32</b>	32	26	31	23	14
II CTZ	30	42	17	22	31	25	51	22
III CTZ	30 18	17	40	22	51	17	26	23
IV CTZ	32	27	57	23	55	26	30	41

a/ January and Merch only.

There are two categories of assassination and abductions: selective and general, as shown in Table 3. Selective means that the person(s) was specifically targeted. Selective assassinations and abductions have both declined in 1969 (24% and 9% respectively), and so have general abductions (37%). However, general assassinations have increased slightly. The much lower rate of general abductions in the April-July 1969 period may reflect the enemy's reduced need for porters as he switched from large ground attacks to a "high point" strategy featuring indirect attacks by fire.

# SELECTIVE VERSUS GENERAL TERROR (Monthly Average)

	1968 No.	<u>\$</u>	(Thru No.	69 1 Jul) 2	1969 10tr	20tr	July
Assassinations Selective General	165 437	27 73	125 453	22 78	166 486	102 460	69 338
Total	602		578		652	562	407
Abductions Selective	153	15	139	20	210	108	18
General	872	85	546	80	858	332	255
Total	1025		685	<del></del>	1068	440	273

Source: TIRS Computer File

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Plain civilians account for over 90% of the VC terror victims, as shown in Table 4. An average of 50 government officials have been terror victims each month for the past 13 months, indicating a steady level of enemy effort against them.

# TABLE 4 TERROR CASUALTIES BY TYPE (Monthly Average)

	1967 49tr	1968 10tr	20tr	30tr	4qtr	1969 10tr	20tr	July
Govt Officials Govt Employees Civilians	72 281 2 <b>5</b> 65	100 307 3632	63 330 3455	55 169 2351	49 97 1891	50 168 3092	52 123 2269	40 96 1644
Total	2918	4039	3848	2575	2037	3310	2444	1780

a/ January and March only.

More than 95% of government officials targeted in 1968-69 were hamlet and village chiefs or officials. Table 5 shows that the chiefs are being hit about as hard in 1969 as they were during most of 1968. Casualties among other officials are lower this year.

## TABLE 5

# TERROR CASUALTIES: VILLAGE AID HAMLLT OFFICIALS (Monthly Average)

	1967 40tr	1968 10tr <sup>2</sup> /	<u> 20tr</u>	<u> 30tr</u>	4ctr	1969 10tr	20tr	July
Chiefs Other Officials	41 28	46 47	24 34	21 20	16 30	25 23	23 28	18 21
Total	69	93	55	51	46	48	. 51	39

a/ January and March only.

Revolutionary Development Cadre and National Police are the main victims in the government employees' target group. Both suffer about the same number of casualties, but the casualty rate for FD cadre is much higher. In 1969 so far, they have suffered about 70% more casualties per 1000 strength than have the police, as indicated in Table 6.

### TABLE 6

## TERROR CASUALTIES: RD CADRE AND MATIONAL POLICE

	1967 19tr	1968 19tr	20to	30tr	liqtr	1969 10tr	29tr	July
RD Terror Casualtiesb/	177	134	160	80	38	75	59	70
RD Personnel Strength (000)S/ Casualties/1000 RD	27.4 6.5	30.3 4.4	37.7 4.2	46.5 1.7	46.5 .8	47.3 1.6	45.7 1.3	44.0 1.6
Mational Police  HP Terror Casualtiesb/ HP Personnel Strength	91	163	165	82	48	89	60	26
MP Personnel Strength (000) <sup>C</sup> / Casualties/1000 MP	69.0 1.3	72.9 2.2	78.1 2.1	80.6	79.2 .6	77.5	76.6 .8	77.5 .3

a/ January and March only.

b/ Monthly average.

c/ Average for the quarter.

Refugees and Peoples' Self-Defense Group personnel appear to be particular targets of VC terror against civilians, especially in 1969 (Table 7). The monthly average of civilian casualties as a whole has declined about % in 1969.

TABLE 7

TERROR CASUALTIES: CIVILIANS
(Monthly Average)

	1967 40tr	1968 10tra/	2Qtr	3Qtr	4Qtr	1969 1Qtr	2Qtr	July
Civilians	2450	3422	3334	2265	1778	2570	1895	1381
Refugees	76	140	62	46	76	225	109	5
PSDF	10	28	21	5	28	290	228	232
Other	29	42	38	35	9	7	37	26
Total	2565	3632	3455	2351	1891	3092	2269	1644

a/ January and March only.

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### TERRORISM IN SVN

Summary. Terrorism increased during April and May with the greatest increases in II CT2. If past patterns hold, however, terrorism should decline in the second half of 1970. More than three-fourths of terrorist victims are ordinary civilians. Of the remainder, primary targets are PSDF, RD codre, National Police and hamlet and village officials.

Casualty Rates. A little more than one-half of VC terrorist activities reported in the Terrorist Incident Reporting System (TIRS) are casualty-producing incidents--assassinations, abductions and woundings. In both 1968 and 1969 terrorist activity peaked in the first quarter and declined during the rest of the year. This pattern may not hold in 1970 (or be delayed) since April and May have been the peak months so far. (Table 1)

### TABLE 1

			TERI		LEST						
	1367	1968	(1	(onth)	7 AVE)					1970	
	1367 415	1968 1st		3rd	4±h	1969 1st	2nd	3rd	4tr	let	2nd
	<u>Çtr</u>	Qtr	a/Qtr	Qtr	<u> </u>	Qtr	<u>Qtr</u>	Qtr	Qtr	Qtr	gtr b
Incidents w/											
Casualties	526	548	672	514	kjų	547	523	435	381	432	822
Other Incidents	674	862	729	415	352	461	432	383	342	_368	623
Total	1200	1510	1401	923	6.6	1008	955	818	723	800	1445

Source: TIRS

In 1968 more than 33,000 Vietnamese civilians were killed, wounded or kidnapped by WC terrorists, and in 1969 the casualty total was 27,000. If the rate of terrorist casualties for the first five months of this year continues through June, then drops off in the second half of the year as it has in past years, we can expect about 25-30,000 terrorism casualties in 1970.

Terrorism Targets. Table 2 divides assessinations and abductions into selected and general categories. Those victims who were apparently specifically targeted by the VC for elimination are reported as "selected." A higher proportion of assessinations were selected in 1970 (29%) than in 1969 (21%) or 1968 (27%); but the proportion of selected abductions (18%) was about the same as 1968-69 (16-20%).

<sup>&</sup>lt;u>s</u>/ Excludes February when no terror incidents were reported because of the Tet offensive disruptions.

b/ moril-May.

### TABLE 2

### TERRORISM CASUALTIES

(Monthly Avg)									
	1969								1
	3066 . 1	.0/0	/	lst	Sug	3rd	4th	lst	2nd
	1968 a/	1969	1970 Ъ/	Qtr	Qtr	Qtr	Qtr	Qtr	Qtr b/
Assassinations Selected	162	106	163	165	101	65	93	116	2314
General	430	401	407	488	460	387	267	584	
Total	592	507	570	653	561	452	360	400	<u>591</u> 825
Woundings	1480	1254	1227	1593	1437	1154	832	847	1796
Abductions Selected	130	101	140	510	108	23	63	132	153
General	837	406	662	858	332	302	136	470	950
Total	967	507	802	1068	440	325	199	602	1103

Excludes February when no terror incidents were reported because of the Tet offensive disruptions.

More than three-fourths of terrorist victims are ordinary civilians (76-88% of the total victims). Many of these civilians are only abducted for a few weeks or months of service with the enemy and return home afterward; others are killed or wounded, possibly for their (or their relatives') "collaboration" with the GVM, or simply as a show of force by the VC reentering areas pacified by the GVM.

Paramilitary and government officials reached their highest levels in two years as victims in April and May 1970, primarily reflecting the rapid buildup of People's Self Defense Forces (PSDF) in 1969-1970, both in strength and importance. Other primary targets are RD ondre, National Police (NP), and hamlet and village officials, all of whom (except NP) were more favored as targets in 1970 than 1969. The June 28 provincial elections may have triggered the increase in terror against government officials as the enemy may be trying to intimidate candidates for such jobs. The number of refugee and Hoi Chanh targets has been gradually falling off as refugees are being resettled and returned to villages, and as the Chieu Hoi program is achieving lower results than during the 1968-1969 Accelerated Pacification Campaigns. (Table 3)

b/ Through Mag.

TABLE 3

TERROR CASUALTIES BY TYPE a/									
		(Month	TA YAE)	1969 1st				1970	
	1968b/	1050	<u>1973</u> E/		2nd	3rd	4th	lst	Sug /
Paramilitary	1300-	<u>1969</u>	1913	Qtr	Qtr	Qtr	Qtr	Qtr	Qtrc
PSDF	19	229	266	289	227	227	171	178	399
RD/TS	101	63	74	74	59	74	46	43	121
NP/PPFF	110		53	69	60	38	23	19	103
Total	230	53 345	393	452	346	339	240	240	623
Officials									
Hamlet Chiefs	19	18	27	22	22	13	13	25	30
Hamlet Officials	20	20	34	19	.19	9	31	32	36
Village Chiex's	6	3	4		ž	Á	4	3	6
Village Officials	15	10	19	3	9	13	13	23	28
Other	4	1	i	4	ó	2	ō	1	.0
Total	64	. 52	85	52	52	41	61	74	100
Selected Civilians									
Refugees	189	. 95 "	- 18	226	108	37	7	· 28	3
Hoi Chanh	17	20"	12	5	36	16	21	10	
Teachers	2	1	2	2	٥	0	1	2	3
Other	13	2	6	3	5	<u>· 1</u>	0	3.	15 3 13 34
Total	521	118	35	236	149	54	29	41	34
Other Civilians	2524	· 1753·	2083	2574	1891	1497	1061	1494	2967
Total	3039	2268	2599	3314	2438	1931	1391	1849	3724

a/ Assassinations, abductions, woundings.

Current Trends. Available weekly data for 1970 (Table 4) shows a sharp increase in assassinations, woundings, and abductions since about March, but the 1970 January-May weekly average for such casualties is still comfortably below 1968 and 1969 levels. However, if the high April-May level of terrorism continues through June, the first half 1970 weekly average for assassinations and abductions will equal the first half 1969 average.

### TABLE &

## CASUALTIES FROM EXEMY TERRORISM (Weekly Avg)

• • •	(Jan-K	ay) ·	1970	1970					
	1968	1969	1970	Jen	Feb	Max	Apr `	May	Jun p
Assassinated Abducted Wounded	154 28; 42.	144 191 361	126 165 273	69 56 179	71 76 110	243 243 100	195 237 425	211 247 469	226 336 455

Excludes February when no terrorist data was reported because of the Tet offensive disruptions. COMPUNE TELESTERS

b/ Excludes February when no terror incidents were reported because of the Tet offensive disruptions.

c/ Through May.

b/ Thru June 13.

All CTZ's had significant increases in terrorist casualties in 1970, but the increases began in I and II CTZ in the first quarter while the increases in III and IV CTZ were delayed until second quarter. The greatest gains were in II CTZ. The 1970 monthly average for II CTZ was 914 higher than in 1969. As a result II CTZ terrorism casualties made up 41% of total SVN terrorism casualties in 1970, up from 24% in 1969 and 27% in 1968. III CTZ showed the greatest decline from 27% in 1968 to 22% in 1969 to 14% in 1970. (Table 5)

While both 1970 assassination and woundings rates were the highest in three years in II CTZ, the greatest increase was in abductions, going from 163 a month last year to 570 a month this year, about 32 times the 1969 level.

TABLE 5
TERRORISM CASUALTIES BY CTZ
(Montlly Avg)

1968° 1969 1970°	1969 19tr 29tr 39tr 49tr 19tr 29trb
CTZ	180 125 124 52 107 239 427 119 71 18 40 132 430 314 294 110 292 469 1037 558 489 180 439 840
II CTZ  Assussinations 117 131 184 Abductions 507 163 570 Woundings 189 255 313 Total 813 549 1067	193 124 108 97 115 288 322 153 90 88 434 775 333 236 246 205 177 519 848 513 444 390 726 1532
Assassinations 174 106 81 Abductions 162 104 58 Woundings, 473 292 214 Total 809 502 353	98 136 87 104 72 94 169 91 110 44 48 71 302 408 212 245 174 274 569 635 409 393 294 439
17 C- Accessinations 139 150 145 Abductions 103 81 98 Woundings 460 420 336 Total 702 551 579	182 176 133 107 106 204 150 77 54 49 80 125 528 479 402 272 204 534 860 732 589 428 390 863
Assessmetions 592 507 570 Abductions 967 507 803 Woundings 1480 1254 1226 Total 3039 2268 2599	653 561 452 360 400 825 1068 440 325 199 602 1103 1593 1437 1154 832 847 1796 3315 2438 1931 1391 1849 3724

a/ Excludes February when no terrorist data was reported because of the Tet offensive disruptions.

b/ Through May.

Table 6 shows that four provinces have consistently ranked among the top ten in level of terrorism casualties in the last 2g years: Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh and Gia Dinh, making up 27-30% of the total. Five of the top ten provinces were in II CTZ during the first five months of 1970. In II CTZ 63% of 1970 terrorism casualties occurred in three provinces: Binh Dinh, Pleiku and Phm Yen. Ftu Yen in particular has experienced intense terrorist activity. In addition to abductions to obtain laborers, reports have been received that the enemy for the first time in II CTZ is kidnapping individuals for ransom. Instances of kidnapping children for training in Laos and North Vietnam and women for training in military proselyting and psychological warfare activities have been reported.

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### TABLE 6

CASUALTIES FROM TERRORISM BY PROVINCE (Monthly Avg)						
	196H. 3	1967	1 <u>970</u> 5/			
Quang Tri	90	8	48			
Thus Thien/Hue	<b>8</b> 5	36	31.			
Quang Nam/Dallang	294 *	285.*	305*			
Quang Tin	57	68*	•73•			
Quang Egai	169.	165*	143*			
I CTZ	715	· 562 ·	600			
Loctum	116*	93*	58			
Binh Dinh	159*	148*	136+			
Pleiku	50	32	158•			
Phu Bon	7	6	58			
Phu Yen	176*	47	<b>6</b> 35e			
Darlac	155.5	26	24			
Khanh Hoa	32	18	12			
Ninh Thuan	32 14	٠ 5	10			
Tuyen Duc/Dalat	26	47	81+			
Quang Duc	37 10	24	14			
Lam Dong	10	7	32			
Binh Thuan	51	<u>%</u> •	.142*			
II CIZ	51 815	94.9 549	1067			
Binh Tuy	13 55 55 55 55 57 58 65 810	20	30			
Long Khanh	55	<b>35</b>	10			
Phuoe Iong	85	19 37 <b>42</b>	5 18			
Binh Long	49	37				
Binh Duong	<del>2</del>	42	39 38			
Tay Einh	<u> 21</u> .	50 80°	30			
Ham Mghia	95*	₩.	36 28			
Bien Nos	73	. 60	18			
Phuoe Tuy	50	· · · · · ·	. 67			
Iong An	. 65	32	. 27			
Gia Dinh/Saigon	242	· 506	. 57 720 353			
III CTZ	•					
Go Cong	25	23	23			
Kien Tuong	19	13	2			
Kien Phong	٠, ٢٤	. 34 118	29			
Dinh Tuong	125°	110	29 17 81*			
Kien Hoe	12	. 33	01*			
Vinh Binh	10	35	· 147			
Vinh Long	•	•37	90 1 30			
An Glang	6	Ţ.,				
Kies Giang	99 48 16 38 38	<b>40</b>	30 44			
Chuong Thien	42	7.	<b>~</b>			
Phone Dirk	93"	67	28 5h 32 . 40			
BA Xuyen	. 45	<b>₹</b>	폱			
An Xuyen	16		. 70			
Rec Lieu	<b>5</b> 5	. य	· ex			
Chan Doc	22	. 74	· 269			
Sa Dec	<u> </u>	53 53 7 40 56 44 57 58 58 58 58	. 🕳			
IA CIS	JOS		717			
Total	30A2	2367	2599			

Top ten provinces. Excludes February when no terror Tet offensive disruptions. Thru May.

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### TERRORISM IN SVN

Surrary. Terrorism is the means by which the Viet Cong enter (or reenter) populated areas in SVN. Provinces which experience high levels of terrorist activity have fairly large populations and have historically been the sites of enemy base areas. It is in these areas that the VC feel they can rekindle the fires of latent sympathy for their cause, negate the effect of GVN presence and make inroads into GVN control. In contrast, terrorism applied to areas traditionally opposed to the VC (e.g. Catholic, Hoa Hao) is generally counterproductive, stiffening the resistance of the people.

The frequency of terrorist incidents has remained high in 1970, but its intensity has declined-incidents are up, but casualties are down. More GVN officials are being attacked (mostly in Binh Dinh province in MR II) but little other change from the pattern of 1968 and 1969 is evident. Terrorism remains about level in MR's I and IV, but is down in III MR and up sharply in II MR this year. A factor which undoubtedly contributes to the VC perception that terrorism is a strategy of choice in MR II has been the weakness of GVN leadership and anti-VCI efforts in that area.

Strategy. Barring any change in the last part of 1970, there will be about 25,000 Vietnamese civilian victims of VC terrorism by the end of the year. (There were 33,000 and 27,000 victims in 1968 and 1969, respectively.) These levels indicate the extent of the role terrorism rlays in the VC "game plan" for the war in SVN.

The communists have formulated a three pronged strategy-military, diplomatic and political -- enumerated in their Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) Resolution #9 (July 1969). Military force is directed to exert pressure, to cause the US to speed its withirawal (and concurrently to showten the time available for strengthening the GWN), and to keep the GVN on a wartime footing. Diplomacy is to be used concurrently to marshal world opinion in their favor.

The Solitical struggle" will be accelerated to lay the groundwork within SVN. Integral to the political struggle is the liberal use of terrorism to weaken and destroy local government, strengthen the party apparatus, proselyte among the populace, erode the control and influence of the GVN and weaken RVNAP. If positive benefits (to the VC) cannot be gained, COSVN #9 indicates that they will settle for creating "figreely contested areas." They intend to "motivate" the peasants in all rural areas — whether contested or controlled by either side. (One observer notes that they sometimes settle for simply teaching the peasants how to remain neutral.)

A Word About the Terrorism Data. There is no single, complete source of data on terrorism. Acts of terror are perpetrated against both military and civilian elements in Vietnam. Consequently, incidents are reported through MACV J-3 or MACCORDS (sometimes both). The MACV J-3 reports yield the "harassment, terror and sabotage" figures in common use. The MACCORDS terrorist incident reporting system (TIRS) is oriented primarily on terrorism directed against.

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civilians. The two systems are not completely compatible in their current forms and analysis is underway to correct this. In the meantime, the TIRS data seems to be the most complete set available and has been used for this analysis.

It is estimated that 90-95% of the terrorist incidents and casualties are reported by TIRS. It classifies the terror incidents by their type of casualties, in terms of assassinations (any killing), abductions, woundings. Assassinations and abductions are further classified as selected or general, depending on whether the victim was known, or judged to be, a specific VC target (such as a village chief), or simply an innocent bystander caught in a raid. These classifications are far from perfect, especially when killings, woundings and abductions of various types of people occur in the same incident. But they do give us a fairly good idea of the make up and targeting of enemy terrorism.

National Overview. Enemy military activity has been winding down over the past year and a half, out terrorism has remained high. The 1970 rate of incidents (through August) is 13% higher than a comparable period of 1969, and only 6% below the first three quarters of 1968. However, casualties are 6% lower than in 1969 and 20% below 1968, a rather clear indication that the enemy may be having more difficulty getting at the population in spite of his strategy (Table 1).

#### TABLE 1

# TERRORIST INCIDENTS AND CASUALTIES IN RVN (Fontbly Average)

	First 3	Quarters		Thru August
	1968	1969		1970
Number of Incidents Number of Casualtics	3036 1112	. 927 2561	•	1047 2418
	•	•		•

Source: TIRS

The decline in intensity of terrorism is more clearly illustrated in Table 2. The 1970 ratio of casualties per incident is about 1% lower than 1969. Moreover, the decline is exhibited by all three categories of terrorism: assassinations are down 8%, abductions down 24%, woundings down 19% from 1969 rates.

### TABLE 2

## INTENSITY OF VC TERRORISM (Casualties/Incident)

	1968	1969	1970
Assassinations Woundings	2.35 8.84	2.18 9.11	2.00 7.38
Abductions	7.90	6.50	4.94
All incidents	2.73	2.76	2.31

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The relative mix of casualties has not shifted greatly in the past 3 years. This year's pattern most closely resembles that of 1968. This year (through August):

- Selected assassinations were 27; of total assassinations compared to 27% in 1968, 21% in 1969.
- Selected abductions were 17% of total abductions compared to 15% in 1968, 20% in 1969.
- Woundings account for 48% of 1970's casualties compared to 49% in 1968 and 55% in 1969.

COSVN Resolution #9 clearly directed terrorist activity against specific targets. "Tyrants - (GVN administrators) - "spies" and "ringleaders in oppressed organizations or in the reactionary political organizations are to be killed." There has been a 70% increase in casualties among government officials - principally hamlet and village chiefs. (One province, Binh Dinh in MR II, accounts for about 25% of the entire national total.) However, there has been no evidence of increased targeting of other groups - paramilitary forces, government employees or prominent citizens - either on a nationwide basis or in specific provinces.

Regional Results. Military Regions I and IV each account for roughly 20% of the nation's terrorist incidents and the levels have been very stable for the last 22 years. In MR's II and III, however, the patterns have shifted.

Military Region III has experienced significant declines in six of its ten provinces in both incidents and casualties this year. Only two provinces, long An and Rinh Tuy, have shown increases. Overall, MR III has had:

- a 3% decline in incidents (242/month vs 249/month)
- a 36% decline in casualties (344/month vs 538/month) comparing the first three quarters of 1969 with 1970 (through August).

Military Region II, always high in terrorist activity, has had a general upsurge in 1970. Incidents have risen 17% (362 vs 309 per month) and casualties are up 53% (922 vs 601 per month). Although all categories of incidents are above 1968 and 1969 levels, the primary cause of the MR II gain is the increase in abductions. They went up 122% and the associated casualties rose 48%. Incidents of assussinations are 36% higher than in 1969, and these casualties are up 18%.

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Terrorism in three MR II provinces -- Binh Dinh, Phu ven and Binh Thuan -- is driving the MR II totals and significantly influencing the national totals. In the first half of 1970 these three provinces (with 8.5% of the Sv., population) have accounted for:

- 50% of the nation's general abductions.
- 33% of its selected abductions.
- 16% of its general assassinations.

It has already been pointed out that selected assassinations are at very high levels in Birh Dinh (25% of the national total). Terrorism of all types in this populous province (920,000) has been consistently high for 22 years.

Phu Yen has experienced the most significant increases in terrorism of any province in the country in 1970. The incident rate has risen 240% (68 vs 20 per month). Casualties are up 362% (240 vs 52 per month in 1969). In terms of both incidents and casualties, the greatest increases have been in selected assassinations and general abductions.

It appears that the VC strategy to "motivate the people to assist in building the armed forces" and "to struggle for their own pressing interest," and the goal of "liberating large blocs of villages or hamlets or to change them into fiercely contested areas" is being pursued with vigor in Northeastern II.

Binh Dinh and Phu Yen provinces fit the mold for lucrative targets for terrorism noted earlier. They are populous and have a history of sympathy for the VC vause. Despite large GVN presence, the government has not been an unqualified success in gaining the support of the people. Moreover, these two provinces are contiguous to the highlands — an area of strategic importance to the VC as stated expressly in COSVN Resolution #9.

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### TERRORISM IN SYN

This update of a previous survey of terrorism in SVN is based upon the most recent data available (through September) from MACV's Terrorist Incident Reporting System. This system is the only source of detailed, final data. The original paper (OASD/SA, 14 October 1970) examined the patterns of terrorist activity in the four military regions. It pointed out that MR II (particularly Phu Yen and Binh Dinh provinces) was responsible for the surge in terrorism this year.

Terrorism continues to be a severe problem in SVN, but the 3rd quarter of 1970 showed a decline from the very high levels of Jan-June, following the pattern established in past years. Comparing 3rd quarter rates with those of the first half:

- Incidents were down 13% (521 per month vs 596 per month).
- Casualties declined 29% (1854 per month vs 2602 per month).

However, comparing incident and casualty rates for 3rd quarter 1970 to 3rd quarter 1969:

- Incidents were up 19% (521 per month vs 436 per month).
- Casualties were down 4% (1854 per month vs 1934 per month), due to a 15% decline in woundings.

### TABLE 1

# TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN RVN (Monthly Average)

	3rd Qtr. 69	1st Half 70	3rd Qtr 70
Incidents with Casualties	436	596	521
Casualties			
Assassinated	453	595	447
Abducted	324 .	776	422
Wounded	1157	1231	985
Total Casualties	1934	2602	1854

Using preliminary data thru 28 November, casualties during the second half of this year are running 35% below the first half, and are about even with the second half of 1969.

The primary reason for the decline in terrorism from 1st half 1970 is an apparent let-up in large scale abductions in MR II. Incidents of abduction

1/ Preliminary data, which deals only with casualties and only on a countrywide basis is derived from the Saigon Embassy Mission Weekly Message.

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in this region are down 31% from the average rate of the first half (60 per month vs 87 per month). However, 3rd quarter rates are still well above the rates in MR II during the 3rd quarter a year ago:

- Incidents are up 114% (60 per month vs 28 per month).
- Casualties are up 137% (213 per month vs 90 per month).

As expected, the MR II provinces responsible for the previous upsuage account for the decline. Binh Dinh had 7 abductions involving 35 ordinary civilians in the third quarter, compared to 25 involving 183 people during the peak activity period of April-June. Selective abductions in Binh Dinh (involving officials and other key figures in the local society) have not shown a similar decline.

Phu Yen province had a decline in all types of terrorist incidents, except assassinations of ordinary civilians (which held at about 9 incidents per month). Casualties of terrorism (except woundings) dropped in the third quarter, especially the number of people abducted, which was about 57% lower than in the first half of this year.

Recent message traffic indicates that the GVN has initiated specific actions to combat terrorist activity in MR II. These actions, however, have probably been too recent to have caused the reductions noted above. It is more likely that the declines are due to decreased enemy initiative, a pattern which has been evident in the last two years.

### TERRORISM IN SOUTH VIETNAM

This update of a previous survey of terrorism in South Vietnam is based upon the most recent data available (thru March) from MACV's Terrorist Incident Reporting System (TIRS). TIRS is the only source of detailed, final data about terrorism. The original paper! examined the patterns of terrorist activity in the four military regions. It pointed out that MR II (particularly Phu Yen and Binh Dinh provinces) was responsible for the 1970 surge in terrorism.

Terrorism continues to be a problem in SVN, especially since it has become one of the enemy's prime means of prosecuting the war. Comparing the first quarters of 1970 and 1971:

- Casualties caused fterrorists are 7% higher this year (1905 per month vs 1787 per month last year). There has been a substantial reduction in selective assassinations (down 12%) and selective abductions (down 57%), but this has been negated by a rise in casualties among ordinary civilians:
- -- Gene. all assassinations are up 37% (376 per month this year vs 274 per month lest -r).
- -- Gener 1 abductions are up 12% (510 per month this year vs 455 per month last year).
- Terrorist incidents are up 5% for 1st quarter 1971 (827 per month this year vs 791 per month a year ago).

Last year's peak period of terrorist activity came during the 2nd quarte.

- Total incidents jumped 70% above 1st quarter levels.
- The number of people assassinated doubled (802 per month vs 387 per month in the lst quarter).
- The number of people abducted increased 65% (565 per month vs 586 per month in the lat quarter).

Five factors lead us to believe that terrorism will again surge in the 2nd quarter of this year and may match last year's levels:

- The strategy pronouncements of the eveny.
- The operations of RVMAF regular forces away from populated areas (outof-country and in the delta's base areas),
- The inability of the enemy to mount or sustain offensive military operations near the populated areas of South Vietnam.
- 1/ September/October 1970 SEA Analysis Report.
  2/ Includes all military, paramilitary and civilian casualties from terrorism.

- The enemy's continuing need to recruit among the populace to replace his losses.
- His current tactic of responding to military pressure by attacking civilians, hoping to draw ARVN forces back to protect the populace.

Table 1 shows the terrorism figures for SVN for the last 31 years.

TABLE 1

	TERRO!		204		
	1968	1969	<u> 1.970</u>	1970	19tr 1971
Incidents With Casualties Other Total	507	472	532	428	463
	527	405	440	<u>363</u>	364
	1034	877	972	791	827
Casualties Assassination Abduction Woundings Total	5 <sup>4</sup> 2	507	495	387	475
	833	508	573	586	567
	1358	1254	1048	814	<u>863</u>
	2783	2270	2116	1787	1905

Source: MACV TIRS.

The most notable change in terrorism this year, compared to last, is the increase in the level of terrorism in MR 1, together with a decline in MR 2.

Terrorist incidents in MR 1 during 1st quarter 1971 averaged 231 per month-about 3% higher than the MR 2 level in the same period and about equal to the highest quarterly rate for MR 1 last year (229 incidents per month during the 2nd quarter).

Incidents in MR 2 during 1st quarter 1971 were lower (224 per month) than at any time in all of 1970.

Last year we noted that Binh Dinh and Phu Yem were the two botbeds for terrorist activity. First quarter results show that:

- Binh Dinh is still experiencing problems. There were 245 incidents in the province during the lat quarter, compared to 136 in the lat quarter a year ago, and 276 during 2nd quarter 1970 when terrorists activity peaked in the province.

- Phu Yen has been replaced as a problem area by Quang Nam (MR 1). The 126 incidents in Phu Yen during lat quarter 1971 was a lower total than in any quarter during 1970.
- Quang Nam has had 238 incidents in 1st querter 1971, an increase of 84% over the 129 incidents it experienced during 1st quarter 1970, and 17% above the highest level reached last year (204 in the 2nd quarter).

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### TERRORISM IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The level of communist terrorism in SVN has dropped during 1971. Compared to January-August 1970,

- casualties fell 23%
- incidents declined 30%

On the basis of current data and past ratterns of activity, we expect:

- about 9,500 incidents in 1971 (compared to over 11,500 in 1970)
- about 20,000 casualties (compared to over 25,000 in 1970)

This means that roughly one in a thousand (0.1%) of SVN's 18,000,000 people will be victims of terrorists in 1971.

In an attempt to place the data in perspective, we compared them to Eureau of the Census statistics on US crime rates. We found:

- The VC are assassinating people in Vietnam at a rate which is about 50% higher than the murder rates of the three worst US cities (28 per 100,000, compared to rates of 18.6 in Charlotte, N.C., and 18.1 for Columbia, S.C., and Shreveport, La.).
- Woundings occur at a rate of 50 per 100,000, about  $\frac{1}{3}$  the aggravated assault rate in the US (152 per 100,000).
- Terrorist incidents not involving casualties (extortion, taxation, etc.) occur at a rate of 24 per 100,000, about 84% below the robbery rate in the US (147 per 100,000).

In ar attempt to see if terrorism was being pushed out of the populated areas of Vietnam, we measured the proportion of the population living within one kilometer of a terrorist incident during the last three years. Comparing the 2nd quarters of 1969, 1970, and 1971 (the annual peak) we found:

- Fewer people were affected this year (28.5%) than in 1969 (32.6%), or 1970 (36.1%).
  - This was true in all regions except MR I.

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#### The Military Regions

- MR 1. Terrorism is intensifying, particularly in Quang Nam, Quang Ngai and Thua Thien, and terrorism in populated areas remains high. During the 2nd quarter of this year about 45% of the population lived within one kilometer of a terrorist incident, compared to 42% in the 2nd quarters of 1969 and 1970.
- MR 2. Terrorism declined this year. Binh Dinh and Phu Yen provinces, the cauldron last year, have seen a substantial easing, as has Binh Thuan. VC terrorists are still affecting a significant part of the population about 45% in the 2nd quarter in Binh Dinh and Phu Yen (but not nearly as much as 2nd quarter of last year, when 60% of the people in Binh Dinh and 75% of the populace in Phu Yen lived near terrorism).
- MR 3 continues to have the lowest terrorism rates in the country, probably reflecting the large GVN presence in and around the capital. In Tay Ninh and Hau Nghia, the proportion of people living near a terrorist incident increased.
- MR 4 has the most dramatic decline in terrorism this year. It is probably a direct benefit of GVN pressure on the enemy.
  - -- Incidents and casualties are down sharply, and
- -- The fraction of the population living close to terrorist incidents is the lowest in the country (17% compared to the countrywide average of 28% during 2nd quarter 1971).

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· May 1967

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#### ROLE OF THE SOUTHERN VIETTICH CADRE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

RAID recently published\* a study of the Vietninh cadres who remained in the South after the chasefire of 1954. Based on interviews with 17 prisoners and 6 defectors, the study describes the treatment of these "stay-behinds" by the Diem government, their relationship to the "second resistence", and the implications for our ability to negotiate a peace settlement with Hanoi.

Some of the Vietminh cadres who remained in the South after 1954 actively responded to the discipline and control of the Vietminh leaders in Hanoi. These "actives" organized and propagandized but did not terrorize. However, many other former Vietminh broke their connections with the Vietminh organization. Their sentiments ranged from loyalty to the Vietminh to hostility.

To check the potential threat from former Vietminh, Diem began to identify and control Communist elements in 1955. The former Vietminh saw this program as a campaign of terror, particularly as enforced in the rural areas. Many former Vietminh and their families, whether active or inactive, were harassed and persecuted by local enforcement agents. While the campaign damaged the Communist apparatus and its excesses may not have been intended by the central authorities (they were not evident in Saigon), the Diem regime lost the trust of many potential supporters among the former Vietminh. The surviving active cadres among the "stay-behinds", later reinforced by Vietminh returning from North Vietnam, were able to recruit those previously inactive in a new revolutionary and intelligence network. Their experience in the war against the French enabled them to make, to maintain and expand tase areas for training, later serving as military jumping off points.

The experience of the "stay-behinds" from 1954-60 will probably affect both VC and NVN views on a settlement of the war. They are likely to be cynical about future promises of amnesty. Hanoi also may fear that the VC might disobey Hanoi's instructions because of the Diem experience. Thus, Hanoi may see a peace treaty as a threat to its control over the Viet Cong movement in the South.

\* RM-5163-ISA/ARPA, Warch 1967: "Origins of the Insurgency in South Vietnam, 1954-1960: The role of the South Vietminh Calres."

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#### VC CADRES IN DIGHTUONS PROVINCE, STILL

A Rand study\* indicates that threatened or disgruntled VC cadre frequently reassess their personal position. At such times they are particularly vulnerable to the argument that the VC is losing popular support, and to the enticement of Chieu Hoi program.

Interviews were held in late 1965-early 1966 with 131 former VC and persons living in VC areas of Dinh Tuong Province in IV CTZ. The study explores the institutional framework within which the VC operate, and the developments in cadre recruitment, organization, and attitudes, with special attention to friction and vulnerabilities.

Despite difficulties, hardships, defections and desertions, the VC can a were largely blind to evidence of declining strength and prospects. They were isolated from their previous environment outside the National Liberation Front, and they believed that the VC will win because "the people" are supporting them. The interviews suggest, however, that disgruntled or threatened cadres often reassess their personal positions and can be shaken in their beliefs of popular support. The loss of support is a particularly lucrative argument to use against VC cadre because their intensive indoctrination has dwelt so strongly on its importance as the key to ultimate victory.

Another vulnerability is the awareness of the Chieu Hoi program, whose credibility is enhanced for all VC cadres by the strenuous VC efforts to counter it. Additional areas appear to include relations between military and civilian cadres; tensions among cadres of different origin, status, and function; and problems created by harsh or incompetent leadership, corruntion and favoritism, and cliques.

<sup>\*</sup> RM- 5114-ISA/ARPA, March 1967. "A Look at the VC Cadres: Dinh Tuong Province, 1965 -1966 (U)."

#### VIET CONG OPERATIONS IN THE VILLAGES

A recent RAND study\* concludes that Vict Cong power derives from its superb organization in the countryside. Ideological and material appeals are important but secondary. To counteract the VC we must disrupt this organization, develop counterpart organizations, and use family ties to develop support for the GVN.

The study was based on about 200 interviews with VC personnel who defected or were captured during 1964-1966. Their statements were checked against captured documents. The study states that: "popular support for the Viet Cong has decreased substantially during the past two to three years. This change in sympathies seems to be based in part on acquaintance with what life is really like under Viet Cong rule and in part on the fact that fewer rural people now expect the insurgents to win the war." However, the VC organization is not disintegrating.

The VO begin forming their organization in the village by collecting intelligence, applying selective terrorism toward GVN officials and GVN aympathizers, and recruiting supporters. They appeal to: (1) fear of the ARVN draft, (2) nationalism and patriotism, (3) desire for honor and position, (4) desire for land, education and a better life, (5) desire for adventure, (6) hatred for the Saigon government and the Americans, (7) attraction of socialism and equality, (8) escape from personal problems, and (9) desire to be on the winning side. Force is used when persuasion fails.

Once in control (gained with or without the aid of organized military forces) the VC consolidate their position by further use of selective terrorism, removal of the remaining members of the former elite and intensive indoctrination. Even villages sympathetic to the GVN can be overrun in this manner.

Assumption of control is all the easier because most country districts of South Vietnam have few strong community organizations. By itself the family is no match for the insurgent organization. Where community organizations do exist, as among the Catholics and the Hoa Hao, the Viet Cong have more difficulty.

The VC administer the villages by means of a network of committees and associations with the cell as the smallest organization unit. Villagers are incorporated into groups according to activity: farmers, women, youth groups, etc. Party members occupy key positions and are formed into the village party committee and the smaller, more elite party chapter committee. The National Liberation Front, though present, is vague and ill-defined.

Everyone in a VC village is used to support the VC -- the young men join the guerrillas or the army. Older people move supplies, build fortifications and sabotage roads. Women's groups write letters to soldiers. And everyone manufactures crude weapons or booby traps. Heavy taxes are levied, hitting the poor hardest. Land reform brings some benefits but has had its difficulties.

<sup>\*</sup> W.P. Davison, Some Observations on Viet Cong Operations in the Villages RN 5267-ISA/ARPA, July 1967.

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The VC try to prevent communication from the GVN areas and wide know-ledge of what is happening in VC areas. Travel is limited, security agents planted, and propaganda maintained. One reason that villagers have often been poor sources of intelligence is that the efficient Viet Cong mecurity controls have kept then from knowing very much." But some GVN information does reach VC villages via Radio Saigon, leaflets, loudspeakers from airplanes, rumor, occasional newspapers smuggled in, etc. To enforce control measures the VC use admonition, public humiliation, terror and death, and re-education. Peasant reactions include passivity (hear no evil, speak no evil, see no evil and grow only enough rice for one's family), mass non-compliance (a rare reaction since the VC remove leadership and reduce intravillage communication to a minimum), and, most often, flight to GVN controlled territory.

#### Recommendations From The Study

Since the strength of the VC lies in its organization, pacification activities should concentrate on disrupting organizations and substituting village administrations which are loyal to the GVN. The GVN should promote communication among villagers in VC areas and tell them as much about the local apparatus as possible.

GVN security and harsh treatment plays into the hands of the VC. Fear of harsh treatment has forced many villagers to join the VC and kept others from rejoining the government side. Viet Cong agents have enlisted villagers simply by tearing up their identity cards, thus making them illegal persons in the eyes of the GVN. Moreover, GVN reprisals against villagers who aid the VC do not seem to lessen support for the VC. Instead, reprisals often force a villager to stay with the VC. To reverse this, the GVN might take the position that all who aid the VC do so unwillingly and thus benefit by fear of VC reprisals.

Villagers understand the need for military operations but they can readily distinguish between justified and unjustified use of force.

Since the VC have been quite successful in enlisting the cooperation of rural women, GVM should give more attention to their aspirations.

If one family member becomes a VC or supports the VC it is likely that the whole family will follow suit. By incorporating large numbers of children into a quality, government-sponsored education system, Saigon might turn this same family to its own advantage.

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#### THE WAR IN THE DELTA: VIEWS FROM THREE VIET CONG\_ATTALIOUS\*

A recent RAID study reports the views of 39 former members (including 35 defectors) of three VC regular force battalions (261st, 263rd and 514th) on recruitment, training, morale, VC control and surveillance measures, and desertion during 1965 and 1966.

VC units operating in the upper Delta began to have recruiting problems in 1964. Until then, the interviewees agreed, the VC could readily get volunteers. After that, more conscription on the spot was required to overcome knowledge of potential prolonged hardship and death. Since 1965, the VC have drafted youths into the guerrillas for later transfer into provincial or regional battalions recognizing that young men preferred to serve in guerrilla units near home.

The use of conscription and shortened training courses allowed the three VC battalions to keep their strength at peak levels during 1965-66 and to maintain their combat effectiveness. To maintain their trained strength, the units reduced their activity. At the same time their missions were changed. Delta units were told that the prolonged struggle required them to: (1) neutralize rather than annihilate the enemy; and (2) meet the increased manpower and supply demands of regional force battalions operating in II and III Corps.

The pervasive and highly effective control system in the three VC battalions seems to explain their durability in face of mounting problems during 1966. The VC control system is designed to break the ties of the individual with his old friends and relations, and to substitute loyalties to the VC. The control system starts with initial training at sites far from home. Friends and fellow villagers are separated; each person is surrounded by strangers and cadre.

The procedures continue in each battalion. The battalion operates as a coordinated unit only during battle (Battalion 514 consisted of 126 cells). Squads are almost autonomous units, sometimes marching and camping alone, and burying their dead in secrecy away from other squads. Visits between squads are sharply restricted, as are visits to villages; in practice, no soldier got home more than cace a year. Moreover, outward expression of dissatisfaction is repressed by surrounding the individual with superiors (Battalion 514 had 1 cadre per 2.6 soldiers).

The purpose of the control and surveillance system is not limited simply to shifting loyalties and maintaining secrecy. The system also reinforces the themes that escape is unwise and dangerous, and that final victory belongs to

<sup>\*</sup> Melvin Gurtov, The War in the Delta: Views from Three Viet Cong Battalions, RAND, RM-5353-ISA/ARPA, September 1967

the Front. It instills fear of punishment for attempted descrition, and degrades GVN promises of fair treatment in the Chiev Soi program.

Cadres and soldiers in the sample used different standards in assessing the morale of their units. Cadres judged morale in terms of whether political education was effective in making the troops ready to risk death. The soldiers assessed morale in terms of daily hardships and endurance. Low morale in the three battalions seemed to arise from feelings of discouragement and weariness rather than from any important failings of the control system. On the contrary, the control system and the lack of clear and safe alternatives to continued service seem to have prevented demoralization and to have maintained the cohesion and efficiency of the battalions.

U.S. - GVN psywar efforts, the PAND study suggests, should aim primarily at breaking down the uncertainty of the ID troops about the GVN treatment of prisoners. The families of VC personnel can be most useful in this regard, for they are in the best position to convince soldiers of the falsity of the VC warnings. (About half of the 35 defectors went home before deciding to turn themselves into the GVN Chieu Hoi program; only three included GVN propaganda among the reasons they gave for having rellied.) Psywar efforts should also exploit anxiety over the prospect of a long war, villagers' grievances, and the VC policy of transferring troops out of the relative safety of the delta.

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#### VC/NVA ISDICAL MATERIEL AND SUPPLIES

Data < 172 enemy caches shows that the majority of the VC/NVA's medical material and supplies are produced in the Republic of Vietnam and western Europe (primarily France and England). United States production is indicated on fewer than 10% of the items captured, but account for about 50% of the dosage of the drugs. Most of these caches were found in the III CTZ area. The captured material probably did not affect significantly his medical needs.

We have reviewed the detailed reports of medical materiel and supply caches captured between September 1967 and February 1968. These reports are summarized by item in Table 1 and by dosage or item of issue in Tables 2 and 3. An item of materiel is a packaged unit; i.e., 200 aspirin tablets, 14 ampules of quinine, or 1 bottle of alcohol. A unit of dosage or item of issue is a single aspirin tablet, a quinine ampule or a bottle of alcohol. Items give a more meaningful estimate of the national origin of the materiel.

A wide variety of drugs have been found: Analgesics (pain killers) such as aspirin and morphine, Anesthetics like novocaine, Antibiotics and Sulfonamides such as penicillin and streptomycine, Antimalarials like quinine, Stimulants like caffeine, Vaccines - primarily serum antitetanique (tetanus vaccine), Vitamins and other miscellaneous drugs (Table 4). In addition to drugs, 18% of the items captured are medical equipment -- hypodermic syringes, forceps, suture needles, thermometers, etc.

Caches are discovered throughout SVN but 58 or .81% of those studied were located in III Corps. The attached map shows the locations of the caches. These caches consisted of 110,668 doses or items of issue or about one dose per main force soldier (Table 2). It is unlikely that the loss of these caches is the cause of reported enemy shortages of medical supplies.

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TABLE 1


# ORIGIN OF ENEMY MEDICAL MATERIEL BY ITEM (Percentage)

	Sept 1967	0ct 1967	Nov <u>1957</u>	Dec 1967	Jan 1968	Feb 1968	Total
RVN NVN VC US	46.0 6.9 1.7 9.0	30.3 11.5 1.0 9.1	32.5 9.0 2.6 8.5	45.3 3.6 2.9 10.5	27.6 7.9 1.0 14.5	17.0 3.8 0 6.1	32.6 8.0 1.6 -9.6
Red China West Europe Communist Europe Other Unknown	1.4 23.9 2.8 1.0 <u>7.3</u>	2.8 21.0 4.8 1.7 17.8 100.0	3.0 15.4 6.1 1.7 21.2 100.0	1.1 18.9 1.4 1.8 14.5	2.4 16.6 6.6 2.4 21.0 100.0	1.9 18.9 6.1 .7 45.5 100.0	2.3 18.8 4.9 1.7 20.5 100.0

#### TABLE 2

# ORIGIN OF ENEMY MEDICAL MATERIEL BY DOSAGE OR ITEM OF ISSUE

	Nov 1967	Dec 1967	Jan 1968	Feb 1968	Total
RVN NVN	1258 3545	3179 981	4989 5755	1303 1497	10729 11778
vc us	1689 1960	7 2779	82 32134	19067	1778 55940
Red China	393	11	35	16	455
West Europe Communist Europe	455 431	1830 55	9693 167	4866 222	16844 875
Other Unknown	5 275	10 1193	15 <u>9432</u> 50303	1 1338 28310	31 12238 110668
	10011	10045	62302	20210	110000



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#### JOINT STAFF COMMENTS ON JUNE ARTICLES

- "1. The June 1968 SEA Analysis Report has been reviewed by the Joint Staff. In accordance with the request for suggestions to improve future reports, page i, the following comments are provided.
- "2. The articles in the report appear to represent three general types: those presenting data and information; those reporting on analysis with findings, conclusions, and sometimes recommendations; and those which commingle presentation of data and conclusions without the associated analyses. Examples from the June 1968 report are:
- "a. Present data and information 'The War in Vietnam Post TET,' page 21; 'Aircraft Sorties and Iosses,' page 58; and 'Wage and Real Income Changes in SVN,' page 65.
- "b. Report on analysis 'Enemy Initiated Activity Against RF/PF,' page 1; 'A Comparison of Allied and VC/NVA Off-asive Manpower in SVN,' page 26; and 'GVN and VC Manpower Pools,' page 33.
- "c. Commingle data and conclusions without analyses 'VC/NVA Medical Material and Supplies,' page 10; 'Interdiction of Energy Truck Traffic,' page 63.
- "3. Articles presenting data and information can be very useful as a source of data for analyses by agencies which do not ordinarily have access to or the personnel to accumulate such data. This type of article should be continued as appropriate.
- "4. Articles reporting the results of analyses can provide useful exchange of information, ideas, and methodology related to analysis of the war in Southeast Asia provided the following are included:
- "a. Statement of the purpose, hypothesis, or proposition being addressed.
  - "b. Statement of the assumptions made or required.
  - "c. Definition of terms and measures.

- "d. Data, rationale, and methodology used.
- "e. Identified findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

'These are required in order to establish a basis for any substantive exchange of ideas or comment on a specific article. The article, 'GV! and VC Manpower Pools,' page 33, is an outstanding example with an additional feature in the sensitivity analysis to show the effects of changes in 'estimated' values. Specific comments on another article, 'A Comparison of Allied and VC/NVA Offensive Manpower in SVN,' are set north below. This type of of article, if technically accurate and ably written, is the most valuable to decision-makers and enalysts and should constitute the majority of the monthly report, however this particular article does not attain this standard.

"5. Articles which commingle data and conclusions without the associated analyses have no place in a report which has the purpose as that stated for the 'Southeast Asia Analysis Report.' Such articles assess the war by innuendo. They also disguise opinion as fact. Specific comment on two such articles are set forth below. These are: 'VC/NVA Medical Material and Supplies,' and 'Interdiction of Enemy Truck Traffic.'

#### Specific Joint Staff Comments on June Articles

"1. Article - 'A Comparison of Allied and VC/NVA Offensive Manpower in SVN," page 26.

#### Comments

'The purpose of the article is stated, 'This paper questions these assumptions,' i.e. '(a) that US/Free World Forces ground fc-ces are clearly superior to VC/NVA forces, and (b) that the margin of superiority is great enough so that we can win a war of attrition and shift some of the military burden now borne by the U. S. to the RVNAF.'

"a. There is, by inference, a conclusion regarding the first as a lion. That is, the assumption is false. This inference is lived on the statements: 'Despite a 5.6 to 1 advantage in total. Litary manpower in December 1967, the friendly forces were roughly at parity with enemy forces in rifle-carrying infantrymen on offensive operations.', page 26, and 'This analysis points up clearly that we do not now have a simple manpower advantage which would enable us to achieve a decisive military advantage, page 31.

"b. The measure used to determine superiority of force appears to be 'rifle carrying infantrymen on offensive operations.' The number of infantrymen, per se, does not indicate the offensive power of ARVN, U.S., and Free World forces. It totally neglects firepower, combat support, and mobility (all of which are acknowledged in passing as US/FWF advantages). Furthermore, the technique used to quantify 'infantrymen on offensive operations' pits only the ARVN, U.S., and FW forces in designated offensive functions against all VC/NVA main force maneuver units.' This results in an inflated strength ratio in favor of the VC/NVA. The implicit assumption required to support this reasoning is that VC/NVA forces are engaged against only those ARVN, U.S., and FW forces on specifically designated offensive operations. This ignores the reality of combat in South Vietnam. In fact, the article, 'Enemy Initiated Activity Against RF/PF,' page 1, indicates that there were 5,210 enemy initiated incidents against RF/PF forces during 1967.

"c. If 'analysis of force dispositions by function' were applied to VC/NVA units, the 'availability' of VC/NVA manpower for offensive operations would be decreased by approximately 93 percent. Empirical evidence indicates that VC/NVA battalions engage in offensive operations about one day in 15. Thus, using the data for platoon strengths on page 28, the VC/NVA available manpower is (1/15)(63.0) = 4.2. The FVF strength wou'd similarly be reduced because they were achieving a utilization rate of 7.5 battalion days of operation per battalion during December 1967. The FWF availability would be (7.5/31)(9.9) = 2.4. There would be no reduction in U. S. availability because they were employed at a rate of 31 battalion days of operation per battalion in December 1967. The resulting comparison is:

#### December 1967

Men in Platoon.			Men in Platoons	
US	34.3	NVA	1.8	
fwf	2.4	· VC	2.4	
Total	<del>36.7</del>		4.2	

'The ratio of US/FWF to VC/NVA is 8.7 to 1. Applying the same method to both friendly and enemy forces to determine the number of forces 'available to engage in offensive operations' would give face validity to such comparisons. However, these comparisons would still be virtually pointless because they fail to

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consider many other factors of offensive power.

"d. The exclusion of the ARTH to provide comparisons between the VC/NVA and US/FWF presents an interesting comparison even though such comparison is meaningless in terms of analysis of the countrywide war. In essence, this eliminates the IV Corps Tactical Zone from consideration during the period covered in the analysis because US forces were there in limited numbers (18,232). Neither does it account for the fact that order of battle statistics indicate that 35,900 or 17.9 percent of the VC/NVA force was in the IV CTZ opposing, almost exclusively, ARVN forces.

#### "e. Based on the force ratios:

Total Military Manpower (pg 26)	5.6 to 1
Main Force Maneuver Units (pg 27) Battalions Men in Battalions	1.7 to 1 2.0 to 1
Men in Platoons "available to engage in offensive operations" (recomputed above)	8.7 to 1

It is asserted that US/Free World Forces ground forces are clearly superior to VC/NVA forces. "Superior" meaning greater in quantity or number since quality has in no way been addressed. Manpower committed to offensive operations has not been considered for two reasons. First, the number of VC/NVA "committed" cannot be determined with accuracy and gross estimates would render the resulting force ratio nearly meaningless (despite the fact that estimates as high as 90 percent of the total VC/NVA force would give a ratio favorable to allied forces rather than the narrow superiority for the VC/NVA indicated in the article.) Second, the number of forces committed to offensive operations can be varied for both sides merely by accounting procedures. As noted on page 29, offensive forces are stationed in defensive positions around South Vietnam's cities and, similarly, defensive units participate in or support offensive actions.

"f. The second assumption - relating to war of attrition and shift of some of the military burden to the RVMAF - is not addressed in the article. An oblique conclusion about shifting

some of the burden to the RVNAF may have been intended by statements in the main conclusions on page 26. These are: 'Because the U. S. contributed most of the friendly offensive battalion and platoon manpower, a decrease in its forces would enable the enemy to gain an advantage in offensive manpower. Without any U. S. forces, the GVN/FWF combat forces on offensive operations might have been outnumbered by 2 to 1 by VC/NVA forces in battalion man; cwer.' and 'Since the Tet offensive, additional troop deployments and the reallocation of deployed forces have probably increased the Allies' relative offensive strength. However, projected increases in ARVN combat strength will not significantly add to this advantage. There is no basis in fact for these statements, without extensive qualification, irrespective of the rurpose for which they were made. Conjecture about offensive manpower ratios resulting from a change in one of five related variables without regard to the remaining four has no place in questioning assumptions. A forthright way to address a question is: state the hypothesis related to the question, select an appropriate statistical test, select a confidence level, calculate the critical value of the test statistic and the value of the selected statistic from empirical data, and then accept or reject the hypothesis. The report of the analysis and resulting conclusions need not be written in so simple a manner, but the report should at least reflect that a technically adequate analysis has been completed.

"g. Irrespective of the stated purpose of the article, one apparent purpose is to refute any future requirement for additional U. S. troops. This point is made on page 31 based on the fact that ' ... the ratio of friendly to enemy maneuver battalions had remained relatively constant since mid-1965.' Using this relatively constant ratio as basis for a conclusion that adding more U. S. troops is not the answer to achieving a 'decisive military advantage' (this term is not defined) is not logically consistent with the earlier developed premise that the key factors are men in maneuver battalions, and, more important, offensive rifle platoon manpower. Neither is it consistent with the change in platoon manpower before and after Tet as noted on page 29. 'Following the Tet offensive, the U. S. was able to both add 12 battalions to its force levels, reallocate 4 battalions to offensive activities from its reserves and pacification programs ... and increase the combat strength through the addition of a 4th rifle company to its standard battalion (ARCOV Program). Likewise, ARVM, without increasing its force size, has been able to shift 21 battalions to offensive operations.' This was accompanied by a total military force increase of 43,200 U. S., 96,500 RVNAF, and 600 3rd Nation which resulted in the following changes:

	Before Tet	After Tet	Percent Change
Allied Battalion Manpower Advantage 1/	1.3 to 1	1.6 to 1	+23
Allied Platoon Man- power Advantage 1/2/	.7 to 1	1.3 to 1	+86
US Maneuver Battalions Combat Operations 1/	81	97	+20
GVN/FWP Maneuver Battalions (Combat Operations) 1/	75	96	+28
Military Forces (Thousands) 3/ US RVNAF 3rd Nation. Total	1201.8	537.5 537.5 743.4 61.2 1342.1	+ 9 + 9 +15 + 1 +12

Source: Southeast Asia Analysis Report, June 1968, pg 29.
 Enemy advantage of 1.4 to 1 converted to allied advantage of .7 to 1.

From these figures it is noted that a 7 percent increase in allied military personnel, achieved by increasing only U. S. personnel and other forces held constant, would result in a twofold increase in the percent change in allied advantage in both battalion and platoon manpower. Assuming that the U. S. increase would be met by a VC/NVA increase to maintain the 1.7 ratio of allied to VC/NVA battalions, there would be approximately a 5 percent increase in the ratio of both battalion and platoon manpower. Neither these force ratio changes nor any facts presented in the article are sufficient basis for decisions regarding increase or decrease of U. S. forces.

"2. Article - 'YC/NVA Medical Materiel and Supplies,' page 10.

<sup>3/</sup> Source: Southeast Asia Statistical Summary, OASD(C), Table 2, 1 August 1768. Before Tet - January 1968, After Tet - May 1968.

#### Comments

- "a. There is no data or analysis in the article to support the statements 'The captured material probably did not affect significantly his medical needs.' and 'It is unlikely that the loss of these caches is the cause of reported enemy shortages of medical supplies.'
- "b. Inclusion of such unfounded statements, apparently the opinion of the author, detracts from the overall value of the article and the 'Analysis Report' by raising the question, 'What is the purpose of the article and the Report?'
  - "3. Article 'Interdiction of Enemy Truck Traffic,' page 63.

#### Comments

- "a. The major conclusion of the article is that 'US airstrikes destroy less than 3% of the total truck traffic in North Vietnam and Laos ... Thus, only about 3% of the total truck movement is destroyed by the US interdiction campaign. Apparently 'destruction of truck movement' is the measure used to evaluate the US interdiction campaign. This does not address the military objective of the air campaign which is to make it as difficult and costly as possible for North Vietnam to continue effective support of the Viet Cong and to cause North Vietnam to cease direction of the Viet Cong insurgency. Interdiction of enemy truck traffic is just one part of the air campaign.
- "b. There is inconsistency in the logic used to arrive at the percent of truck movements destroyed. The analysis is based on a CIA estimate that we sight only 25 percent of the actual truck traffic while noting that an increase in truck sightings probably results from seeing a higher percentage of the traffic due to more sorties, more overt enemy movement, and use of night observation devices. This leads to the obvious questions as to when the CIA estimate was made, what is the current estimate of percent traffic sighted, and whether the change in observation rate was taken into account to arrive at the conclusion stated.
- "c. The impact of truck attrition on the North Vietnamese truck inventory is discounted by stating that the Communist Bloc truck production is so large that it is unlikely the North Vietnamese logistic effort will be constrained by a shortage of trucks and while the number of trucks may have decreased, the decline has been offset by the importation of bigger and better vehicles. If such statements are intended to support a contention that the interdiction of truck traffic has no effect on the North Vietnamese logistic effort, they show a blatant

disregard of factors essential to the analysis of a logistic system. Essential factors include: quantity of goods delivered, transportation time, resources required to maintain equipment and roads, transhipment and other support required, utilization of vehicles, etc.

"d. The data presented in the report indicates that 10,466 trucks have been destroyed from January 1967 through May 1968. This represents about a 100 percent turnover during that period and a substantial reduction in truck inventory. Despite the fact that some modernization has occurred, there is no data presented to indicate the capacity of the logistic system and whether the capacity has remained constant, decreased, or increased."

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
#### VC/NVA EASE AREAS

Surrary. Allied forces have made limited gains in inactivating VC/NVA base areas but evidence shows that, once "neutralized," base areas are generally rated active again the next month. Base areas form a supply network of interdependent bases, with etaging areas in SVN or on the Cambodian border, logistical resupply areas both in SVN and across the border, and areas for transshipment of personnel and supplies generally out-of-country. Enemy activity is lowest in II Corps and I Corps base areas and is highest in IV Corps and on the Cambodian border. Enemy activity in the Cambodian border base areas reached its highest level in fourth quarter of 1969 (data for the first quarter of 1970 is not yet available).

The CICV Base Area Study shows that since the second quarter of 1968, only 11 out of a total of 58 (19%) base areas have been deleted as inactive. Most (7) of these eleven inactivations came in the IV Corps. Over the same period four new base areas have been established which makes a net gain of seven base area deletions (12% of the original 58).

Analysis of the BASFA file shows that on the average a base area will be reactivated the month following its neutralization. Out of 95 neutralizations, 80 lasted for only one month. Eleven lasted for 12 months or longer, indicating permanent abandoment/neutralization of the base area.

Analysis of the CICV Base Area Study shows that the base areas form a supply network of interdependent bases, rather than independent, fortress-like areas. There are three major functions that can be performed by a b. ie area; (1) transshipment and infiltration, (2) logistical resupply, and (3) staging for political and military operations. While all bases perform each of these functions to a limited extent, areas with the major function of staging to be inside SVN (with the exception of some Cambodian base areas), Instical resupply functions (which include training, command and control, storage, and sanctuary) are found both within and outside SVN, and the movement of men and supplies tends to be performed out-of-country. An exception to this pattern occurs in II Corps where there is a band of transphipment base areas running through the center of the CTZ; these areas may serve as mass an analyment points for the movement of men and supplies toward the coastal caging areas. Figure 1 gives a detailed presentation of the 4th quarter 1969 base areas and the functions performed by them.



Enemy activity in base areas is measured in several ways - intelligence reports, anti-aircraft fire incidents, unit sightings, number of installations. Of these, intelligence reports are probably the best indicator of enemy activity. Table 1 presents the levels of enemy activity (as measured by confirmed intelligence reports) in VC/NVA base areas during the 4th quarter of 1969.

It shows that bases in II Corps were the least active and that all bases in I Corps except BA 112 were nearly as inactive. Bases in III Corps and in Laos exhibited moderate activity. But, activity was by and large centered in IV Corps and Cambodia (including base areas on the Cambodian border in III Corps, i.e. 350, 351, 353, 354). Together these two areas accounted for 77% of the 4584 confirmed intelligence reports. BA 353, which is home of the in-country portion of COSVN, and BA 708 (these "together with BA 352 are known as the Fishhook) accounted for one third, (34%) of the confirmed intelligence reports in the 4th quarter of 1969.

Intelligence reports include prisoner interrogations, captured documents, aerial recommaissance photos, ground observations, etc. Intelligence reports can be either "confirmed" or "unconfirmed," a confirmed report consists of two or more mutually reinforcing intelligence reports, i.e. two or more reports indicating activity at the same place and time. Whenever possible data on confirmed intelligence reports only is given in this paper; however because of the system of reporting, data in Table 2 are the total of both confirmed and unconfirmed reports.



#### TABLE 1

#### ENEMY ACTIVITY IN VC/NVA BASE AREAS a/ (Confirmed Intelligence Reports, 4th Qtr 1969)

		Base Area	No. of Reports		Base Area	No. of Reports
Iow Activity	I CTZ	112 128 126 127 124 117 121	133 60 30 23 21 15 0	<u>11 CTZ</u>	226 236 202 229 238 203 228 237 251	41 27 15 2 2 0 0
Moderate Activity	III CTZ	353 302 303 354 359 372 351 350 356 355	547 68 33 29 22 12 11 9	Laos	611 602 609 607 604 614 613	456 28 25 17 16 13
High Activity	IN CLY	470 483 400 490 487 482	365 320 289 152 3 0	Cambodia	708 704 709 706 740 702 701	1027 265 169 149 108 50 24

a/ Source: CICV Base Area Study, 4th Qtr 1969.

Table 2 gives a time series of enemy activity in the Cambodian border base areas. It shows that enemy activity (as measured by confirmed and unconfirmed intelligence reports) was higher in the 4th quarter or 1969 (data for 1st quarter 1970 are not yet available) than in any previous quarter for which data are available. Activity was more than double that for the third quarter and was 26% higher than the 4th quarter of 1968. Nost of this increase was due to base areas 352 and 7085 which were nearly three times as active as they had ever been (they accounted for over 36%).

<sup>2/</sup> During 4th quarter 1969 the area normally covered by BA 352 was included in BA 708-the term "Fishbook" includes BA 352, 353 and 708.



of the Cambodian-border area intelligence reports). BA 740 and BA's 704/709 also showed marked increases. The base areas comprising the Farrot's Beak (BA's 354/706/367) hit their lowest point in activity since the 4th quarter of 1968.

TABLE 2

ENEMY ACTIVITY IN CAMBODIAN BORDER BASE AREAS

(Confirmed and Unconfirmed Intelligence Reports) a/

	1968		1969	•	•	· 🖵
	2nd Qtr	4th Qtr	1st Otr	and Qtr	3rd Qtr	4th Qtr
702/701 740	30	458	365	18	23	178
740	348	197	88	98	99	282
351/350	82	168	61	12	44	55
352/708	160	429	544	351	422	1580
353	292	1252	1040	455	652	850
354/706/367	235 b/	627	1259	997	652	641
709/704	49	276	623	625	302	717
Total	1196	3407	3980	25 <b>5</b> 6 .	2194	4303

a/ CICV VC/NVA Base Area Study; 2nd Qtr 1968, 4th Qtr 1968; 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Qtrs 1969.

b/ Figure is low due to lack of reporting on BA 354.

However, the reliability of intelligence reports as indicators of enemy activity is not high; while BA's 351/350 had the lowest activity of the Cambodian border areas in 4th quarter, BA 351 yielded some of the largest ammunition caches found in the Cambodian operations. A future article will deal in greater detail with the results of the Cambodian operations.

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